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IN THE SWREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
I Plaintiff-Appellant, 1 
ROBERT GRAY, 
TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, INC., 
a Washington corporation; RAY ALLRAD, an 
individual; KATHY PETERSON, an individual; 
GARY PETERSON, an individual, 
Supreme Court Case No. 34666 
Defendants-Respondents. 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
HONORABLE CHERI C. COPSEY 
ERIK F. STIDHAM 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE. LDAHO 
JASON G. MURRAY 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE. IDAHO 
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Date: 1/24/2008 Fo. '1 Judicial District Court -Ada County User: CCLUNDMJ 
Time: 10:14 AM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 5 
Robert Gray 
Date 
12/2/2004 
Case: CV-OC-2004-12362 Current Judge: Cheri C. Copsey 
Robert Gray vs. Tri-way Construction Services Inc, etal. 
vs. Tri-way Construction Services lnc, Ray Allrad, Kathy Peterson, Gary Peterson 
Code User Judge 
NEWC CCCOLEMJ New Case Filed Cheri C. Copsey 
CCCOLEMJ Civil Complaint, More Than $1000, No Prior Cheri C. Copsey 
Appearance 
SMlS CCCOLEMJ Summons Issued Cheri C. Copsey 
SUBC CCMONGKJ Substitution Of Counsel (stidham For Gray) Cheri C. Copsey 
AFSV CCEAUCCL Affidavit Of Service And Summons (3/18105) Cheri C. Copsey 
MOTD CCCARUHA Motion To Dismiss Cheri C. Copsey 
LODG CCCARUHA Lodged Memo In Support Of Motion Cheri C. Copsey 
CCEARLJD Civil Appearance, More Than $1000, No Prior Cheri C. Copsey 
Appearance(p Olsson For Tri-way Co.) 
HRSC CCGROSPS Hearing Scheduled & Scheduiing Order Cheri C. Copsey 
(0511612005) Cheri C. Copsey 
ORDR CCGROSPS Stip And Order Re: Scheduling Cheri C. Copsey 
AFFD CCTAYSSE Affidavit Of Erik Stidham in Support Of M Dsm Cheri C. Copsey 
OPPO CCSTACAK Plaintiffs Opposition Tp Motion To Dismiss Cheri C. Copsey 
RPLY CCBLACJE Def's Reply Memo In Support Of Motn To Dismis Cheri C. Copsey 
NOTC CCBLACJE Plaintiffs Notice Of Lodgment In Support Of Cheri C. Copsey 
CONT CCBLACJE Opposition To Motion To Dismiss Cheri C. Copsey 
AFFD CCBLACJE Affidavit Of Robert Gray Cheri C. Copsey 
HRHD CCGROSPS Hearing Held Cheri C. Copsey 
ORDR CCGROSPS Order Denying Mtn To Dismiss Cheri C. Copsey 
HRSC CCGROSPS Notice Of Telephonic Status (0711512005) Cheri Cheri C. Copsey 
C. Copsey 
NOTS CCEARLJD Notice Of Service Cheri C. Copsey 
ANSW CCCHILER Answer To Cornplnt (p Olsson For Tri-way) Cheri C. Copsey 
STSC CCDWONCP Stipulation For Scheduling And Planning Cheri C. Copsey 
HRVC CCGROSPS Hearing Vacated Cheri C. Copsey 
NOTS CCEARLJD Notice Of Service Cheri C. Copsey 
HRSC CCGROSPS Hearing Scheduled - Pre-trial Conference Cheri C. Copsey 
(0412712006) Cheri C. Copsey 
JTSC CCGROSPS Jury Trial Scheduled - (0510812006) Cheri C. Cheri C. Copsey 
Copsey 
NOTS CCBLACJE Notice Of Service Cheri C. Copsey 
MOTN CCAMESLC Motion For Leave To File First Amended Compl Cheri C. Copsey 
LODG CCAMESLC Lodged Memo in Support Of Motion For Leave Cheri C. Copsey 
NOTC CCWATSCL Notice of Hearing Cheri C. Copsey 
HRSC CCWATSCL Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/21/2006 04:OO Cheri C. Copsey 
PM) Moton for Leave to File 1st Amended 
Complaint 00003 
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Page 2 of 5 Case: CV-OC-2004-12362 Current Judge: Cheri C. Copsey 
Robert Gray vs. Tri-way Construction Services Inc, etal. 
User: CCLUNDMJ 
Robert Gray 
Date 
vs. Tri-way Construction Services Inc, Ray Allrad, Kathy Peterson, Gary Peterson 
Code 
HRVC 
User Judge 
Hearing result for Motion held on 02/22/2006 Cheri C. Copsey 
04:OO PM: Hearing Vacated Moton for Leave to 
File 1st Amended Complaint 
CCBOURPT 
AMCO CCBOURPT Amended Complaint Filed and Demand for Jury Cheri C. Copsey 
Trial 
Acceptance Of Service (02/22/06) Cheri C. Copsey 
Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial Cheri C. Copsey 
and Counterclaim (Murray for Defendant) 
Notice Of Taking Deposition Cheri C. Copsey 
Notice Of Motion & Motion To Strike Purusant To Cheri C. Copsey 
Rules 12(F), 15(A) & 16(B), & MotionTo Dismiss 
Pursuant To Rule 12(B)(6) & 8(A) By Robert 
Gray 
Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Strike Cheri C. Copsey 
Purusant To Rules 12(F), 15(A) & 16(B), & 
Motion To Dismiss Pursuant To Rule 12(8)(6) & 
8(A) By Robert Gray 
Notice of Hearing on Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Cheri C. Copsey 
and Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims (4/20/06 @ 
3:OOPM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/20/2006 03:OO Cheri C. Copsey 
PM) 
Notice of Continued Deposition Duces Tecum of Cheri C. Copsey 
Robert Gray 
Notice of Errata Re: Missing Page in PI. Memo in Cheri C. Copsey 
Support of Motion to Strike and Motion to 
Dismiss 
Lodged Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion Cheri C. Copsey 
to Strike and Motion to Dismiss 
Hearing result for Motion held on 04/20/2006 Cheri C. Copsey 
03:OO PM: Hearing Held 
Order Denying Motion to Strike and Motion to Cheri C. Copsey 
Dismiss 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 05/08/2006 Cheri C. Copsey 
09:OO AM: Hearing Vacated 
Hearing result for Pre-trial Conference held on Cheri C. Copsey 
04/27/2006 04:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Cheri C. C O ~ S ~ Y  
10/19/2006 04:30 PM) 
Order Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial - Cheri C. Copsey 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 10/30/2006 09:00 
AM) 
Motion for Summary Judgment Cheri C. Copsey 
ACCP 
ANSW 
CCDWONCP 
CCSHAPML 
NOTD 
NOTC 
CCWATSCL 
CCWOODCL 
LODG CCWOODCL 
NOTC CCSHAPML 
HRSC 
NOTC 
NOTC 
CCSHAPML 
CCDWONCP 
CCAMESLC 
LODG 
HRHD 
ORDR 
HRVC 
HRVC 
HRSC 
HRSC 
CCEARLJD 
CCGROSPS 
DCANDEML 
CCGROSPS 
CCGROSPS 
CCGROSPS 
CCGROSPS 
CCYRAGMA MOTN 
MEMO CCYRAGMA Memorandum in Support of Def Motion for Cheri C. Fj@@)lr 
Summary Judgment 
AFFD CCYRAGMA Affidavit of Jason G Murray in Support of Def Cheri C. Copsey 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
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Page 3 of 5 Case: CV-OC-2004-12362 Current Judge: Cheri C. Copsey 
Robert Gray vs. Tri-way Construction Sewices Inc, etal. 
Robert Gray vs. Tri-way Construction Sewices Inc, Ray Allrad, Kathy Peterson, Gary Peterson 
Date Code User Judae 
MOTN 
MEMO 
CCYRAGMA 
CCYRAGMA 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Memorandum in Support of Plnt Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of Erik F Stidham in Support of Plnt's 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
AFFD 
AFFD 
CCYRAGMA 
CCYRAGMA 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Affidavit of Robert Gray in Support of Plnt Motion 
for Summary Judgment 
Plaintiffs Answer to Tri-Way Constructions 
Services and Gary Petersons Counterclaim 
Cheri C. Copsey 
ANSW CCWRIGRM Cheri C. Copsey 
NOTC CCMAXWSL Notice of Hearing on Motions for Summary 
Judgment (Sept. 23,2006 @ 3:OOpm) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary 
Judgment 09/25/2006 03:OO PM) 
Notice of hearing on Summary Judgment and 
Scheduling order 
Cheri C. Copsey 
HRSC CCMAXWSL Cheri C. Copsey 
NOTC CCGROSPS Cheri C. Copsey 
NOTC CCEARLJD Notice of Hearing on Motion for Summary 
Judgment (9.25.06@3pm) 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 
Cheri C. Copsey MEMO CCWRIGRM 
AFFD 
AFFD 
MEMO 
CCWRIGRM 
CCWRIGRM 
MCBIEHKJ 
Affidavit of Robert Gray Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Affidavit of Scott E. Randolph 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of Jason G Murphy Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
AFFD 
RPLY 
MCBIEHKJ 
CCWRIGRM Robert Grays Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Motion 
Defendant's Reply Memorandum In Support Of 
Motion For Summary Judgment 
Cheri C. Copsey RPLY CCTEELAL 
NOTS 
HRHD 
CCWRIGRM 
CCGROSPS 
Notice Of Sewice 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment 
held on 09/25/2006 03:OO PM: Hearing Held 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
NOTC 
MlSC 
MEMO 
CCEARLJD 
CCWRIGRM 
CCWRIGRM 
Notice of Change of Address 
Stipulated Briefing Schedule re Statute of Frauds 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey Supplemental Memorandum in Support of 
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 
Mediation Ordered Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
MEDl 
HRSC 
CCGROSPS 
CCGROSPS Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 
09/06/2007 04:30 PM) 
Order Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial - 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 0911 712007 09:OO 
AM) 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on 
10/19/2006 04:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Cheri C. Copsey HRSC CCGROSPS 
Cheri C. Co@@O= HRVC CCGROSPS 
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Page 4 of 5 Case: CV-OC-2004-12362 Current Judge: Cheri C. Copsey 
Robert Gray vs. Tri-way Construction Services Inc, etal. 
Robert Gray vs. Tri-way Construction Services Inc, Ray Allrad, Kathy Peterson, Gary Peterson 
Date Code User Judae 
HRVC CCGROSPS Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 10/30/2006 Cheri C. Copsey 
09:OO AM: Hearing Vacated 
Motion to Continue Briefing Schedule Cheri C. Copsey 
Affidavit of Erik F Stidham Cheri C. Copsey 
Order on Motion to Continue Briefing Schedule Cheri C. Copsey 
re: Statute of Frauds 
MOTN 
AFFD 
ORDR 
MCBIEHKJ 
MCBIEHKJ 
DCANDEML 
MEMO CCTEELAL Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in Support Cheri C. Copsey 
Of Motion For Summary Judgment RE Statute 
Of Frauds 
Reply to Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum re Cheri C. Copsey 
Statute of Fraud 
Stipulation of Counsel Cheri C. Copsey 
RPLY CCWRIGRM 
STlP 
NOHG 
HRSC 
CCBLACJE 
CCWATSCL 
CCWATSCL 
Notice of Telephonic Status Conference Cheri C. Copsey 
Hearing Scheduled (Status by Phone 
04/27/2007 OR30 AM) 
Cheri C. Copsey 
CCGROSPS Hearing result for Status by Phone held on Cheri C. Copsey 
04/27/2007 08:30 AM: Hearing Held 
Stipulation re: Completion of Briefing Cheri C. Copsey 
Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment to Cheri C. Copsey 
Tri Way 
Order Denying in Part and Grating In Part Gray's Cheri C. Copsey 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Notice of Status Conference (7117107 @ 9 am) Cheri C. Copsey 
Hearing Scheduled (Status 07/17/2007 09:OO Cheri C. Copsey 
AM) 
Plaintiffs Motion for Clarification of Order Cheri C. Copsey 
Granting Motion for Summary Judgment to 
Tri-Way 
Notice of Hearing (07/17/07 @ 9:00 AM) Cheri C. Copsey 
Order Resetting Status Conference - Hearing Cheri C. Copsey 
Scheduled (Status 07/20/2007 01:OO PM) 
Hearing result for Status held on 07/2012007 Cheri C. Copsey 
01:OO PM: Hearing Held 
Order Clarifying June 5, 2007 Summary Cheri C. Copsey 
Judgment Order & Correcting the Order 
Stipulation for Dismissal of Counterclaim with Cheri C. Copsey 
Prejudice 
Order Granting Stipulation for Dismissal with Cheri C. Copsey 
Prejudice 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on Cheri C. Copsey 
09/06/2007 04:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 09/17/2007 Cheri C. C@@b06 
09:OO AM: Hearing Vacated 
HRHD 
STlP 
CDIS 
CCNAVATA 
CCGROSPS 
ORDR CCGROSPS 
NOTC 
HRSC 
MCBIEHKJ 
MCBIEHKJ 
MOTN CCDWONCP 
NOTC 
HRSC 
CCDWONCP 
CCGROSPS 
HRHD CCHUNTAM 
ORDR DCANDEML 
STlP CCWRlGRM 
ORDR TCWEATJB 
HRVC TCWEATJB 
HRVC TCWEATJB 
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Page 5 of 5 Case: CV-OC-2004-12362 Current Judge: Cheri C. Copsey 
Robert Gray vs. Tri-way Construction Services Inc, etal. 
Robert Gray vs. Tri-way Construction Services Inc, Ray Allrad, Kathy Peterson, Gary Peterson 
Date Code User Judge 
911 212007 JDMT 
9/26/2007 MOTN 
MEMO 
AFFD 
10/15/2007 APSC 
STlP 
10/2412007 STlP 
TCWEATJB 
DCANDEML 
CCBOYIDR 
CCBOYIDR 
CCBOYIDR 
CCTHIEBJ 
CCTHIEBJ 
CCBLACJE 
Civil Disposition entered for: Allrad, Ray, Cheri C. Copsey 
Defendant; Peterson, Gary, Defendant; Peterson, 
Kathy. Defendant; Tri-way Construction Services 
Inc, Defendant; Gray, Robert, Plaintiff. 
order date: 9110/2007 
Judgment Cheri C. Copsey 
Motion for Attorney Fees Cheri C. Copsey 
Memorandum of Costs and Fees Cheri C. Copsey 
Affidavit in Support of Memorandum of Costs Cheri C. Copsey 
and Fees 
Appealed To The Supreme Court Cheri C. Copsey 
Stipulation To Extend Deadline To Object To Cheri C. Copsey 
Motion For Attorneys Fees 
Stipulation to Extend Deadline to Object to Cheri C. Copsey 
Motion for Atty Fees 
Plaintiffs Objection to Defendants Motion for Cheri C. Copsey 
Fees and Costs 
1 1/8/2007 HRSC CCBLACJE Notice of Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 
Scheduled 11/29/2007 09:30 AM) 
Cheri C. Copsey 
11/29/2007 AFFD CCBLACJE Affidavit of Erik F. Stidham Re: Any Fees Cheri C. Copsey 
Hearing 
AFFD CCBLACJE Affidavit of Debra L. Jenkins Re: Atty Fees Cheri C. Copsey 
Hearing 
HRHD TCWEATJB Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Cheri C. Copsey 
11/29/2007 09:30 AM: Hearing Held 
12/10/2007 REQU CCTHIEBJ Respondents' Request For Additions To Record Cheri C. Copsey 
AFFD CCTHIEBJ Affidavit Of Jason G. Murray In Support Of Cheri C. Copsey 
Request For Additions To Record 
12/21/2007 ORDR TCWEATJB Order Granting Costs and Attorney Fees Cheri C. Copsey 
1/18/2008 AMEN CCTHIEBJ Amended Notice Of Appeal Cheri C. Copsey 
buc ORIGINAL c, + , _ . _ .  , ., . . . .. 
. ,,,',:.  . &"qiys , r ,  ' : . , , I , .  , ~ ,. 1 
Erik F. Stidham, ISB #5483 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1900 
Boise, ID 83702-5958 
Telephone: (208) 389-9000 
Facsimile: (208) 389-9040 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ROBERT GRAY, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
v. 
DEFENDANT TRI-WAY 
CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, INC., a 
Washington Corporation, 
Plaintiff, Robert Gray ("Plaintiff Gray"), by and through his attorneys, Stoel Rives LLP, 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY 
TRIAL 
alleges as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND PARTIES 
1. At all times relevant hereto, Robert Gray was a resident of the State of Idaho, 
County of Ada. 
2. Defendant, Defendant Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc., ("Defendant Tri- 
Way") is, and was at all times mentioned herein, a corporation organized and existing under the 
laws of the State of Washington, with its principal place of business in Vancouver, Washington. 
Nl 
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
3. This Court has jurisdiction as the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional 
minimum of this Court. 
4. Venue is properly conferred on this Court as the actions which make up the 
subject matter of this lawsuit took part in Ada County, Idaho. 
5. On information and belief, Defendant Tri-Way has transacted business within this 
state as defined by LC. $ 5-514 and is therefore subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. 
6. Defendant Tri-Way purposefblly availed itself to this Court's jurisdiction by 
initiating contact with Idaho resident Plaintiff Gray regarding employment. Defendant Tri- 
Way's recruiting efforts and negotiating efforts were directed at Plaintiff Gray while he resided 
in Idaho. Among other contacts, Defendant Tri-Way directed contacts to Plaintiff Gray via 
email, fax and telephone while Plaintiff Gray was a resident of Idaho. Defendant Tri-Way 
conducted it business with Plaintiff Gray and within the State of Idaho for the purpose of 
realizing pecuniary benefit and for the purpose of realizing, transacting, andlor enhancing 
Defendant Tri-Way's business purposes and objectives. At all times relevant, Defendant Tri- 
Way knew that it was negotiating and contracting with an Idaho resident. Moreover, Defendant 
Tri-Way initiated contact with Plaintiff Gray for the purpose of obtaining certain construction 
contracts with Albertsons, Inc., a corporation with its principal place of business in Boise, Idaho 
("Alhertsons Projects"). 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
7 .  At all times mentioned herein Defendant Tri-Way was in the construction 
business, managing and serving as general contractor for commercial construction projects. 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - Page 2 
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8. In April, 2004, Plaintiff Gray and Defendant Tri-Way entered into negotiations 
for the purpose of creating a contract of employment between said parties and for the purpose of 
establishing an office in Phoenix, Arizona, and securing certain Albertsons Projects for Tri-Way. 
9. Pursuant to the terms of this agreement, Defendant was to employ Plaintiff as 
General Manager at Defendant Tri-Way, responsible for overseeing certain Defendant Tri-Way 
construction projects. Defendant was to provide certain company resources, including but not 
limited to, company employees, so that Plaintiff Gray could increase the net profits which he was 
to share. 
10. Defendant was to compensate Plaintiff Gray at an escalating base salary as well as 
at an annual amount equal to 50% of the net profit realized by the Defendant's efforts. In 
addition, the contract provided that Plaintiff would be entitled to purchase an ownership interest 
in Defendant Tri-Way at a set share price agreed to by the parties. 
1 I. Relying upon this representation and their mutual agreement, Plaintiff resigned 
his position at Albertsons, Inc., his former place of employment in Boise, Idaho to take 
employment with Tri-Way. Under the terms of the agreement, Plaintiff Gray secured two 
Albertsons Projects for Defendant Tri-Way, managed those projects successfully, and passed the 
contractor licensing exam in Arizona, all for the benefit of Defendant Tri-Way. Without the 
efforts of Plaintiff Gray, Defendant Tri-Way would not have secured the Albertsons Projects. 
12. On or about June 1,2004, Plaintiff moved to Arizona and began working for 
Defendant according to the terms of the contract. Plaintiff Gray fulfilled all of his obligations 
pursuant to the agreement between the parties. 
13. Defendant Tri-Way failed to satisfy its obligations under the agreement. On or 
about September 1,2004, Defendant Tri-Way began attempting to renegotiate certain portions of 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR WRY TRIAL -Page 3 
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its agreement with Plaintiff Gray. The new terms proposed by Defendant were substantially 
different than the existing terms originally agreed upon by the parties. The new terms proposed 
by Defendant adversely affected Plaintiff Gray, by and among other things, decreasing Plaintiff 
Gray's wages and increasing the cost of Plaintiff Gray purchasing an ownership interest in 
Defendant Tri-Way. 
14. Plaintiff Gray refused to accept the proposed modification to the agreement. On 
or about October 22,2004, Defendant sent Plaintiff an email informing him that his employment 
was terminated. Defendant Tri-Way failed to pay Plaintiff Gray in accordance with the 
agreement and failed to allow Plaintiff Gray to purchase an ownership interest in Tri-Way at the 
agreed upon price. 
15. As a d~rect and proximate result of the wrongful acts and omissions of Defendant 
Tri-Way, Plaintiff has suffered significant economic damages, in excess of the jurisdictional 
limit. 
16. At the time Defendant entered into the employment contract with Plaintiff 
Defendant knew or should have known that the representations Defendant made concerning the 
terms and conditions of said agreement were false. During negotiations, including but not 
limited to discussions taking place in March 2004, on or about April 17,2004 and on or about 
June 9,2004, Defendant Tri-Way, through Ray Allrad, Kathy Peterson and Gary Peterson, 
represented that Plaintiff Gray would receive 50% of certain profits and would be allowed to 
purchase ownership in Tri-Way at a set price. Defendant Tri-Way made these representations 
knowing that these representations were false. Defendant Tri-Way made these representations 
for the purpose of inducing Plaintiff Gray to secure the Albertsons Projects for Tri-Way and to 
cause Plaintiff Gray to enter an employment contract with Tri-Way. 
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17. Defendant knowingly concealed facts from Plaintiff regarding the terms and 
conditions of the parties' employment agreement and Defendant's plan to withdraw or modify 
the terms of said agreement after Plaintiff Gray secured the Albertsons Projects and after 
Plaintiff Gray took the position with Tri-Way in Phoenix, Arizona. Defendant Tri-Way never 
intended to compensate Plaintiff Gray as promised. Defendant Tri-Way concealed this plan from 
Plaintiff Gray until October 2004. 
18. At all times mentioned herein Defendant intended that Plaintiff rely upon 
Defendant's representations and concealment of facts in order to induce Plaintiff Gray to secure 
the Albertsons Projects for Tri-Way and to induce Plaintiff Gray to work for Defendant. 
19. Plaintiff relied, to his detriment, on the false representations made by Defendant 
Tri-Way and was induced to act by Tri-Way's concealment of facts. Plaintiff Gray's detriment 
includes, but is not limited to, quitting his existing employment, taking employment with Tri- 
Way, and disrupting his residence and family in Boise, Idaho so that he could perform General 
Manager services for Tri-Way in Phoenix, Arizona. 
COUNT I 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
20. Plaintiff hereby incorporates and realleges each and every preceding paragraph 
and incorporates the same by reference herein. 
21. The terms of the employment agreement entered into by the parties, called for 
Plaintiff to perform the duties of General Manager for Defendant Tri-Way and, in consideration 
thereof, Defendant was to compensate Plaintiff according to the mutually agreed upon terms of 
said contract. Plaintiff performed all duties owing Defendant under the subject employment 
contract until Defendant breached this agreement. 
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22. Defendant failed to fulfill its obligations under the terms of the contract. 
Defendant's failure includes, but is not limited to, unilateral revocation and/or modification of 
material terms of the contract, including failure to compensate Plaintiff according to the agreed 
upon terms and failure to sell Plaintiff Gray shares of Defendant Tri-Way at the agreed upon 
price. 
23. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's knowing concealment of material 
facts, its intention for Plaintiff to rely upbn Defendant's representations and concealment of facts 
and its failure to perform its obligations pursuant to its contract with Plaintiff, Plaintiff Robert 
Gray has been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
COUNT I1 
STATUTORY CLAIM FOR WAGES 
24. Plaintiff hereby incorporates and realleges each and every preceding paragraph 
and incorporates the same by reference herein. 
25. Defendant Tri-Way has failed and/or refused to pay the amount owed to Plaintiff 
for work pursuant to an agreement. 
26. Plaintiff Gray makes claim for all wages currently due and owing, attorney fees 
and any other damages allowed under Idaho's wage claim statues, Idaho Code 9 45-601, et. seq. 
27. Plaintiff Gray also makes claim for prejudgment interest upon amounts owed 
pursuant to his wage contract under Idaho Code 5 28-22-104. 
COUNT 111 
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL 
28. Plaintiff hereby incorporates and realleges each and every preceding paragraph 
and incorporates the same by reference herein. 
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29. Defendant represented, and Plaintiff reasonably relied upon the parties' past 
performance and representations concerning the terms of their employment agreement. By doing 
so, Plaintiff suffered substantial economic detriment including, but not limited to, the loss of past 
and future income, owing to him pursuant to the terms of the contract. 
30. Defendant foresaw or should have foreseen that Plaintiff would act in reliance 
upon Defendant's past practices and on Defendant's representations and that, as a result of this 
reliance, Plaintiff would suffer substantial economic detriment. 
COUNT 1V 
EOUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
3 1. Plaintiff hereby incorporates and realleges each and every preceding paragraph 
and incorporates the same by reference herein. 
32. Defendant falsely represented to Plaintiff and/or concealed from Plaintiff, 
material facts essential to and part of, the terms of the parties' employment contract. Defendant 
intended that said representations and concealed facts would be relied upon by Plaintiff all to 
Plaintiffs economic detriment. 
33. Plaintiff was without knowledge of Defendant's misrepresentations and 
concealment of material facts and thus, Plaintiffs performance of his employment obligations 
was based upon Defendant's misrepresentations and concealment, all to his own prejudice. As a 
result, Plaintiff was damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
COUNT V 
FRAUD 
34. Plaintiff hereby incorporates and realleges each and every preceding paragraph 
and incorporates the same by reference herein. 
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35. Defendant made representations to and concealed information from Plaintiff 
regarding the terms and conditions of the parties employment agreement. 
36. The representations made by Defendant were false. 
37. The representations made by Defendant were material. 
38. Defendant knew that such representations were false or were ignorant of the truth 
of such representations. 
39. Defendant intended that such representations would be acted upon by Plaintiff. 
40. Plaintiff was ignorant of the falsity of such representations. 
41. Plaintiff relied on the truth of such representations. 
42. Plaintiff had a right to rely on such representations. 
43. As a direct and proximate result of his reliance upon such representations, 
Plaintiff suffered damages. 
COUNT VI 
DAMAGES 
44. Plaintiff hereby incorporates and realleges each and every preceding paragraph 
and incorporates the same by reference herein. 
45. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's conduct complained of herein, 
Plaintiff has suffered the following damages: 
a. Past and fkture loss of income, including income which Robert Gray ordinarily 
would have received in merit and longevity wage increases and which would be 
reasonably expected to be received in his normal career advancement with 
Defendant Tri-Way. 
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b. Past and future suffering of general damages, including but not limited to the 
following: 
i. Severe and irreparable injury to Plaintiff Gray's reputation and good 
standing, both occupationally and with the public generally; and 
ii. Costs associated with Plaintiff Gray taking steps to establish residency in 
Arizona; 
c. Past wages owing pursuant to his employment contract andlor the State of Idaho's 
wage claim statutes; 
d. For treble damages with respect to wages past due under Idaho Code (i 45-615 on 
the basis that the wages have been fully earned by have been withheld willfully, 
arbitrarily and without just cause; 
e. Restitution damages, including but not limited to monies obtained by Tri-Way for 
two Albertsons Projects wrongly obtained due to Tri-Way misrepresentations and 
concealments to Plaintiff Gray; 
f. Past and future losses of income which Robert Gray would ordinarily have 
received; 
g. Any further damages as may be proven; 
h. Interest according to law, including prejudgment interest on all liquidated sums 
allowable pursuant to Idaho Code (i 38-22-104; 
i. Costs and attorneys' fees related to this suit under Idaho Code (i 12-120 and (i 12- 
121 and other applicable statutes; and 
j. Any other and further relief that this Court considers proper. 
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REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES 
As a consequence of the complaints, causes, and claims stated herein, Plaintiff has been 
required to retain the law firm of Stoel Rives LLP, and has incurred and will incur costs and 
reasonable attorneys' fees related thereto, for which Plaintiff is entitled to under Idaho Code $9 
12-120 and 12-1 21,45-615,45-617,38-22-104, et. seq., and other comparable provisions of the 
laws of United States or the State of Idaho. 
DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL IS HEREBY MADE. 
DATED: December 2,2004. 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
Erik F. Stidham \ 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Patricia M. Olsson, ISB No. 3055 
Jason G. Murray, ISB No. 6172 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 
Facsimile (208) 385-5384 
pmo@moffatt.com 
jgm@moffatt.com 
22-072 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ROBERT GRAY, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
Case No. CV OC 0409193D 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, 
INC., a Washington Corporation, 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW the above-named defendant, Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc. 
("Tri-Way"), by and through undersigned counsel, and for an Answer and response to plaintiffs 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial alleges as follows: 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a claim against Tri-Way upon which relief may 
be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Tri-Way denies each and every allegation of plaintiffs Complaint not herein 
expressly and specifically admitted. 
1. 
Tri-Way admits paragraphs 2,7 and 9 of the Complaint. 
11. 
With respect to the allegations set forth at paragraph 3 of the Complaint, Tri-Way 
admits only that the amount to which plaintiff claims he is entitled exceeds the minimum 
jurisdictional limits of this Court. All other allegations or inferences contained in paragraph 3 
are denied. 
111. 
With respect to the allegations set forth at paragraph 6 of the Complaint, Tri-Way 
admits only that some communications between the parties occnrred while plaintiff was in Idaho, 
and defendant knew plaintiff was, at times, living in Idaho. All other allegations or inferences in 
paragraph 6 are denied. 
IV. 
With respect to the allegations set forth at paragraph 12 of the Complaint, Tri- 
Way admits only that on or about June 1,2004, plaintiff moved his residence to Arizona to begin 
working for Tri-Way. All other allegations or inferences contained in paragraph 12 are denied. 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 2 
With respect to the allegations set forth at paragraph 14 of the Complaint, Tri- 
Way admits only that plaintiff refused to negotiate with respect to the terms and conditions of his 
employment with Tri-Way. Defendant denies any remaining allegations or inferences, and 
specifically denies that a final agreement had been reached which defendant then sought to 
modify in any way. Defendant further expressly denies terminating plaintiffs employment, as 
plaintiff resigned from Tri-Way. 
VI. 
With respect to the allegations set forth at paragraph 8 of the Complaint, Tri-Way 
admits only that in or about April, 2004, it was engaged in discussions concerning the 
employment of plaintiff with Tri-Way. All other allegations which may be construed as an 
attempt to limit or otherwise define the scope or purpose of those discussions are hereby denied. 
VII. 
Defendant Tri-Way denies the allegations set forth at paragraphs 1,4-5, 10-1 1, 
13, and 15-45 of the Complaint. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Plaintiff has waived and/or is estopped from asserting the claims set forth in the 
Complaint. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff failed to mitigate the amount of his damages. The damages claimed by 
plaintiff could have been mitigated by due diligence on his part or by one acting under similar 
circumstances. Plaintiffs failure to mitigate is a bar to some or all of his recovery under the 
Complaint. 
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FIFTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims are barred, either in whole or in part, because the actions 
complained of were undertaken in good faith and for lawful, legitimate business reasons.. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
The amounts plaintiff claims are due and owing for lost wages and/or benefits 
must be reduced and offset by any amount that the plaintiff earned or could have earned, with the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, during the period for which lost earnings are sought by plaintiff. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
The actions and damages alleged within plaintiffs Complaint were proximately 
caused, if at all, by plaintiffs own acts or omissions. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
Tri-Way has fully performed each term of the agreement between it and plaintiff, 
and plaintiff has received the full consideration agreed upon, and that his employment with Tri- 
Way was carried out in full and in accordance with the parties' agreement. 
NINTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff breached the employment agreement, if any, which existed between the 
parties. 
TENTH DEFENSE 
That pursuant to Idaho Code, § 6-801, et seq., plaintiff is comparatively 
responsible for the damages alleged in his Complaint. 
ELEVENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff has failed to state with particularity all averments of fraud as required by 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 4 
TWELFTH DEFENSE 
That this Court has no jurisdiction over the defendant for the reason that Tri-Way 
is a non-resident of Idaho and does not have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum such 
that exercising jurisdiction over it would violate its right to Due Process. 
CAVEAT 
Tri-Way, by virtue of pleading a "defense" above, does not admit that said 
defense is an "affirmative defense" within the meaning of applicable law, and does not thereby 
assume a burden of proof not otherwise imposed upon it as a matter of law. In addition, in 
asserting any of the above defenses, Tri-Way does not admit any fault, responsibility, liability or 
damage, but, to the contrary, expressly denies the same. 
WHEREFORE, Tri-Way prays that: 
1. Plaintiff takes nothing by his Complaint, and that the Complaint in this 
action be dismissed, with prejudice; 
2. For its costs; 
3. For its attorney fees; and 
4. For such other and further relief as the Court deems proper. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Tri-Way hereby demands a trial by jury on all issues. 
DATED this 12th day of July, 2005. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS. CHARTERED 
G. Murray - Of the P i m  
Attorneys for defendant u 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 12th day of July, 2005, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY 
TRIAL to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Erik F. Stidham ( 4 , s .  Mail, Postage Prepaid 
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER, P.A. ( ) Hand Delivered 
815 West Washington Street ( ) Overnight Mail 
Boise, Idaho 83702 ( ) Facsimile 
Facsimile (208) 3 19-2601 
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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 6 
......... 
Erik F. Stidham, ISB #5483 " .. P.,.,,~. I .: ,p!.:k. ".? ,".;%+) 
Curtis D. McKenzie, ISB #5591 
GnEENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER PA 
815 W. Washington Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Tel: (208) 3 19-2600 
Fax: (208) 3 19-2601 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ROBERT GRAY, 
Plaintiff, 
'I'RI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, 
INC., a Washington Corporation; RAY 
ALLRAD, an individual; KATHY 
PETERSON, an individual; GARY 
PETERSON, an individual, 
Case No.: CV OC 0409193D 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAlNT AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff, Robert Gray ("Plaintiff Gray"), by and through its attorneys, Greener Banducci 
Shoemaker P.A., alleges as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND PARTIES 
1. At all times relevant hereto, Robert Gray was a resident of the State of Idaho, 
County of Ada. 
7 
-. Defendant Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc., ("Defendant Tri-Way") is, and 
was at all times mentioned herein, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the 
State of Washington, with its principal place of business in Vancouver, Washington. 
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3. Defendant Ray Allrad ("Allrad") is, and was at all times mentioned herein, an 
officer of and shareholder in Tri-Way. On information and belief, Allrad is an individual 
residing in the State of Washington. 
4. Defendant Kathy Peterson is, and was at all times mentioned herein, an officer of 
and shareholder in Tri-Way. On informatioll and belief, Kathy Peterson is an individual residing 
in the State of Washington. 
5. Defendant Gary Peterson is, and was at all times mentioned herein, an officer of 
and shareholder in Tri-Way. On information and belief, Gary Peterson is an individual residing 
in the State of Washington. 
6 .  Defendants Tri-Way, Allrad, Kathy Peterson and Gary Peterson are collectively 
referred to as "Defendants." 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
7. This Court has jurisdiction as the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional 
minimum of this Court. 
8. Venue is properly conferred on this Court as the actions which make up the 
subject matter of this lawsuit took part in Ada County, Idaho. 
9. 011 information and belief, Defendants have transacted business within this state 
as defined by I.C. § 5-514 and is therefore subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. 
10. Defendants purposefully availed themselves to this Court's jurisdiction by 
initiating contact with Idaho resident Plaintiff Gray regarding employment and regarding the sale 
of Defendant Tri-Way. Defendants' recruiting efforts and negotiating efforts were directed at 
Plaintiff Gray while he resided in Idaho. Among other contacts, Defendants directed contacts to 
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Plaintiff Gray via email, fax and telephone while Plaintiff Gray was a resident of Idal~o. 
Defendants conducted business with Plaintiff Gray and within the State of Idaho for the purpose 
of realizing precuniary benefit and for the purpose of realizing, transacting, andlor enhancing 
their business purposes and objectives and personal gain. At all times relevant, Defendants knew 
that they were negotiating and contracting with an Idaho resident. Moreover, Defendants 
initiated contact with Plaintiff Gray for the purpose of obtaining certain construction contracts 
with Albertsons, Inc., a corporation with its principal place of business in Boise, Idaho 
("Albertsons Projects"). 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
11. At all times mentioned herein Defendant Tri-Way was in the construction 
business, managing and serving as general contractor for commercial construction projects. 
12. At all times mentioned herein, Defendant Allrad was an officer and shareholder in 
Tri-Way. 
13. At all times herein, Defendant Kathy Peterson was an officer and shareholder in 
Defendant Tri-Way. 
14. At all times herein, Defendant Gary Peterson was an officer and shareholder in 
Defendant Tri-Way. 
15. In April, 2004, Plaintiff Gray and Defendants entered into negotiations for the 
purpose of creating a contract of employment between said parties and for the purpose of 
establishing an office in Phoenix, Arizona, and securing certain Albertsons Projects for Tri-Way 
and to sell an interest in Tri-Way. 
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16. Pursuant to the terms of this agreement, Defendant Tri-Way was to employ 
Plaintiff as General Manager, responsible for overseeing certain construction projects. 
Defendants were to provide certain company resources, including but not limited to, company 
employees, so that Plaintiff Gray could increase the net profits which he was to share. 
17. Defendant Tri-Way was to compensate Plaintiff Gray at an escalating base salary 
as well as at an annual amount equal to 50% of the net profit realized. In addition, the agreement 
provided that Plaintiff would be entitled to purchase an ownership interest in Defendant Tri-Way 
at a set share price previously agreed to by the parties. Defendants assured Plaintiff Gray that an 
agreement was in place and that they would agree to have the term memorialized in a written 
agreement after he was in Arizona. 
18. Defendants Peterson represented to Plaintiff Gray that he would be paid 50% of 
the net profit realized. Defendants made these representations with the intent that Plaintiff Gray 
would rely on the representations. At the time the representations were made, Defendants knew 
the representations were untrue. Defendants never intended to act in accordance with these 
representations. 
19. Relying upon Defendants' representations and their representation of a mutual 
agreement, Plaintiff resigned his position at Albertsons, Inc., his former place of employment in 
Boise, Idaho to take employment with Tri-Way. In reliance on Defendants' promises and/or 
under the terms of the agreement, Plaintiff Gray secured two Albertsons Projects for Defendant 
Tri-Way, managed those projects successfully, and passed the contractor licensing exam in 
Arizona, all for the benefit of Defendants. Without the efforts of Plaintiff Gray, Defendant Tri. 
Way would not have secured the Alhertso~ls Projects and Defendants would not have realized the 
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financial benefits. Defendants profited from Plaintiff Gray's work on the Albertsons Projects 
and from his work in Arizona. 
20. On or about June 1,2004, Plaintiff moved to Arizona and began working for 
Defendant Tri-Way according to the terms of the agreement and pursuant to Defendants' 
promises. Plaintiff Gray fulfilled all of his obligations pursuant to the agreement between the 
parties. Plaintiff Gray relied on the promises made by Defendants when he took actions to his 
detriment. 
21. Defendants failed to satisfy their obligations under the agreement. Defendants 
failed to live up to the representations made to Plaintiff Gray. 011 or about September 1, 2004, 
Defendants began attempting to change certain portions of its agreement with Plaintiff Gray. 
The new tenns proposed by Defendants were substantially different than the existing terms 
originally agreed upon by the parties. The new terms proposed by Defendants adversely affected 
Plaintiff Gray, by and among other things, decreasing Plaintiff Gray's wages and increasing the 
cost of Plaintiff Gray purchasing an ownership interest in Defendant Tri-Way. Defendants 
intended that these new terms were less advantageous to Plaintiff Gray and would damage 
Plaintiff Gray. Defendants took these wrongful actions knowing that Plaintiff Gray had acted in 
reliance on their previous representations. 
22. Plaintiff Gray refused to allow Defendants to make the proposed modifications to 
the agreement. On or about October 22, 2004, Defendants sent Plaintiff an e-mail informing him 
that his employment was terminated. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff in accordance with the 
agreement and failed to allow Plaintiff Gray to purchase an ownership interest in Tri-Way at the 
agreed upon price. 
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23. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful acts and omissions of 
Defendants, Plaintiff has suffered significant economic damages, in excess of the jurisdictional 
limit. 
24. At the time Defendants entered into the employment contract and agreement to 
purchase an interest in Tri-Way with Plaintiff, Defendants knew or should have known that the 
representations they made concerning the tenns and conditions of said agreements were false. 
During discussions, including but not limited to discussions taking place in March 2004, on or 
about April 17,2004 and on or about June 9,2004 and in subsequent phone conversations, 
Defendant Tri-Way, through Ray Allrad, Kathy Peterson and Gary Peterson, represented that 
Plaintiff Gray would receive 50% of certain profits and would be allowed to purchase ownership 
in Tri-Way at a set price. Defendants made these representations knowing that these 
representations were false. Defendants made these representations for the purpose of inducing 
Plaintiff Gray to secure the Albertsons Projects for Tri-Way and to cause Plaintiff Gray to enter 
an employment contract with Tri-Way. Defendants profited from the Albertsons Projects 
secured by Plaintiff Gray. 
25. Defendants knowingly concealed facts from Plaintiff regarding the terms and 
conditions of the parties' employment agreement and Defendants' plan to withdraw or modify 
the tenns of said agreement after Plaintiff Gray secured the Albertsons Projects and after 
Plaintiff Gray took the position with Tri-Way in Phoenix, Arizona. Defendants never intended to 
compensate Plaintiff Gray as promised. Defendants never intended to sell Plaintiff Gray an 
interest in Tri-Way according to the tenns discussed. Defendants concealed this plan from 
Plaintiff Gray until October 2004. 
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26. At all times mentioned herein Defendants intended that Plaintiff rely upon 
Defendants' representations and concealment of facts in order to induce Plaintiff Gray to secure 
the Alberlsons Projects for Tri-Way and to induce Plaintiff Gray to work for the benefit of 
Defendants. 
27. Plaintiff relied, to his detriment, on the false representations made by Defendants 
and was induced to act by Defendants' concealment of facts. Plaintiff Gray's detriment includes, 
but is not limited to, quitting his existing employment, taking employment with Tri-Way, and 
disrupting his residence and family in Boise, Idaho so that he could perform Gelleral Manager 
services for Defendants in Phoenix, Arizona 
COUNT I 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
(All Defendants) 
28. Plaintiff hereby incorporates and realleges each and every preceding paragraph 
and incorporates the same by reference herein. 
29. The terms of the einployment agreement entered into by the parties, called for 
Plaintiff to perform the duties of General Manager for Defendant Tri-Way and, in consideration 
thereof, Defendants were to compensate Plaintiff according to the mutually agreed upon terms of 
said contract and to allow Plaintiff Gray to purchase an interest in Tri-Way according to certain 
terms. Plaintiff perfonned all duties owing Defendants under the subject employment contract 
until Defendants breached this agreement. 
30. Defendants failed to fulfill its obligations under the terms of the contract. 
Defendants' failure includes, but is not limited to, unilateral revocation andlor modification of 
material terms of the contract, including failure to compensate Plaintiff according to the agreed 
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upon terms and failure to sell Plaintiff Gray shares of Defendant Tri-Way at the agreed upon 
price. 
3 1. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' knowing concealment of material 
facts, its intention for Plaintiff to rely on Defendants' representations and concealment of facts 
and its failure to perform its obligations pursuant to its contract with Plaintiff, Plaintiff Robert 
Gray has been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
COUNT I1 
QUASI-CONTRACTIIMPLIED IN-FACT CONTRACT 
(All Defendants) 
32. Plaintiff hereby incorporates and realleges each and every preceding paragraph 
and incorporates the same by reference herein. 
33. Plaintiff Gray conferred a benefit on Defendants. 
34. Defendants appreciated the benefit given by Plaintiff Gray. 
35. Defendants accepted the benefit under circumstances that would make it 
inequitable for Defendants to retain such benefits without payment to Plaintiff Gray of the value 
thereof. 
36. The terms and existence of the contract were manifested by the conduct of the 
Defendants and Plaintiff Gray and the request by Defendants and performed by Plaintiff Gray 
can be inferred by their actions 
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COUNT 111 
STATUTORY CLAIM FOR WAGES 
(Defendant Tri-Way) 
37. Plaintiff hereby incorporates and realleges each and every preceding paragraph 
and incorporates the same by reference herein. 
38. Defendant Tri-Way has failed andlor refused to pay the amount owed to Plaintiff 
for his work pursuant to an agreement. 
39. Plaintiff Gray makes claim for all wages currently due and owing, attorney fees 
and any other damages allowed under Idaho's wage claim statues, ldaho Code 5 45-601, el. seq. 
and other applicable statutes and, in the alternative, the laws o f  the States o f  Washington and 
Arizona. 
40. Plaintiff Gray also makes claim for prejudgment interest upon amounts owed 
pursuant to his wage contact under ldaho Code 5 28-22-104 and other applicable statutes. 
COUNT IV 
PROMISORRY ESTOPPEL 
(All Defendants) 
41. Plaintiff hereby incorporates and realleges each and every preceding paragraph 
and incorporates the same by reference herein. 
42. Defendants represented, and Plaintiff reasonably relied upon the parties' past 
performance and representations concerning the terms o f  their e~nploynent agreement. B y  doing 
so, Plaintiff suffered substantial economic detriment including, but not limited to, the loss o f  past 
and future income, owing to him pursuant to the tenns of the contract and the right to purchase 
an interest in Tri-Way, 
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43. Defendants foresaw or should have foreseen that Plaintiff would act in reliance 
upon Defendants' past practices and on Defendants' representations and that, as a result of this 
reliance, Plaintiff would suffer substantial economic detriment. 
44. Plaintiff Gray has been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial 
COUNT V 
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
(All Defendants) 
45. Plaintiff hereby i~~corporates and realleges each and every preceding paragraph 
and incorporates the same by reference herein. 
46. Defendants falsely represented to Plaintiff and/or concealed from Plaintiff, 
material facts essential to and part of, the terms of the parties' employment contract. Defendants 
intended that said representations and concealed facts would be relied upon by Plaintiff all to 
Plaintiffs economic detriment. 
47. Plaintiff was without knowledge of Defendants' misrepresentations and 
concealment of material facts and thus, Plaintiffs perfonnance of his employment obligations 
was based upon Defendants' misrepresentations and concealme~~t, all to his own prejudice. As a 
result, Plaintiff was damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
COUNT V I  
FRAUD 
(A11 Defendants) 
48. Plaintiff hereby i~lcorporates and realleges each and every preceding paragraph 
and incorporates the same by reference herein 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - Page 10 
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49. Defendants made representations to and concealed information fiom Plaintiff 
regarding the terms and conditions of the parties' employment agreement. 
50. Thc representations made by Defendants were false. 
51. The representations made by Defendants were material. 
52. Defendants knew that such representations were false or were ignorant of the truth 
of such representations. 
53. Defendants intended that such representations would be acted upon by Plaintiff 
54. Plaintiff was ignorant of the falsity of such representations 
55. Plaintiff relied on the truth of such representations. 
56. Plaintiffhad a right to rely on such representations, 
57. As a direct and proximate result of his reliance upon such representations, 
Plaintiff suffered damages and Defendants wrongly benefited in an amount to be proven at trial 
COUNT VII 
CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD 
(All Defendants) 
58. Plaintiff hereby incorporates and realleges each and every preceding paragraph 
and incorporates the same by reference herein. 
59. Defendants and Plaintiff Gray were in a relationship of trust and confidence. 
60. Owing to their relationship of trust and confidence, Defendants owed Plaintiff 
Gray, including but not limited to, a duty not to conceal or misrepresent material facts. 
61. Plaintiff Gray was damaged and Defendants benefited in amounts to be proven at 
trial, 
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62. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants wrongful actions, Plaintiff suffered 
damages and Defendants wrongly benefited in an amount to be proven at trial 
COUNT VIII 
OUASI-ESTOPPEL 
(All Defendants) 
63. Plaintiff hereby iilcorporates and realleges each and every preceding paragraph 
and incorporates the same by reference herein. 
64. Defendants have gained advantage for themselves. 
65. Defendants have produced a disadvantage to Plaintiff Gray. 
66. Defendants have induced Plaintiff Gray to change his position 
67. It would be unconscionable to allow Defendants to maintain a position which is 
inconsistent with the position taken when Defendants induced and accepted the benefit 
DAMAGES 
(All Defendants) 
68. Plaintiff hereby incorporates and realleges each and every preceding paragraph 
and incorporates the same by reference hcrein. 
69. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct coinplaint of herein, 
Plaiiitiff has suffered the following damages: 
a. Past and future loss of income, including income which Robert Gray ordinarily 
would have received in merit and longevity wage increases or which would be 
reasonably expected to be received in his nonnal career advancement with 
Defendant Tri-Way. 
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b. Past and future suffering o f  general damages, including but not limited to the 
following: 
i .  Severe and irreparable injury to Plaintiff Gray's reputation and good 
standing, booth occupationally and with the public generally; and 
ii. Costs associated with Plaintiff Gray taking steps to establish residency in 
Arizona; 
c. Past wages owing pursuant to his employment contract andlor the State o f  Idaho's 
wage claim statutes; 
d .  For treble damages with respect to wages past due under Idaho Code 5 45-61 5 on 
the basis that the wages have been fully earned by have been withheld willfully, 
arbitrarily and without just cause; 
e. Restitution damages, including but not limited to monies obtained by Tri-Way for 
two Albertsons Projects wrongly obtained due to Tri-Way misreprese~itations and 
conceallnents to Plaintiff Gray; 
f. Past and future losses o f  income which Robert Gray would ordinarily have 
received; 
g. Any future damages as may be proven; 
h. Interest according to law, including prejudgment interest on all liquidated sums 
allowable pursuant to Idaho Code 5 38-22-104; 
i. Costs and attorneys' fees related to this suit under Idaho Code 5 12-120 and 5 12- 
121 and other applicable statutes; and 
j .  Any other and future relief that this Court considers proper. 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - Page 13 
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REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES 
(All Defendants) 
As a consequence of the complaints, causes, and claims stated herein, Plaintiff has been 
required to retain the law firm of Greener Banducci Shoemaker P.A., and has incurred and will 
incur costs and reasonable attorneys' fees related thereto, for which Plaintiff is entitled to under 
Idaho Code §$ 12-120 and 12-121,45-615,45-617,38-22-104, et. seq., and other comparable 
provisions of the laws of United States or the State of Idaho. 
DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL IS HEREBY MADE. 
DATED: February 2 , 2 0 0 6 .  
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A. 
Erik F. Stidham 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be served the foregoing First Amended Complaint 
Against Ray Alirad, Kathy Peterson and Gary Peterson on the following named person(s) on 
the date indicated below. in the manner indicated below: 
Jason G. Murray, Esq. [ f j  U.S. Mail 
MOFFATT HOMAS BARRETT ROCK [ ] Facsimile 
&FIELDS, CHTD. [y] Hand Delivery 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, loth Floor [ ] Overnight Delivery 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0829 
-P DATED this Jb day of February, 2006. 
- 
Erik F. Stidham 
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Patricia M. Olsson, ISB No. 3055 
Jason G. Murray, ISB No. 6172 
MOPFATT, HOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FI~LDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 1OthFloor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise. Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 
Facsimile (208) 385-5384 
pmo@moffatt.com 
jgm@moffatt.com 
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Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ROBERT GRAY, 
Plaintiff I 
Counter-defendant, 
VS. 
TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, 
INC., a Washington Corporation, RAY 
ALLRAD [sic], an individual; KATHY 
PETERSON, an individual, GARY 
PETERSON, an individual, 
Defendant I 
Counterclaimants. 
Case No. CV OC 04091 93D 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TIUAL, AND 
COUNTERCLAIM 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 
FOR JURY TRIAL, AND COUNTERCLAIM - 1 
I. ANSWER 
COMES NOW the above-named defendants, Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc. 
("Tri-Way"), Ray Allard, Kathy Peterson and Gary Peterson (collectively "defendants"), by and 
through undersigned counsel, and for an Answer and response to plaintiffs First Amended 
Complaint and Dcmand for Jury Trial ("Amended Complaint") allege as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint fails to state a claim against defendants upon 
which relief may be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Defendants deny each and every allegation of plaintiffs Amended Complaint not 
herein expressly and specifically admitted. 
I. 
Defendants admit paragraphs 2 though 5, 11 through 14 and 16 of the Amended 
Complaint. 
11. 
With respect to the allegations set forth at paragraph 7 of the Amended 
Complaint, defendants admit only that the amount to which plaintiff claims he is entitled exceeds 
the minimum jurisdictional limits of this Court. All other allegations or inferences contained in 
paragraph 7 are denied. 
111. 
With respect to the allegations set forth at paragraph 10 of the Amended 
Complaint, defendants admit only that some communications between the parties occurred while 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 
FOR JURY TRIAL, AND COUNTERCLAIM - 2 
plaintiff was in Idaho, and defendants knew plaintiff was, at times, living in Idaho. All other 
allegations or inferences in paragraph 10 are denied. 
IV. 
With respect to the allegations set forth at paragraph 20 of the Amended 
Complaint, defendants admit only that on or about June 1,2004, plaintiff moved his residence to 
Arizona to begin working for defendant Tri-Way. All other allegations or inferences contained 
in paragraph 20 are denied. 
v .  
With respect to the allegations set forth at paragraph 22 of the Amended 
Complaint, defendants admit only that plaintiff refused to negotiate with respect to the terms and 
conditions of his employment with defendant Tri-Way. Defendants deny any remaining 
allegations or inferences, and specifically deny that a final agreement had been reached which 
defendants then sought to modify in any way. Defendants further expressly deny terminating 
plaintiffs employment, as plaintiff resigned from defendant Tri-Way on October 21,2004, 
which resignation was to become effective on October 22,2004. 
VI. 
With respect to the allegations set forth at paragraph 15 of the Amended 
Complaint, defendants admit only that in or about April, 2004, defendant Tri-Way was engaged 
in discussions concerning the employment of plaintiff. All other allegations which may be 
construed as an attempt to limit or otherwise define the scope or purpose of those discussions are 
hereby denied. 
VII. 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 
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Paragraph 6 of the Amended Complaint merely sets forth a definition of the 
parties to which no responsive pleading is required. 
VIII. 
Defendants deny the allegations set forth at paragraphs 1,8-9, 17-19,21, and 23- 
69 of the Amended Complaint. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Plaintiff has waived and/or is estopped from asserting the claims set forth in the 
Amended Complaint. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff failed to mitigate the amount of his damages. The damages claimed by 
plaintiff could have been mitigated by due diligence on his pad or by one acting under similar 
circumstances. Plaintiffs failure to mitigate is a bar to some or all of his recovery under the 
Amended Complaint. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims are barred, either in whole or in part, because the actions 
complained of were undertaken in good faith and for lawful, legitimate business reasons.. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
The amounts plaintiff claims are due and owing for lost wages and/or benefits 
must be reduced and offset by any amount that the plaintiff earned or could have earned, with the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, during the period for which lost earnings are sought by plaintiff. 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 
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SEVENTH DEFENSE 
The actions and damages alleged within plaintiffs Amended Complaint were 
proximately caused, if at all, by plaintiffs own acts or omissions. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
Defendants have fully performed each term of the agreement between them and 
plaintiff, and plaintiff has received the full consideration agreed upon, and that his employment 
with Tri-Way was carried out in full and in accordance with the parties' agreement. 
NINTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff breached the employment agreement, if any, which existed between the 
parties. 
TENTH DEFENSE 
That pursuant to Idaho Code, § 6-801, et seq., plaintiff is comparatively 
responsible for the damages alleged in his Amended Complaint. 
ELEVENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff has failed to state with particularity all averments of fraud as required by 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). 
TWELFTH DEFENSE 
That this Court has no jurisdiction over the defendant for the reason that 
defendants are non-residents of Idaho and do not have sufficient minimum contacts with the 
forum such that exercising jurisdiction over them would violate their right to Due Process. 
THIRTEENTH DEFENSE 
That plaintiffs conduct in inducing defendants to hire him as a district manager 
for defendant Tri-Way at an agreed salary and with agreed benefits is such that it would be 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 
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unconscionable for him to now maintain a position which is inconsistent with the position taken 
by defendants when plaintiff induced and accepted the benefit of that agreement. 
CAVEAT 
Defendants, by virtue of pleading a "defense" above, do not admit that said 
defense is an "affirmative defense" within the meaning of applicable law, and do not thereby 
assume a burden of proof not otherwise imposed upon them as a matter of law. In addition, in 
asserting any of the above defenses, defendants do not admit any fault, responsibility, liability or 
damage, but, to the contrary, expressly deny the same. 
11. COUNTERCLdAIM 
COME NOW the above-named defendantslcounter-claimants Tri-Way 
Construction Services, Inc., and Gary Peterson (collectively "defendantslcounter-claimants"), by 
and through undersigned counsel, and for a cause of action against plaintifficounter-defendant 
Rob Gray alleges as follows: 
1. Defendantslcounter-claimants incorporate by reference into this 
Counterclaim the substance of paragraphs 2,5, 11, 14 and 16 of the First Amended Complaint 
and Demand for Jury Trial. 
2. Although the proposed employment contract submitted by counter- 
defendant to counter-claimant Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc. ("Tri-Way") was rejected, 
Tri-Way nevertheless offered the counter-defendant an enlployment position at a salary of 
$4,000.00 per month with employee medical benefits to begin effective his first day of 
employment, June 1,2004. In addition, Mr. Gray was provided with a company truck to be used 
for company business, and company credit cards to he used likewise. Pursuant to these terms, 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 
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Mr. Gray was to serve as an employee of Tri-Way and act as the manager for the to-be-created 
Phoenix division. 
3. As the division manager for Tri-Way, Rob Gray was to secure all 
necessary state licenses in Arizona, secure suitable office space, hire necessary crews and/or 
subcontractors, obtain work for the company, and to begin selling Tri-Way's services using Tri- 
Way's existing national vendor list. During the period of June 1,2004 through his resignation on 
October 22,2004, counter-defendant failed to provide any of these services for Tri-Way. 
4. Shortly before plaintifflcounter-defendant's resignation Erom Tri-Way, the 
parties' relationship began to deteriorate. At or near this time, counter-claimants believe, and 
based thereon assert, that Mr. Gray began to speak harmfully regarding his employer andlor Gary 
Peterson to third persons and/or other outside entities, which communications harmed counter- 
claimants' business opportunities. 
5 .  Following Mr. Gray's resignation on October 22,2004, he was asked to 
return certain company items which were necessary in order to close out certain job files, 
including job files pertaining to the Tooele and Juanita projects. Mr. Gray failed andlor refused 
to return those project files as requested, thereby requiring Tri-Way to expend a substantial 
amount of time and effort "re-creating" the project files so that the jobs could be closed. 
COUNT ONE 
(Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing) 
6 .  Counter-claimants incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in 
paragraphs 1 through 5 as though fully set forth herein. 
7. As a result of the employment relationship which existed between Mr. 
Gray and Tri-Way, the expressed and implied promises made in connection with that 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 
FOR JURY TRIAL, AND COUNTERCLAIM - 7 
relationship, and the acts, conduct, and communications resulting in these implied promises, 
there arose an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by which counter-defendant 
promised to act in good faith toward and deal fairly with Tri-Way. 
8. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires, among other 
things, that: each party in the relationship must act with good faith toward the other concerning 
all matters related to the employment; each party in the relationship must act with fairness 
toward the other concerning all matters related to the employment; neither party would take any 
action to unfairly prevent the other from obtaining the full benefits of the employment 
relationship; that each party would give the other's interests as much consideration as it would 
give its own interests; and each party would refrain from any act which would prevent or impede 
the other from receiving the full benefit of the employment agreement. 
9. Counter-defendant breached his implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing with regard to Tri-Way by refusing to provide the necessary licenses and by otherwise 
refusing to perform those necessary duties and functions set forth in paragraph 3, supra, and by 
failing to provide Tri-Way with necessary job files following his resignation from Tri-Way. 
10. Counter-defendant's conduct during the course of his employment with 
Tri-Way was wrongful, in bad faith, and unfair, and therefore a violation of his legal duties. 
1 I. Counter-defendant's breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
was a substantial factor in causing damage and injury to Tri-Way. As a direct and proximate 
result of counter-defendant's conduct alleged in this Counterclaim, Tri-Way has suffered and 
continues to suffer substantial losses and other benefits it would have received absent counter- 
defendant's acts in an amount in excess of the minimum jurisdictional limits of this Court, the 
exact amount of which will be proven at trial. 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 
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COUNT TWO 
(Tortious Interference With Prospective Economic Advantage) 
12. Counter-claimants incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in 
paragraphs 1 through 11 of the Counterclaim as though fully set forth herein. 
13. Counter-defendant Rob Gray knew he was employed by, and therefore 
owed certain legal duties to, counter-claimant Tri-Way. 
14. Rob Gray, for personal reasons which were wrongful and for the purposes 
of harming both Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc. and Gary Peterson, provided 
unsubstantiated, inaccurate andlor defamatory information regarding counter-claimants to third 
persons or entities, purposefully and with the intent to bring about harm to Tri-Way's 
prospective business dealings. 
15. As a result of Mr. Gray's wrongful conduct, counterclaimants have been 
injured and damaged in an amount which exceeds the minimum jurisdictional limits of this Court 
which shall be proven at trial. 
COUNT THREE 
(Defamation) 
16. Counter-claimants incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in 
paragraphs 1 through 15 of the Counterclaim as though fully set forth herein. 
17. Counter-defendant has published, orally, in writing or through his actions, 
false statements concerning both Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc., and Gary Peterson. These 
statements have been published, communicated, conveyed and made known by counter- 
defendant to persons other than Mr. Peterson or entities other than Tri-Way and without privilege 
to do so. 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 
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18. The statements communicated and published by counter-defendant 
defamed Gary Peterson and Tri-Way and proximately caused counter-claimants' damages. 
19. The conduct and statements communicated and published by counter- 
defendant defamed Tri-Way and Gary Peterson's character by imputing to them conduct or 
characteristics incompatible with the proper exercise of their lawful business, trade and 
profession. As such, the conduct and statements communicated and published by counter- 
defendant constitutes defamation per se. 
20. Counter-claimants have suffered harm from counter-defendant's 
defamatory actions, including harm to personal and professional reputation and good name in 
their communities, and difficulties in finding subsequent construction projects, all in amounts 
which exceed the minimum jurisdictional limits of this court and in an amount which will be 
proven at trial. 
COUNT FOUR 
(Tortious Interference With Contract) 
2 1. Counter-claimants incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in 
paragraphs 1 through 20 of the Counterclaim as though fully set forth herein. 
22. Upon his separation from Tri-Way, Rob Gray was asked to retum a 
number of job files, including project files pertaining to the Tooele and Juanita projects. Rob 
Gray, for an improper purpose and without any good faith reason for so doing, refused to retum 
those job files. The files wrongfully retained by Mr. Gray contained a number of documents or 
other information which was essential to Tri-Way's ability to perform under certain contracts 
andlor subcontracts. 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 
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23. As a result of Rob Gray's tortious interference with these contracts andlor 
subcontracts, Tri-Way has been injured and damaged in an amount which will be proven at the 
time of trial. 
COUNT FIVE 
(Conversion) 
24. Counter-claimants incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in 
paragraphs 1 through 23 of the Counterclaim as though fully set forth herein. 
25. Plaintifficounter-defendant's conduct in failing and/or refusing to return 
the Tri-Way job files constituted an act of dominion wrongfully asserted over the personal andlor 
business property of counter-claimants, which denied counter-claimants the exercise of their 
rights over such property. 
26. As a result of plaintifffcounter-defendant's conversion of counter- 
claimants' property, counterclaimants have been damaged in an amount which will be proven at 
trial. 
COUNT SIX 
(Quasi-Estoppel) 
27. Counter-claimants incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in 
paragraphs 1 through 26 of the Counterclaim as though fully set forth herein. 
28. Because of his employment relationship with defendantslcounter- 
claimaiits, courrteu-defendant has gained an advantage for himself 
29. Plaintiff/counter-defendant, through his conduct, placed 
defe~~dantslcounter-claimants at a disadvantage. 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 
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30. Plaintifucounter-defendant deceitfully and for an improper purpose 
induced defendantslcounter-claimants to change their position in reliance upon the employment 
relationship to which the parties had agreed. 
3 1. It would be unconscionable to allow plaintifucounter-defendant to 
maintain a position which is inconsistent with the position taken when he induced and accepted 
the employment benefit from defendantslcounter-claimants. 
WHEREFORE, defendantslcounterclaimants pray that: 
1. Plaintiff takes nothing by his First Amended Complaint, and that the First 
Amended Complaint in this action be dismissed, with prejudice; 
2. For damages which counterclaimants have suffered and will continue to 
suffer on account of plaintifflcounter-defendant's wrongful conduct described herein; 
3. For their costs; 
4. For their attorney fees; and 
5. For such other and further relief as the Court deems proper. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Defendantslcounterclaimants hereby demand a trial by jury on all issues. 
DATED this 10th day of March, 2006 
Attorneys for ~efendant  V 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10th day of March, 2006, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY 
TRIAL, AND COUNTERCLAIM to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
i 
Erik F. Stidham (\lfU.~. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER, P.A. ( ) Hand Delivered 
815 West Washington Street (F Mail
Boise, Idaho 83702 ( Facsimile 
Facsimile (208) 3 19-2601 
&\G as . Murray 
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Patricia M. Olsson, ISB No. 3055 
Jason G. Murray, ISB No. 6172 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 
Facsimile (208) 385-5384 
pmo@moffatt.com 
jgrn@moffatt.com 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ROBERT GRAY, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
Case No. CV OC 0409193D 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, 
INC., a Washington Corporation; RAY 
ALLRAD [sic], and individual; KATHY 
PETERSON, an individual; GARY 
PETERSON, an individual, 
Defendants. I 
COME NOW the defendants, Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc, Ray Allard, 
Kathy Peterson, and Gary Peterson, through counsel, and pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
~.J,,(,L \,.- 
of Civil Procedure, move this Court for an order granting summary judgment in their favor 
against plaintiff on all claims asserted in plaintiffs First Amended Complaint. 
This motion is based on the pleadings on file herein, and the Memorandum in 
Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Affidavit of Jason G. Murray, filed 
contemporaneously herewith. 
DATED this 2nd day of August, 2006. 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2nd day of August, 2006, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to 
be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Erik F. Stidham ( 6 , s .  Mail, Postage Prepaid 
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER, P.A. ( ) Hand Delivered 
815 West Washington Street ( ) Overnight Mail 
Boise, Idaho 83702 ( ) Facsimile 
Facsimile (208) 3 19-2601 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 
Erik F. Stidham, ISB #5483 
Scott E. Randolph, ISB #6768 
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER PA
8 15 W. Washington Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Tel: (208) 3 19-2600 
Fax: (208) 3 19-2601 
w I \ l u l t ! n L  NO. 
FllEO 
A . M o , b  
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ROBERT GRAY, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, 
INC., a Washington Corporation; RAY 
ALLARD, an individual; KATHY 
PETERSON, an individual; GARY 
PETERSON. an individual, 
Case No.: CV OC 0409193D 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Assigned Judge: Cheri C. Copsey 
Defendants. i 
AND RELATED COUNTERC1,AIMS. 
COMES NOW, the above named Plaintiff Robert Gray ("Gray"). by and through his 
counsel of record, Greener Banducci Shoemaker P.A., and moves this Court pursuant to Rule 56 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for an order granting summary judgment against 
Defendants Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc. and Gary Peterson on their counterclaims 
against Gray. 
I'I.AIN I IFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - I'age 1 
(hh060-001 n 1714961 
This Motion is supported by pleadings previously filed with the Court, a Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, and Affidavits of Erik Stidham, Robert Gray and 
Mark Sipiora, all filed concurrently herewith. 
Oral A1gument is requested. 
DATED: August$%O6. 
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A. 
- 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Robert Gray 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 2 
(66060-001 # I  71496) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be served the foregoing Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the following named person(s) on the date indicated below, in the manner 
indicated below: 
Jason G. Murray, Esq. U.S.,Mail 
MOFFATT HOMAS BARRETT ROCK Facs~mlle 
&FIELDS, CHTD. ] Hand Delivery 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, 1 oth Floor r[ ] Overnight Delivery 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0829 
r l  
DATED this 3- day of August, 2006 
PLAIN I'IFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 3 
(66060-001 #I714961 
Erik F. Stidham, ISB #5483 
Scott E. Randolph, ISB it6768 
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER PA 
8 15 W. Washington Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Tel: (208) 31 9-2600 
Fax: (208) 3 19-2601 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ROBERT GRAY, I 
Plaintiff, 1 Case No.: CV OC 0409193D 
TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, 
WC., a Wasl~ington Corporation; RAY 
ALLARD, an individual; KATHY 
PETERSON, an individual; GARY 
PETERSON, an individual, 
Defendants. 
AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIM. 
PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER TO TRI-WAY 
CONSTRUCTIONS SERVICES, INC. AND 
GARY PETERSON'S COUNTERCLAIM 
Assigned Judge: Cheri C. Copsey 
COMES NOW Plaintiff Robert Gray ("Gray"), by and through its counsel of record, 
Greener Banducci Shoemaker P.A., and hereby responds to Defendant Tri-Way Construction 
Services, Inc. ("Tri-Way") and Gary Peterson's ("Peterson") (collectively "Counterclaimants") 
Counterclaim as follows: 
1. GENERAL DENIAL 
Gray denies each and evcry allegation contained in Counterclaimants' Counterclaim not 
herein spec~fically and expressly admitted. Gray reserves the right to amend t h ~ s  and any other 
PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER TO TR1-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES. INC. AN11 GARY PETERSON'S 
COUNTERCLAIM -- Page 1 
(66060-001 lr171Y23) 
answer or denial stated herein once it has had an opportunity to complete discovery regarding the 
allegations contained in Counterclaimants' Counterclaim. 
11. COUNTERCLAIM 
1. Gray admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 1 of the Counterclaim. 
2. Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 2 of the Counterclaim. 
3. Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 3 of the Counterclai~n. 
4. Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 4 of the Counterclaim. 
5. Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 5 of the Counterclaim. 
COUNT ONE 
(Breach o f  the Implied Covenant o f  Good Faith and Fair Dealing) 
6 .  As to Paragraph 6 ,  Gray hereby refers to each and every admission and/or denial 
in each and every preceding paragraph and incorporates the same as if fully set forth herein. 
7. Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 7 of the Counterclaim, except 
Gray admits that an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists in each employment 
relationship. 
8. Paragraph 8 of the Counterclaim contains legal conclusion and Gray neither 
admits nor denies said paragraph, 
9. Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 9 of the Counterclaim. 
10. Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 10 of the Counterclaim. 
11. Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 11 of the Counterclaim. 
Ill 
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COUNT TWO 
(Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage) 
12. As to Paragraph 12, Gray hereby refers to each and every admission and/or denial 
in each and every preceding paragraph and incorporates the same as if filly set forth herein. 
13. As to Paragraph 13, Gray admits that he was an employee of Tri-Way. 
14. Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 14 of the Counterclaim. 
15. Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 15 of the Counterclaim. 
COUNT THREE 
(Defamation) 
16. As to Paragraph 16, Gray hereby refers to each and every admission andlor denial 
in each and every preceding paragraph and incorporates the same as if fully set forth herein. 
17. Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 17 of the Counterclaim. 
18. Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 18 of the Counterclaim. 
19. Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 19 of the Counterclaim. 
20. Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 20 of the Couilterclaim 
COUNT FOUR 
(Tortious Interference with Contract) 
2 1. As to Paragraph 21, Gray hereby refers to each and every admission and/or denial 
in each and every preceding paragraph and incorporates the same as if filly set forth herein 
22. Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 22 of the Counterclaim. 
23. Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 23 of the Counterclaim. 
COUNT FIVE 
(Conversion) 
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24. As to Paragraph 24, Gray hereby refers to each and every admission andlor denial 
in each and every preceding paragraph and incorporates the same as if fully set forth herein. 
25. Gray denies thc allegations contained in Paragraph 25 of the Counterclaim. 
26. Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 26 of the Counterclaim. 
COUNT SIX 
(Quasi-Estoppel) 
27. As to Paragraph 27, Gray hereby refers to each and every admission and/or denial 
in each and every preceding paragraph and incorporates the same as if fully set forth herein 
28. Gray denies the allegatio~ls contained in Paragraph 28 of the Counterclaim 
29. Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 29 of the Counterclaim. 
30. Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 30 of the Counterclaim. 
3 1 .  Gray denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 3 1 of the Counterclaim. 
111. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Counterclaimants' Counterclai~n fails to state a claim against Gray upon which relief may 
be granted 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Gray demies each and every allegation of Counterclaimants' Counterclaim not herein 
expressly and specifically denied 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Counterclaimants have waived and/or are estopped from asserting the claims set forth in 
the Counterclaim. 
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FOURTH DEFENSE 
Counterclaimants failed to mitigate the amount of their damages. The damages claimed 
by Counterclaiinants could have been mitigated by due diligence on their part or by any acting 
under similar circuinstances. Counterclaimants' failure to mitigate is a bar to some or all of their 
recovery under the Counterclaim. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
Counterclaimants' claims are barred, either in whole or in part, because the action 
coinplained of were undertaken in good faith and for lawful, legitimate business reasorts. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
The actions and damages alleged in Counterclaimants' Counterclaim were proximately 
caused, if at all, by Counterclaimants' own acts or omissions. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
Gray has fully performed each term of the agreement between the parties, and 
Counterclaimants have received the full consideration ageed upon, and that Gray's employment 
with Tri-Way was carried out in full and in accordance with the parties' agreement. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
Counterclaimants breached the employment agreement which existed between the 
parties. 
NINTH DEFENSE 
That pursuant to Idaho Code 5 6-801, et seq., Counterclaimants are comparatively 
responsible for the damages alleged in their Counterclaims 
Ill 
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TENTH DEFENSE 
Counterclaimants have failed to state with particularity all averments of fraud as required 
by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). 
ELEVENTH DEFENSE 
That Counterclaimants' conduct in inducing Gray to be hired as a district manager for 
Tri-Way at an agreed salary and with agreed benefits is such that it would be unconscio~lable for 
Counterclaimants to now maintain a position which is inconsistent with the position taken by 
Counterclaimants when Counterclaimants induced and accepted the benefit of that agreement, 
TWELFTH DEFENSE 
Counterclaimants' claims are barred by applicable statute of limitations, 
IV. PRAYER 
WHEREFORE, Gray prays: 
1. That Counterclaimants take nothing by their Counterclaims; 
2. For fees and costs; and 
3. For such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper. 
DATED: August 4,2006. 
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A. 
&'ink F. stidhamy 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Robert Gray 
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RE: STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
COME NOW the above-named parties, by and through undersigned counsel, and 
hereby stipulate and agree to the following briefing schedule in response to the Court's request 
for additional briefing on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, which briefing shall be 
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limited to whether Plaintiffs alleged oral agreement is barred by the statute of frauds. To that 
end, the following schedule shall apply to this request for supplemental briefing: 
Defendants' opening brief shall be due on or before Octoher 13,2006; 
Plaintiff's response brief shall be due on or before Octoher 27,2006; and 
. Defendants' reply brief shall be due 011 or before November 3, 2006. 
DATED this l $ a y  of October, 2006. 
Attorneys for defendant 
DATED this day of October, 2006. 
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER. P.A 
Erik F. ~ t i d h i r n C  
Attorfiey for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
............... ... ....................... ............................. ..... ..... ~ ..... ~ ..... ~ ............ ~..... ...... ............... ........ 
OF THE STATE OF LDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ROBERT GRAY, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, 
INC., a Washington Corporation; RAY 
ALLRAD [sic], and individual; KATHY 
PETERSON, an individual; GARY 
PETERSON, an individual, 
Defendants. 
Case-No. CV OC 0409193D 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
RE: STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Following two separate extensions of time relative to the deadlines' set in the 
parties' earlier Stipulated Briefing Schedule Re: Statute of Frauds, plaintiff filed his 
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Ax- ' ,  
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Statute of Frauds 
on or about November 13,2006. In that memorandum, plaintiff provided nearly eight full pages 
of "factual" arguments, most of which are either unsupported by any record evidence, or are 
otherwise "supported" solely by plaintiffs affidavit "testimony." Since over two months have 
now elapsed since oral argument was heard on the parties' motions for summary judgment, 
however, it is worth noting that on September 25 the court established the parameters of the 
supplemental statute of frauds briefing. The supplemental briefing was to address the limited 
question of whether the statute of frauds applies to bar the enforceability of the alleged oral 
agreement argued by plaintiff, the terms of which consisted exclusively of those terms contained 
in the Draft Employment Agreement and the Draft Option to Purchase Corporate Stock as they 
existed on May 21, 2004. 
Despite the clear limitation placed on the supplemental briefing, plaintiff has 
devoted the vast majority of an eight-page "Statement of Facts" to alleged "terms" which he 
describes as having been modified afler the May 21, 2004 meeting. Both the court and counsel 
were abundantly clear at the September 25 bearing that the "terms" of the alleged oral agreement 
were those that existed in the written Draft Employment Agreement which was presented by 
plaintiff to the defendants at the May 21,2004 meeting in Vancouver, Washington. Plaintiffs 
counsel so conceded, and the scope of this supplemental briefing was thus to be limited to those 
"terms." Plaintiffs efforts to address any "changes" discussed at the May 21 meeting or at any 
point thereafter, as well any statements of belief he has made regarding what the parties did or 
did not agree to thereafter (to the extent that such statements differ from the written document as 
it existed on May 21), are entirely inappropriate to this discussion. In fact, any discussion by 
plaintiff concerning modifications, discussions related thereto, or other supposed representations 
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by any party to continuing negotiations after May 21, 2004 are beyond the allowable scope of 
this supplemental briefing. As such the "factual" argument presented by plaintiff, beginning at 
the second bulleted item on page 3 and continuing thereafter through the conclusion of the 
"Statement of Facts," should not be considered by the Court. 
It should be noted further that while the parties have been asked to submit 
supplemental briefing on the limited issue of the statute of frauds, nothing in that analysis alters 
the fact that under Idaho law, in order for there to be a binding contract (oral or otherwise), there 
must be a complete meeting of the minds, and the overwhelming evidence of record 
demonstrates that such is not the case here. Plaintiff has failed to submit any admissible 
evidence that a final agreement had been reached, including any agreement with respect to the 
bonus pay provisions which he claims are not subject to the statute of frauds. Accordingly, the 
court does not need to reach the statute of frauds analysis in order to find that no valid or 
enforceable "contract" exists. Nevertheless, defendant will address plaintiffs statute of frauds 
arguments in turn. 
11. ARGUMENT 
A. The Statute of Frauds Issue Is Properly Before the Court. 
Plaintiff first argues that defendants have somehow waived any defense based 
upon the statute of frauds because they did not specifically raise it in the responsive pleadings. 
See Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum, p. 9. The basis for plaintiffs argument is Rule 8(c); 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and based upon his construction of that Rule, he adamantly 
refuses to "consent to allowing Defendants to raise a new affirmative defense at this point in the 
case." See id., pp. 9-10. Had plaintiff reviewed the annotated cases which follow Rule 8(c), 
however, he would have immediately learned that the defense of the statute of frauds "can be 
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raised for the first time in the summary judgment motion even though the [responsive pleading] 
has been filed." See Bluestone v. Mathewson, 103 Idaho 453,455,649 P.2d 1209,121 1 (1982). 
This issue has come before the Idaho appellate courts several times, and both the Supreme Court 
of Idaho and the Court of Appeals have held in favor of allowing the defense. 
The Court of Appeals provided the basic analytical framework in the matter of 
Good v. Hansen, 110 Idaho 953,719 P.2d 1213 (Ct.App. 1986). There, the party seeking to 
avoid application of the statute of frauds had argued that it could not be considered because the 
opposing party "failed specifically to plead it." Good, 110 Idaho at 955. The Court then noted: 
We acknowledge that a court is not obliged to consider the statute 
if not pleaded. But it does not follow that the court is prohibited 
from considering the statute. A court has the inherent power to 
identify and to apply legal authorities germane to the controversy 
presented. Hansen urges that Paloukos v. Intermountan Chevrolet 
Co., 99 Idaho 740,588 P.2d 939 (1978), restricts this power. 
However, Paloukos is a case where a statute of frauds was not 
considered at all by the district court. The statute was mentioned 
for the first time on appeal during oral argument. Our Supreme 
Court simply observed that the statute had been raised "much too 
late." Id. at 744,588 P.2d at 943. Paloukos does not govern 
where, as here, the district court actually has considered and ruled 
upon the statute. 
Good, 11 0 Idaho at 955 (emphasis in original). 
Several years earlier, the Supreme Court had sin~ilarly upheld the trial court's 
consideration of the statute of frauds, even though it had not been specifically pled. See 
Bluestone, supra. There, the court addressed a line of reasoning that had begun in the federal 
circuit courts of appeal. In summary, the federal courts had increasingly held that a party could 
raise an affirmative defense during summary judgment proceedings only when that motion was 
the "initial pleading" (is., a motion to dismiss which was subsequently treated as a motion for 
summary judgment). The Idaho courts expressly rejected such a limitation, and held as follows: 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM RE: STATUTE OF FRAUDS - 4 
[Elven though it would have been better practice for the appellant 
to have raised the affirmative defense in the reply to the 
counterclaim or to have requested an amendment, we decline to 
follow the federal circuit courts cited. The defendant knew of the 
affirmative defense and was given time to present argument in 
opposition to the defense. This case is unlike Paloukos where the 
affirmative defense was not raised until the appeal to this Court. 
Therefore, in light of I.R.C.P. l(a), which mandates that the rules 
"be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding," we hold that where 
the defense was raised before trial and the defendant was given 
time topresent argument in opposition, the defense of statute of 
frauds can be raised for the first time in the summary judgment 
motion. . . . 
Bluestone, 103 Idaho at 455 (emphasis added). 
Here, as in Bluestone, the statute of frauds issue was raised by the court at the 
summary judgment level. In fact, when the court raised the issue, counsel forplaintiff suggested 
that additional briefing could be submitted to address the applicability of the statute. Defendant 
did not object to this request, but the mere lack of an objection does not amount to "defendants 
rais[ing] a new affirmative defense," despite plaintiffs claim. See Plaintiffs Supplemental 
Memorandum, pp. 9-10. Plaintiff instead clearly "consented" to the issue when his attorney 
asked for an opportunity to submit additional briefing, and his argument that raising the defense 
would be "unfair" is illusory at best. Given these facts, and the clearly controlling case law 
provided above, plaintiffs argument that the statute of frauds defense has been waived is utterly 
without merit. 
B. Plaintiff3 Reliance Upon Gomez v. Mastec Is Misplaced. 
Plaintiff cites Gomez v. Mastec North America Inc., 2006 W L  36902 (D.Idaho 
2006), and argues that even if the Draft Employment Agreement and the Draft Option to 
Purchase Corporate Stock are themselves,subject to the statute of frauds, the "Incentive or Bonus 
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Pay" provision should he separately enforced because that particular term could have been 
performed within one year. Defendants first note that the Gomez case is an unreported opinion. 
As such, that case is uncontrolling and of no precedential or even persuasive authority. 
Furthermore, defendants submit that the very act of citing to such an unpublished opinion is 
inappropriate, and the case should not be considered. 
Even if the Gomez decision warranted further consideration, it seems clear that 
the Idaho appellate courts would have (and arguably have) reached a different conclusion. 
Plaintiff has attempted to distinguish Treasure Valley Gastroenterology Specialists, IZC. V.  
Woods, 135 Idaho 485,20 P.3d 21 (Ct.App. 2001) from the facts of this case. Specifically, he 
argues that the plaintiff in that case was attempting to "enforce a provision which related to a 
number of years," whereas he is "simply bring[ing] a contract claim based upon the agreed upon 
compensation terms as they relate to his employment of less than one year with Tri-Way." See 
Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum, p. 12. A closer reading of the Treasure Valley case 
shows that the plaintiff there was seeking to enforce both a non-competition and a liquidated 
damages provision. There is no indication, however, that the non-competition provision or the 
liquidated damages clause would become enforceable against the defendant only after a specified 
period of time. Instead, they were to apply "after the cessation of her employment with Treasure 
Valley." See Treasure Valley, 135 Idaho at 488. Because there were no other limitations on the 
provisions at issue they could have become enforceable within one year. Nevertheless, the Court 
of Appeals held that the entire contract was unenforceable, and did not selectively carve out any 
exception to the statute of frauds simply because certain terms "could have" been completed in 
less than one year. Instead, the Court of Appeals applied the statute of frauds uniformly vis-a-vis 
the contract as a whole. 
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Section 9-505(1), IDAHO CODF, states only that "[aln agreement that by its terms 
is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof' must be in writing. The statute 
does not read "[aln agreement or anypart thereof," nor is there any controlling case law which 
carves out such an exception. To take such a piecemeal approach to the statute of frauds would 
be incompatible with other holdings of the Idaho Supreme Court. For example, the Idaho 
Supreme Court established over forty years ago that "if anyportion of the proposed terms is 
unsettled and unprovided for, there is no contract." LeaveN & Co. v. Grafe &Associates, Inc., 
90 Idaho 502,512,414 P.2d 873 (1966) (emphasis added). Furthermore, in order to be 
enforceable a contract must contain "all of the terms necessary," and an "acceptance of an offer, 
to be effectual, must be identical with the offer and unconditional, and must not modify or 
introduce any new terms into the offer." Id. (emphasis added). Admittedly the Leavell case 
dealt with issues of contract formation. Yet to now find plaintiffs proposed five-year 
employment contract may have particular portions excluded from the writing requirement would 
eviscerate the holding of Leavell and its progeny, which requires that the proposed terms to a 
contract must be considered as a whole. Thus, the fact that a "portion of the proposed terms" 
might be completed in less than one year does not alter the fact that the alleged contract must be 
considered in its entirety, and the Idaho courts have yet to carve out the kind of exception argued 
here. 
Rather than being distinguishable as plaintiff suggests, the Treasure Valley case is 
highly instructive in the present matter. Taken to its logical end, plaintiffs argument would 
result in any alleged oral agreement being dissected to the point where a party engaging in good 
faith negotiations could find himself or herself bound to terms they never intended, so long as 
just one provision of the "contract" being negotiated could be performed within one year. If a 
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party were allowed to pick and choose isolated provisions of an alleged oral agreement, which he 
could later seek to enforce on an individual basis, the possible exceptions to the statute of frauds 
would quickly swallow tho rule. 
Finally, plaintiff incorrectly argues that the relief he is seeking is limited only to 
"the agreed upon bonus structure for the time that he worked at Tri-Way." See Plaintiffs 
Supplemental Memorandum, p. 10. According to the First Amended Complaint, he is seeking, 
inter alia: "past and future loss of income," including income that he "would have received in 
merit and longevity wage increases" (7 69(a)); "past and future suffering" (7 69(b)); "past and 
future losses of income which Robert Gray would ordinarily have received" (7 69(f)); "any 
future damages as may be proven" (7 69(g)); as well as attorney fees based upon the contract 
claims he has continuously pursued (7 69(i)). He also continues to seek enforcement of the Draft 
Option to Purchase Corporate Stock. Thus, the unenforceability of the entire Draft Employment 
Agreement is still squarely at issue in this case, and both the statute of frauds and controlling 
case law interpreting that statute preclude enforcement of any of the proposed terms. 
Despite his efforts, plaintiff has failed to distinguish this case from the operative 
facts and holding at issue in the Treasure Valley case. The fact remains that significant portions 
of the Draft Employment Agreement were unsettled, and the contract in its entirety is 
unenforceable. Because the Idaho courts have refused to carve out the limited exception urged 
by plaintiff, and indeed have consistently held that proposed contractual terms must be analyzed 
in the aggregate, there is no room for a piecemeal approach under the statute of frauds. Of 
course, defendants have already established through prior briefing in support of their motion for 
summary judgment that there has never been a sufficient meeting of the minds to support that a 
valid contract for payment of bonus or incentive pay provisions was ever formed in the first 
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place. The fact that those terms are also subject to the statute of frauds in this case is but a 
secondary reason supporting entry of summary judgment in defendants' favor. 
C. The Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel Based on Part Performance Does Not 
Apply to a Contract Which Comes Within the Statute of Frauds Because It 
Cannot Be Performed Within One Year. 
Finally, plaintiff has argued that the doctrine of equitable estoppel bars a defense 
based upon the statute of frauds because there has been "part performance" by the parties. He 
hrther argues that all of the "acts of performance are solely explainable by Gray's employment 
agreement," and thus that performance is "explainable solely by the contract at issue." See 
Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum, p. 12. These arguments either ignore or fail to consider 
the plain language of the controlling case law cited by defendants in their initial statute of frauds 
briefing. Both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals of Idaho have held that "the doctrine 
of part performance is not applicable to a contract which comes within the statute of frauds 
because it cannot beperformed within one year." Treasure Valley, 135 Idaho at 489 (emphasis 
added) (citing Allen v. Moyle, 84 Idaho 18,23,367 P.2d579 582 (1961)),,,~ narrow "exception. 
to the exception" thus has been expressly recognized by the Idaho courts in order to avoid 
"nullification of the statute." Id. (quoting 49 Am.Jur. 798, Q: 497). 
Because the equitable estoppel exception to the statute of frauds does not apply to 
the May 21 Draft Employment Agreement in the first place, there is no need for the court to 
consider whether the alleged performance is "consistent solely with the alleged contract." 
111. CONCLUSION 
The issue now before the court is much simpler than plaintiff would suggest. The 
court need not, and based upon the comments made during the September 25 hearing should not, 
consider further the factual arguments plaintiff has presented in his supplemental briefing. First, 
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the facts set forth by plaintiff go well beyond the narrow issue on which supplemental briefing 
was requested. Plaintiff had an opportunity to address the full spectrum of facts in his moving 
papers, and his effort to supplement the factual record at this juncture is contrary to both the rules 
and the scope of supplemental briefing prescribed by the court. In addition, plaintiffs 
"statement of facts" is largely either unsupported or supported solely by his own self-serving 
affidavit testimony. 
Plaintiffs substantive arguments also carry little or no weight. The most 
rudimentary search of Idaho law would have led plaintiff to conclude that the court is free to 
raise the statute of frauds issue if it is "germane to the controversy presented." For him to further 
argue that the statute of frauds should not be considered as an issue in this case is further belied 
by the fact that he, and not defendants, requested the opportunity to submit additional briefing if 
the court felt that it was appropriate. Similarly, plaintiffs supplemental memorandum has failed 
to provide any authority contrary to the findings of the Treasure Valley court. There, the Court 
of Appeals confirmed the long-standing rule that part performance does not apply when the basis 
for applying the statute of frauds is due to the fact that the alleged contract cannot be performed 
within one year. Finally, the Idaho appellate courts have never carved out the particular kind of 
exception urged by plaintiff when an isolated term within an unenforceable contract may be 
capable of performance within one year. Had the courts been so inclined, they presumably 
would have done so in the Treasure Valley case, since the provisions which the plaintiff sought 
to enforce in that case "could have" become applicable within one year. Instead, the appellate 
courts have routinely applied the statute of frauds to the contract as a whole, and there is no 
controlling authority which would support a finding that allows for a separate evaluation in the 
manner urged by plaintiff. 
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Defendants respectfully submit that the exceptions argued by plaintiff in his 
supplemental briefing do not apply to the particular facts and circumstances of this case. The 
statute of frauds clearly applies to the Draft Employment Agreement as it existed on May 21, 
2004. Since the "terms" of that alleged agreement were never reduced to a final writing, they are 
unenforceable. Accordingly, defendant is entitled to entry of summary judgment on plaintiffs 
contract claims, including the claim for "compensation" based upon the unenforceable contract. 
DATED this 27th day of November, 2006. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27th day of November, 2006, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM RE: STATUTE OF FRAUDS to be served by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Erik F. Stidham ( ~ u . s .  Mail, Postage Prepaid 
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER, P.A. ( ) Hand Delivered 
950 West Bannock Street, Suite 900 ( ) Overnight Mail 
Boise, Idaho 83702 ( ) Facsimile 
Facsimile (208) 31 9-2601 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
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Defendant. 
VS. 
TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, 
INC. 
On August 3, 2006, Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc. ("Tri-Way") moved this Court to 
THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OJ? 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO TRI-WAY 
ROBERT GRAY, 
Plaintiff, 
The Court heard argument September 25, 2006, and sua sponte ordered further briefing I 
Case No. CVOC 0409 
13 
14 
15 
17 1 I regarding the applicability of the statute of frauds to the employment agreement because by its terms I 
grant summary judgment finding the parties never entered into an employment contract. Tri-Way 
supported its Motion with affidavits and documents. Robert Gray opposed and filed supporting 
affidavits. Tri-Way replied 
18 11 the parlies contemplated a five year tern of employment. Both parties filed additional memoranda. / 
$9  / / The C o w  further ordered the parties into mediation. I 
20 11 Mediation failed and the parties asked the Court to enter a decision. Pursuant to stipulation 
2, 11 of counsel, the Court took the matter under advisement on May 11,2001. I 
22 11 For the reasons stated below, the Court grants Tri-Way's and Peterson's Motion for Summary 
23 11 Judgment. I 
26 a Washington corporation. Tri-Way is a general contractor building commercial construction II 
24 
25 
BACKGROUND' 
This dispute arises out of an alleged employment contract behveen Robert Gray and Tri-Way, 
27 
28 
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projects. In 2004, Tri-Way was expanding its operations into Arizona. Gray worked as a senior 
29 
30 
3 1 
' These facts are undisputed. To the extent any facts are disputed, Gray's facts are considered true for the purposes of 
?-Way's summary judgment only. To the extent Gray "argues" that his conclusion that an agreement had been reached 
is a fact, thereby creating a material dispute, the Court disagrees. It is a legal conclusion. 
construction manager for Albertson's Inc. when he began negotiations for employment with Tri-Way 
Construction in January 2004. Albertson's was going through a down-sizing and by 2002 had laid off 
at least half of its construction managers. Gray had begun working for Albertsons in 1986. 
Following a February 2004, meeting with Tri-Way, Gray retained counsel to prepare a written 
agreement containing the proposed terms of his employment and a proposal whereby Gray would 
buy out Peterson's interest. On March 10, 2004, Gray e-mailed Peterson and Ray Allard at Tri-Way 
that he would have his counsel prepare a proposed employment agreement. Gray testified in his 
deposition that there was no agreement between the parties as to any material terms. 
On March 16, 2004, Gray e-mailed an outline of his employment proposal to Tri-Way which 
included a buy-out of Gary Peterson's interest in the Seattle-Portland business and a salary and bonus 
plan. Gray proposed that Allard, Peterson and Gray each contribute $15,000 to a capital account to 
provide start-up costs for the Arizona venture. Gray also proposed that the Arizona and Seattle- 
Portland operations be tracked separately until 2008 when they would be combined. Under his 
proposal, none of the parties would take dividends out of the retained earnings until 2009, and at that 
time Gray's share would be 33% of the retained earnings. 
For 2004, Gray proposed he would draw a minimal salary of $400 per week, and in 2005 he 
would be paid $1 10,000 either as salary or draws. This amount would increase by 8% through 2008. 
Gray proposed that as of January 1, 2009, he would become 50-50 partners in the Tri-Way Seattle- 
Portland operation. However, he indicated he was open to suggestions. Gray testified that on or 
about April 29,2004, he sent an e-mail to his accountant, Rob Grover, referencing partnership papers 
that lie was having his attorney draft for a "corporation/partnership in Arizona." 
On May 19, 2004, Gray e-mailed his initial DraftZ Employment Agreement, drafted by his 
attorney. It proposed a term of employment of 5 years, beginning June 1,2004, and ending August 
1, 2009, unless otherwise terminated as provided in the draft agreement. He also proposed that his 
salary would be $4,000 per month until January 2005 when it would raise to $10,000. The draft also 
included an annual bonus of 50% of the net profits before taxes of only the Arizona operation. This 
draft differed significantly from the proposal Gray e-mailed Tri-Way on March 16, 2004. Peterson 
! The document is clearly labeled "Draft." 
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acknowledged he received the e-mail with the draft proposal on May 19, 2004, at 10:31 in the 
morning. 
Gray testified that prior to May 21St, his attorney also generated what was labeled a Draft 
Option to Purchase Corporate Stock. Gray testified that this document was discussed at the May 21S' 
meeting. This document was clearly labeled a draft. In it, Gray agreed he would tender $5,000 to 
the Petersons when the agreement was executed as consideration for the Petersons granting him the 
option to purchase their stock. He testified he never tendered (or offered) the $5,000 to Peterson and 
that no party ever signed the Option to Purchase. That draft agreement also proposed that Gray 
would be entitled to exercise the option to purchase the Petersons' stock at "any time during the 
period from April 1, 2009 through and including August 1, 2009," approximately five vears in the 
future. Peterson testified neither nor his wife ever agreed to this option. 
Subsequent to this draft, another draft was prepared. This new draft contained Gray's 
handwritten notes. No party ever executed this draft. Gray testified that hesent e-mails to Peterson 
and that in an e-mail dated July 27, 2004, he wrote: "I also hope to have the final draft of our 
agreements with me, so we could possibly go over those and sign them, and I could hand you your 
$5,000." 
Gray quit his job at Albertson's May 1, 2004, before the parties met to discuss Gray's draft 
agreement on May 21, 2004, and before Gray e-mailed his initial Draft Employment Agreement or 
sent Peterson a copy of the Draft Option to Purchase Corporate Stock. 
The parties, Gary Allard, Gary Peterson, Peterson's wife and Gray, met on May 21, 2004. 
Peterson testified at his deposition that Tri-Way (Allard, Peterson and his wife) told Gray they 
rejected Gray's proposed employment agreement. Gray denies they told him that and testified in his 
affidavit as follows: 
As of May 21, 2004, I had an agreement regarding the substantial terms of my 
employment with Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc., including hut not limited to, 
compensation and profit sharing and my option to purchase the Petersons' ownership 
interest in Tri-Way. 
On May 21, 2004 during the meeting regarding my employment with Tri-Way, Gary 
Peterson and Ray Allard gave me the impression that we had an agreement regarding 
my option to purchase the Petersons' interest in Tri-Way and regarding my 
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compensation. Based on their conduct during the meeting, I believed that we had 
reached an agreement3 
-Iowever, subsequent to this May 21'' meeting, Gray acknowledges that another draft was prepared -- 
3xhibit 7 to Gray's deposition. Gray acknowledged this draft was prepared after the May 21'' 
neeting. While the date it was actually prepared is unclear, Gray testified it obviously reflected a 
ater version of the employment agreement because it contained a non-compete and non-disclosure 
:lause discussed at the May 21, 2004, meeting; his draft did not contain these items. Therefore, he 
estified it must have been prepared afler the May 21, 2004, meeting. Gray also testified the 
>andwitten changes to Exhibit 7 were his, and he further testified that Exhibit 7 was not the same 
locument used at the May 21,2004, meeting. His handwritten changes reflect si~nificant changes to 
;alary and the bonus pay provisions. 
Gray began working for Tri-Way on June 1, 2004, opening its Arizona office, even though 
rdmittedly no par& had signed aw em~lovment or buy-out a~reement. After he began working, 
3ray and Tri-Way continued to negotiate his employment contract and the buy-out agreement4 
Tri-Way's attorneys prepared another version, (labeled "Ver. 1 6/04/04" at the top) reflecting 
;ome of the things discussed at the May 21'' meeting. This version was dated three days after Gray 
legan working and modified his proposed salary, reducing the 2005 salary to $8,000 per month and 
~ro-rating the proposed incentive or bonus pay. This version is clearly a draft because it contained 
yped italicized remarks inserted in the middle of text - most significantly -- text directly addressing 
:ompensation and bonuses. For example, in Article 4, which addressed compensation and incentive 
)r bonus pay, this draft contained the following language inserted in the middle of the text: 
Section 4.2. Performance Based Salary. . . . * this section is too confusing? . . . . 
*computed when-each month at the end of iheJirst year? 
'eterson testified he rejected this version. 
Gray testified that this version reflected some of the things discussed in the May 21St meeting, 
)ut he did not believe it accurately reflected e v e d i n g  discussed in the meeting. In fact, 
These two statements represent Gray's conclusions that he had an agreement and represent his perceptions. They are 
actual statements. 
While Gray disputes there were continued "negotiations," his own exhibits clearly demonstrate that the agreement 
ontinued to evolve over a period of time subsequent to his beginning employment and that the parties continued to 
liscuss the important provisions regarding compensation. 
IRDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO TRI-WAY 
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estified he wanted the non-compete to be changed. Likewise, Gray testified that he recalled 
eceiving a subsequent version labeled "Ver.2 6110.04" at the top. Gray testified that this June 10, 
,004, version contained changes Gray suggested, and his handwritten notes on this version suggests 
'urther changes. Like the previous version, it also contained twed italicized remarks inserted in the 
niddle of text expressing continued concerns about the language in the compensation and bonus 
iection, among other things. 
Gray claims that there were no further discussions about the employment agreement beyond 
rune 22, 2004, twenty-two days after he began working for Tri-Way and testified as follows: 
A. I believe they were completed and there were no discussions necessary at this 
point. 
Q. And why do you say that? 
A. Because of the discussions that took place on May 21'' and final drafts were 
executed between June 1' and June 10" 
Q. When you say "final drafts were executed," what do you mean by "executed"? 
A. I meantyped. 
Q. Prepared? 
A. Prepared. 
Q. Okay. ~evised?' 
A. Correct. 
Q. Okay. And yet none of those revised agreements were signed by any party at 
any time, correct? 
A. Correct. 
On July 27,2004, approximatel~ 6 weeks after he began working, Gray e-mailed Peterson, in 
elevant part, as follows: 
I also hope to have the final draft of our agreements with me, so we could possibly go 
over those and sign them, and I could hand you your $5,000. 
The parties continued to modify and discuss the salary and bonus provisions throughout September 
!004, as well as, the proposed buy-out agreement. During this period, the parties had numerous 
onversations negotiating the employment agreement terms. Peterson testified that the Arizona 
Neither party introduced any evidence of a "final" version that contained no italicized comments clearly suggesting 
ontinued concerns about the versions. 
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ivision would not effectively be run if 50 percent of its net profits were being taken out in cash and 
iven to Gray. These concerns caused Peterson to have his attorney to make further revisions to the 
~mpensation provision in the employment agreement -- Article 4. 
Gray testified that around September 1,2004, Tri-Way began attempting to change portions 
f the "agreement." On September 13, 2004, Gray e-mailed Peterson and Ray Allard, in relevant 
art, as follows: 
I understand from our conversation that if AZ profit for the year was $300,000 for 
example, and $184,000 after taxes, your proposal was to have me take 50% of the 
$184,000, or $92,000, as my annual bonus. Of the remaining $92,000, % was going 
to go to the company as retained earnings, and % was going to go to a separate escrow 
account, which would fund the buyout (or a portion thereof) in 4 years as a dividend 
payout to Gary [Peterson]. This agreement you sent me betow doesn't say that. It 
says '/z of my 50% bonus would go to the escrow account each year. Which defeats 
the purpose of having the option to buy stock agreement, and would be unacceptable 
to me anyway. If you can have this revised to read the way it was discussed, I'll pass 
it on to my CPA for review and get back to both of you. If I misunderstood our 
discussion, please let me know. 
'eterson responded by e-mail as follows: 
Rob 
Think about what you are asking. You want Ray and I to buy me out in 4 % years and 
give you half of the company! 
The 50% after taxes that is for the owners will stay in retained earnings as cash flow. 
Your 50% as we discussed will be divided with '/z in cash bonus to you and the other 
half to remain in the company as a separate account to use as the purchase agreement. 
Any questions -Please respond. 
Gary 
fn October 2,2004, Gray sent another proposal to Ray Allard and indicated this was a "last gasp" to 
try and put this deal together." Gray gave Tri-Way until October 25, 2004, to agree to his terms. 
)ctober 20, 2004, he returned the company credit cards and on October 21, 2004, he e-mailed Ray 
illard, as follows: 
As I mentioned in our conversation earlier today [October 21,20041, I'd like to make 
next Friday my last day with Tri Way. . . . 
I will not seek reimbursement from Tri Way for those costs I incurred in Attorney and 
CPA fees as we tried to draft our agreements over the last 6 months, even though they 
are substantial. As is the earnest money deposit I'll be walking away from on the 
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house here in Phoenix. As is the amount of depleted retirement savings. Buy [sic] 
hey, like I said, I'm a big boy and I put myself into this nightmare, I'll have to dig 
myself (and my family) out of it. 
I would hope that whatever portion of the profits I generated for Tri Way over the last 
4 months that you and Gary feel I'm entitled to could be paid to me by November 1'. 
5 //(Emphasis added.) October 26,2004, Gray again e-mailed Ray Allard and Peterson in relevant part i 
Gary, 
Just wanted to thank you for the opportunity to trv to out this 'deal' tovether over the 
last few months. . . . 
Let me try to explain: The last two weeks were not good ones for me. After 5 or 6 
months of effort, I have to admit that our failure to out this deal together. . . 
(Emphasis added.) Gray testified he "refused to allow" Tri-Way to make the proposed 
"modifications" and that on or about October 22,2004, Tri-Way emailed Gray terminating him. 
Peterson testified that Gray gave Tri-Way an October 25,2004, deadline to respond to Gray's 
1 I dispute that he returned all the corporate credit cards. He claims, however, he was terminated by Tri- / 
14 
15 
final offer. However, according to Tri-Way, at some point prior to October 20, 2004, Gray returned 
all the corporate credit cards and on October 21,2004, Gray tendered his resignation. Gray does not 
//and offered him a bonus of $60,000. Gray brought two projects to Tri-Way - generating gross I 
17 j 
j 18 
way. 
According to Tri-Way, it paid Gray the agreed-upon salary for the work he had done so far 
I 20 
21 
revenues of $960,000 and $215,000. Kathy Peterson testified that the Arizona division generated 
$271,792.48 in net profits from June 2004 to September 30,2004. 
22 
23 
Gray testified that Tri-Way misrepresented and concealed certain facts which form the basis 
of the cause of his action for fraud and upon which he claims he relied. He testified Tri-Way 
24 
25 
26 
I 27 
28 
I 29 
30 
3 1 
represented to him that he could purchase Gary Peterson's interest in Tri-Way for a certain amount. 
For example, he testified he was unaware that Kathy Peterson owned a 25% interest in Tri-Way, 
until the May 21'' meeting or that she was unwilling to sell her shares. However, in his deposition, 
Gray testified that he never had any discussions with her about her willingness to sell her shares and 
no one ever communicated to him that she was unwilling. Gray also testified that Tri-Way 
represented it would compensate him "at an escalating base salary as well as at an annual amount 
equal to 50% of the net profit realized by the Defendant's efforts [Tri-Way]." Gray asserts that 
23 ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO TRI-WAY 
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2 11 accepted employment with Tri-Way. 1 because of the representations made regarding these terms, he quit his job at Albertson's and 
3 
4 
/ / ordinarily have received." He also seeks enforcement of the "Draft Option to Purchase Corporate 
Gray brought suit alleging breach of contract, a statutory claim for wages, promissory 
estoppel, equitable estoppel, and fraud. Relevant to this Motion for Summary Judgment, Gray secks 
5 
6 
"past and future" loss of income, including income that he "would have received in merit and 
longevity wage increases," and "past and future losses of income which Robert Gray would 
9 
12 
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Stock." 
Tri-Way moves for summary judgment and asks the Court to dismiss all Gray's claims with 
prejudice. Gray also moves for summary judgment and asks the Court to dismiss Tri-Way's and 
Peterson's counterclaims. 
ANALYSIS 
13 
l4 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
2 1 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is 
"rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
. dany, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 5 56(c); See also First Security Bank of Idaho, NA. v. 
Murphy, 131 Idaho 787, 790,964 P.2d 654,657 (1998). A party against whom summary judgment 
is sought may not merely rest on allegations contained in his pleadings, but must come forward and 
produce admissible evidence to contradict the assertions of the moving party and establish a genuine 
issue of material fact. McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765,820 P.2d 360 (1991); Olsen v. J.A. Freeman 
Co., 117 Idaho 706,791 P.2d 1285 (1990). See Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208,211, 868 P.2d 
1224, 1227 (1994). Any sworn statements that are part of the record are to be considered by the trial 
court in deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact. 
On causes of action to be tried to a jury, the party opposing summary judgment is entitled to 
the benefit of every reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidentiary facts. G & MFarms 
v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 851 (1991); Meridian Bowling Lanes, Inc. v. 
Meridian Athlete Ass'n, Inc., 105 Idaho 509, 670 P.2d 129 4 (1983). All controverted facts are 
liberally construed in favor of the party opposing the summary judgment. Tusch Enterprises v. 
Coffin, 113 Idaho 37,740 P.2d 1022 (1987); Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466,716 P.2d 1238 (1986). 
2 1 I  moving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to 1 
1 The existence of disputed facts, however, will not defeat summary judgment when the non- 
11 or that is admissible at trial will be considered by the Court. Id Conclusory assertions, in the face of I 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
its case. Garzee v. Barclay, 121 Idaho 771,774,828 P.2d 334,337 (Ct.App. 1992). 
Moreover, disputes of material facts are not created by mere conclusory statements. Hecla 
Mining Co. v. Star-Morning Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 786, 839 P.2d 1192, 1200 (1992). The 
requirements of Rule 56(e) are not satisfied by an affidavit that is conclusory, based on hearsay, or 
not supported by personal knowledge. See also Oats v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U S A . ,  126 Idaho 
162, 166, 879 P.2d 1095, 1099 (1994); Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 80-81, 844 P.2d 706, 709-10 
(1992). Only material contained in affidavits or depositions that is based upon personal knowledge 
l3 11 122 Idaho at 786, 839 P.2d at 1200) 1 
l2 
the facts, are not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Farm Credit Bank of 
Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 274, 869 P.2d 1365, 1369 (1994) (citing Hecla Mining Co., 
26 1 1  There is no evidence that the parties ever had a meeting of the minds as to either agreement. 1 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
2 1 
22 
23 
24 
25 
27 1 1  A valid contract requires a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the terms of the contract. I  
The admissibility of the evidence contained in affidavits and depositions in support of or in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment is a threshold question to be answered before applying 
the liberal construction and reasonable inferences rule to determine whether the evidence is sufficient 
to create a genuine issue for trial. Hecla Mining Co., 122 Idaho at 794, 839 P.2d at 1198 ( "[tlhe 
question of admissibility is a threshold question to be answered before applying the liberal 
construction and reasonable inferences rule to the admissible evidence."); see also State v. Shama 
Resources Ltd. Partnership, 127 Idaho 267, 270, 899 P.2d 977, 981 (1995). Therefore, Gray's 
"conclusions" that he had an agreement or that he had the impression he had an agreement alone do 
not create a material dispute of fact, especially in the face of the overwhelming evidence the parties 
simply did not have an agreement, including Gray's own evidence. 
I. THERE WAS NO MEETING OF THE MINDS AS TO ALL THE TERMS OF THESE 
CONTRACTS. 
28 
29 
Leave11 & Co. v. Grafe &Associates, Inc., 90 Idaho 502, 512 (1966). Accordingly, to be effective, 
an acceptance 
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5 1 I proposed agreements and never finalized any agreement. I 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 1  In particular with respect to the employment agreement, they continued to discuss the very I 
must be identical with the offer and unconditional, and must not modify or introduce 
any new terms into the offer. An acceptance which varies from the terms of the offer 
is a rejection of the offer and is a counter proposition, which must in turn be accepted 
by the offeror in order to constitute a binding contract. 
Id. In this case, the parties continued to introduce new terms and to modify the language of the 
/ I  confusing" and "computed when - each month at the end of the first year?" In fact, Gray himself I 
7 
8 
1 1  conceded he wanted the section regarding the non-compete changed. This was after the May 21St I 
term central to this lawsuit - compensation. Even the last written draft labeled "Ver. 1 6110104" was 
not final. It contained italicized comments in the compensation section -- like "this section is too 
11 meeting where he testified he had concluded they had an agreement. Clearly, they did not have an I 
1 1  I f  Leave11 & Co. , the Idaho Supreme Court reiterated these general rules as follows: I 
l2  
14  
'In order to constitute a contract, there must be a distinct understanding common to 
both parties. The minds of the parties must meet as to all of its terms, and, ifhg~! 
portion of the proposed terms is unsettled and unprovided for, there is no contract. 9 
Cyc. 245. An offer to enter into a contractual relation must be so complete that upon 
acceptance an agreement is formed which contains all of the terms necessary to 
determine whether the contract has been performed or not. 1 PAGE ON CONTRACTS, 
sec. 27; 9 Cyc. 248. An acceptance of an offer, to be effectual, must be identical with 
the offer and unconditional, and must not modify or introduce any new terms into the 
offer. 1 PAGE ON CONTRACTS, sec. 45; 9 Cyc. 267. An acceptance which varies from 
the terms of the offer is a rejection of the offer and is a counter proposition, which 
must in turn be accepted by the offerer in order to constitute a binding contract. 
agreement and his conclusion, unsupported by admissible facts, does not create a material dispute of 
fact, sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Hecla Mining Co., 122 Idaho at 794,839 P.2d at 1198. 
The general rules for the formation of a binding contract are well established in Idaho. In C. 
24 1 1  C. H Leavell & Co. v. Grajk & Associates, Inc., 90 Idaho 502, 51 1-12, 414 P.2d 873, - (1966) 1 
2 5  1 1  (quoting Phelps v. Good, 15 Idaho 76,84,96 P. 216,218 (1908)) (Emphasis added). In other words, I 
26 1 1  if Gray cannot establish that the most important term - compensation - was settled in any way - I 
27 1 I there is no enforceable contract. In this case, other than Gray's conclusory statement that they had an 1 
28 1 agreement, there is no evidence to support his conclusion that the parties had actually agreed on all 1 
29 1 1 the terms of employment, especially compensation including a bonus, and there is no evidence they I 
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greed on the option to purchase. In fact, his own testimony and evidence is that they continued to 
iscuss and negotiate the terms of both contracts. 
Gray has the burden of proof to prove each contract's existence and its enforceability. 
ohnson v. Albert, 67 Idaho 44, 170 P.2d 403 (1946). Thus, Gray must show a contract was formed 
hrough mutual assent. Thompson v. Pike, 122 Idaho 690, 696, 838 P.2d 293, 299 (1992). A distinct 
nderstanding common to both parties is necessary in order for a contract to exist. Mitchell v 
liqueiros, 99 Idaho 396, 400, 582 P.2d 1074, 1078 (1978)(citing Brothers v Arave, 67 Idaho 171, 
74 P.2d 202 (1946)). 
Furthermore, in this case, it appears the parties intended to reduce any agreements to writing 
n order to make them enforceable. Whether a contract exists when contracting parties agree to 
educe their agreement to writing, is a question of the parties' intent. Id. See also, Thompson, 122 
daho at 696, 838 P.2d at 299. Gray does not testify or introduce evidence that he did not intend for 
heir agreements to be in writing. Generally, there is no requirement that a contract be in writing 
lnless the parties did not intend the contract to be binding until the terms had been reduced to 
~riting. Intermountain Forest Management, Inc. v. Louisiana-PaciJic Corp., 136 Idaho 233,237, 3 1 
'.3d 921 (2001). The factors which show an intent to have a written contract are: 
(1) whether the contract is one usually put in writing, (2) whether there are few or 
many details, (3) whether the amount involved is large or small, (4) whether it 
requires a formal writing for a full expression of the covenants and promises, and (5) 
whether the negotiations indicate that a written draft is contemplated as the final 
conclusion of negotiations. 
d. An orai agreement will not be valid if the intent of the parties was to have a writing be the 
'consummation of the negotiation." Id 
In this case, the undisputed facts on the record support a conclusion that these parties 
ntended these contracts to be in writing because throughout the negotiations, the parties were 
:xchanging written drafts of the agreement. Moreover, both contained a section indicating the 
lgreement was an integrated document. 
At Gray's request, Gray's attorney and accountant drafted the first proposed agreements. 
krthermore, these are the kinds of contracts usually put in writing, given the parties proposed a five 
ear employment contract and given the option to purchase could not be exercised for five years. 
The proposed contracts contained numerous details, and involved large amounts of money. The 
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matters covered in the draft employment agreement included detailed non-competition clauses, 
detailed grounds for termination for cause (sexual harassment, alcohol or drug use, violence, etc.), 
employee benefits (insurance, withholding), non-disclosure clauses and specifically provided for 
attorney fees and indicated it was the entire integrated agreement. Likewise, the proposed draft 
option agreement involved a great deal of money, required consideration and addressed areas like 
warranties and detailed how the parties were to treat each other. Based on all of this, the Court finds 
the parties clearly anticipated consummating any contract negotiations with a written document. The 
parties agree none was ever consummated, 
An oral agreement is & valid if the written draft is viewed by the parties as a mere record; 
however, the oral agreement is not valid if the parties view the written draft as a consummation of 
the negotiation. Id. Furthermore, "[wlhere it is clear that one party has agreed that an oral agreement 
must be reduced to writing before it shall be binding, there is no contract until a formal document is 
executed." Mitchell, 99 Idaho at 400, 582 P.2d at 1078 (citations omitted). Therefore, the Court 
finds there was no meeting of the minds and no contracts were formed. 
Finally, with respect to any option to purchase corporate stock five years from the date of 
employment, Gray's draft option agreement clearly required him to pay the Petersons $5,000 as a 
condition precedent. Gray admits that he never tendered the $5,000 consideration clearly anticipated 
by draft option agreement. Therefore, with respect to any option agreement, even if the parties 
had an oral agreement, it was never consummated because Gray failed to tender the consideration 
clearly required in his own draft agreement. 
Finally, even if the Court were to determine that there were oral contracts, as Gray contends, 
the statute of frauds precludes enforcement. 
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11. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS PRECLUDES THE COURT FROM ENFORCING 
ANY ALLEGED CONTRACT. 
It is undisputed that neither party ever signed any employment contract creating a written 
contract. Thus, at best, Gray had an oral contract for employment. It is also undisputed that the 
employment contract Gray contends existed was for a term of five years. 
Likewise, it is undisputed that neither party signed any Option to Purchase Corporate Stock. 
It is also undisputed that the draft option agreement clearly by its terms anticipated that the option 
could not be exercised for five years. 
For the purposes of this summary judgment analysis only, the Court assumed Gray and 
Tri-Way had oral or implied employment contract as asserted by Gray and that Gray and the 
Petersons had an oral option to purchase agreement as asserted by Gray. Therefore, the question 
presented is whether the enforcement of those two oral agreements is prohibited by the statute of 
frauds, LC. 5 9-505, which provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
In the following cases the agreement is invalid, unless the same or some note or 
memorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the party charged, or by his 
agent. Evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing or 
secondary evidence of its contents: 
1. An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the 
making thereof. 
A contract of employment for a fixed term greater than one year is subject to the statute of 
frauds. Treasure Valley Gastroenterology Specialists, P.A. v. Woods, 135 Idaho 485,20 P.3d 21 (Ct. 
App. 2001); Burton v. Atomic Workers Fed Credit Union, 119 Idaho 17, 20, 803 P.2d 518, 521 
(1990); Allen v. Moyle, 84 Idaho 18,23, 367 P.2d 579, 582 (1961). Likewise, an option to purchase 
6 While Gray argues that Tri-Way and Peterson waived their right to rely on the statute of frauds and, thus, the Court 
should not consider this defense, the Court disagrees. In Bluestone v. Mathewson, the Idaho Supreme Court held that 
where the defense was raised before trial and theparg was given time topresent argument in opposition, the defense of 
statute of frauds can he raised for the first time in the snmmary judgment motion. Bluestone v. Mathewson, 103 Idaho 
453, 649 P.2d 1209 (1982)(citing McKinley v. Bendir Corp., 420 F.Supp. 1001 (W.D.Mo.1976); Greenwald v. Cunard 
Steam-Ship Company, 162 F.Snpp. 250 (S.D.N.Y.1958); See Baker v. Chicago, Fire 8r Burglary Detection, Inc., 489 
F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1973)); see also Good v. Hansen, 110 Idaho 953, 719 P.2d 1213 (Ct. App. 1986). Furthermore, the 
court has the inherent power to identify and to apply legal authorities germane to the controversy presented. Good v. 
Hansen, 110 Idaho 953, 719 P.2d 1213 (Ct. App. 1986). In this case, the Court gave both parties the opportunity to 
address this issue and both did. 
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stock contract which by its terms cannot be completed within one year (the sale of the stock nearly 
five years after the alleged oral contract) is subject to the statute of frauds. Id. 
The statute of frauds does not prevent the creation of an oral contract but precludes the 
contract's enf~rcement.~ Thus, in Hoffman v. S. V. Co., Inc., 102 Idaho 187,628 P.2d 218 (1981), the 
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's holding that an oral contract for the conveyance of real 
property had been formed but that failure to comply with the statute of frauds rendered the oral 
agreement unenforceable. See also Treasure Valley Gastroenterology Specialists, supra; Hemingivay 
v. Gruener, 106 Idaho 422,424,679 P.2d 1140, 1142 (1984); Wing v. Munns, 123 Idaho 493,499, 
849 P.2d 954, 960 (Ct.App.1992). Therefore, the alleged oral or implied employment contract, with 
the bonus provisions upon which Gray relies, is rendered unenforceable by the statute of frauds 
unless there are circumstances which exempt this transaction from the strictures of the statute. Id 
Likewise, any option to purchase at some time after five years is rendered unenforceable. Id. 
Gray argues that by beginning to work for Tri-Way June 1,2004, part performance takes this 
employment "contract" and the option contract out of the application of the statute of frauds. The 
Court disagrees. First, it has long been established in Idaho law that the doctrine of part performance 
is not applicable to a contract which comes within the statute of frauds because it cannot be 
performed within one year. Id.; Allen, 84 Idaho at 23, 367 P.2d at 582. "The mere part performance 
of such a contract does not take it out of the operation of the statute or permit a recovery under the 
contract for any part of the contract remaining executo ry.... [T]o hold that part performance is 
performance would be a nullification of the statute." Id (quoting 49 AM.JuR. 798, 5 497). See also 
Burton, 1 19 Idaho at 20,803 P.2d at 52 1. 
Second, under Idaho law, part performance per se does not remove a contract from the 
operation of the statute of frauds. Rather, "[tlhe doctrine of part performance is best understood as a 
specific form of the more general principle of equitable estoppel." Treasure Valley Gastroenterology 
Specialists, 135 Idaho at 490,20 P.3d at 26; Wing v. Munns, 123 Idaho 493, 500, 849 P.2d 954, 961 
(Ct.App. 1992). Therefore, the question whether part performance allows Gray to avoid application of 
7 To the extent that Gray relies on an unreported opinion issued by the Magistrate Judge in the Federal Bankruptcy 
Court, his reliance is misplaced. See Gomez v. Mastec North America, 2006 WL 36902 (D. Idaho 2006). Gray argues 
that the Comt should simply excise portions of the employment agreement that are not directly tied to the five year 
employment clause and enforce those provisions. He is simply wrong. This would nullify the Statute of Frauds. 
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the statute of frauds depends upon whether the part performance is such as to equitably estop 
Tri-Way from relying upon the statute as a defense. The Court finds it does not. The elemelits of 
equitable estoppel with respect to the party to be estopped are: 
... (1) Conduct which amounts to a false representation or concealment of material 
facts, or, at least, which is calculated to convey the impression that the facts are 
otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to 
assert; (2) intention, or at least expectation, that such conduct shall be acted upon by 
the other party; (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts. As related to 
the party claiming the estoppel, they are: (1) Lack of knowledge and of the means of 
knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question[;] (2) reliance upon the conduct of 
the party estopped; and (3) action based thereon of such a character as to change his 
position prejudicially. 
Treasure Valley Gastroenterology Specialists, 135 Idaho at 490, 20 P.3d at 26; Tew v. Manwaring, 
94 Idaho 50, 53, 480 P.2d 896, 899 (1971). See also Charpentier v. Welch, 74 Idaho 242, 248, 259 
P.2d 814, 817 (1953); Frantz, 11 1 Idaho at 1010, 729 P.2d at 1073. Where these elements have 
been proven, estoppel bars the party making the false representation from raising the statute of frauds 
as a defense. Frantz, supra. 8 
In this case, while the evidence may show there was an employment relationship, it is clear 
that the actual terms of that relationship, in particular compensation, were still being negotiated and, 
to be specifically enforced by operation of the doctrine of part performance, an oral agreement "must 
be complete, definite and certain in all its material terms, or contain provisions which are capable in 
themselves of being reduced to certainty." Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat. Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362, 365, 
109 P.3d 1104, 1109 (2005) (citing Bear Island Water Ass'n, Inc. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 723,874 
P.2d 528, 534 (1994)). Like Lettunich, what is lacking is a sufficiently definite agreement to be 
enforced. See also Black Canyon Racquetball v. First Natl  119 Idaho 171, 178, 804 P.2d 900, 907 
(1991). A contract will be enforced if it is "complete, definite and certain in all its material terms, or 
contains provisions which are capable in themselves of being reduced to certainty." Dursteler v. 
Dursteler, 108 Idaho 230, 234, 697 P.2d 1244, 1248 (Ct. App.,1985) (quoting Giacobbi Square v. 
PEK Corp., 105 Idaho 346, 348, 670 P.2d 51, 53 (1983) (emphasis omitted). To meet this standard 
the contract must embody a distinct understanding of the parties, showing a meeting of the minds as 
8 Likewise, the party claiming estoppel must be referable @to the contractual term that is in dispute - in this case, the 
bonus provisions. Treasure Valley Gastroenterologv Specialists, 135 Idaho at 490,20 P.3d at 26. 
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to all necessary terms of the contract. The obligations of the parties must be identified so that the 
adequacy of performance can be ascertained. Dale's Service Co., v. Jones, 96 Idaho 662, 534 P.2d 
1102 (1975). If terms necessary to a contract are left for future negotiation, the contract cannot be 
enforced. Brothers v. Arave, 67 Idaho 171,174 P.2d 202 (1946). 
Contrary to Gray's conclusory statements that an agreement as to "regarding the substantial 
terms of my employment with Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc., including but not limited to, 
compensation and profit sharing and my option to purchase the Petersons' ownership interest in Tri- 
Way," there is no evidence to support his conclusion. Equitable estoppel assumes the existence of a 
complete agreement, which is clearly lacking here. Therefore, equitable estoppel will not render 
either the Draft Employment Agreement or the Draft Option to Purchase Corporate Stock 
enforceable. 
Therefore, neither contract is enforceable and partial summary judgment is granted to 
Tri-Way and to Peterson. 
111. SINCE THE PARTIES NEVER AGREED ON THE TERMS OF ANY BONUS, 
GRAY'S STATUTORY WAGE CLAIM FAILS. 
Gray also makes a claim for wages due and owing under Idaho Code 5 45-601 which 
provides, 
"Wage claim" means an employee's claim against an employer for compensation for 
the employee's own personal services, and includes any wages, penalties, or damages 
provided by law to employees with a claim for unpaid wages. 
Tri-Way concedes that the term wage includes "any ascertainable unpaid commissions and 
bargained-for compensation." Moore v. Omnicare, Inc., 141 Idaho 809, 118 P.3d 141 (2005). 
Likewise, it concedes that a "claim for an employee bonus, which was calculated by reference to the 
net profit of the defendant company and paid yearly, was part of the compensation bargained for in 
the agreement of employment." Johson v. Allied Stores Corp., 106 Idaho 363, 367, 679 P.2d 640 
(1984). 
However, Tri-Way argues that because the bonus was the part of the contract that was never 
finally agreed to, there was never a "bargained for agreement" in this case and no possible wage 
claim. On this issue, Gray argues that since there is an issue of fact whether there was a valid 
agreement summary judgment is not appropriate. However, the Court disagrees. As discussed 
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ibove, Gray introduces no evidence that the parties ever actually agreed on the terms of his bonus. 
rhus, this cause of action fails. 
Therefore, based on the above the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 5" day of June 2007. 
&$YYCLL, 
Cheri C. Copsey 
District Judge 
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ROBERT GRAY, 
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I 0  
ORDER DENYING IN PART AND 
GRANTING IN PART GRAY'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, 
INC. 
Defendant. I 
On August 3, 2006, Robert Gray moved this Court to grant summary judgment dismissing 
Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc. ("Tri-Way") counterclaims.' Gray supported his Motion with 
affidavits and documents. Tri-Way opposed and filed supporting affidavits. 
The Court heard argument September 25, 2006, and ordered the parties into mediation. 
Mediation failed and the parties asked the Court to enter a decision. Pursuant to stipulation of 
counsel, the Court took the matter under advisement on May 11,2007. 
Although Gray moved for s w a r y  judgment on counts I-VI of Tri-Way's counterclaims, 
Tri-Way only responded to Counts I (Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing), IV (Tortious Interference with Contract), and V (Conversion). Therefore, as to Counts II, 
22 
23 
24 
27 1 1  ANALYSIS 1 
III and VI, the Court dismisses those counts. 
Furthermore, for the reasons stated below, the Court denies Gray's Motion for Summary 
Judgment as to the remaining Counts I, IV and V finding there are disputes of material facts. By 
25 
26 
reference, the Court hereby incorporates the factual statement found in its Order Granting Summary 
Judgment to Tri-Way dated June 5,2007. 
28 
29 
Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is 
"rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on iile, together with the affidavits, 
3 1  
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[any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
3 a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 5 56(c); See also First Security Bank of Idaho, N A .  v. 
lurphy, 131 Idaho 787, 790, 964 P.2d 654, 657 (1998). A party against whom summary judgment 
s sought may not merely rest on allegations contained in his pleadings, but must come forward and 
~roduce admissible evidence to contradict the assertions of the moving party and establish a genuine 
ssue of material fact. McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 820 P.2d 360 (1991); Olsen v. LA. Freeman 
Zo., 117 Idaho 706, 791 P.2d 1285 (1990). See Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 211, 868 P.2d 
224, 1227 (1994). Any sworn statements that are part of the record are to be considered by the trial 
:ourt in deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact. 
On causes of action to he tried to a jury, the party opposing summary judgment is entitled to 
he benefit of every reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidentiary facts. G & M Farms 
. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 851 (1991); Meridian Bowling Lanes, Inc. v. 
deridian Athlete Ass'n, Inc., 105 Idaho 509, 670 P.2d 129 4 (1983). All controverted facts are 
iberally construed in favor of the party opposing the summary judgment. Tusch Enterprises v. 
:offin, 113 Idaho 37,740 P.2d 1022 (1987); Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466,716 P.2d 1238 (1986). 
Although Gray moved for summary judgment on counts I-VI of Tri-Way's counterclaims, 
hi-Way only responded to Counts I (Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
lealing), IV (Tortious Interference with Contract), and V (Conversion). Therefore, as to Counts 11, 
I1 and VI, the Court dismisses those counts. However, with respect to the remaining counterclaims, 
he Court finds that there are disputes of material facts that preclude summary judgment. 
Therefore, based on the above Gray's Motion for Summary Judgment on the conversion, 
ortious interference with contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is 
lenied. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 1 l th day of June 2007. 
District Judge 
The Court granted summary judgment to Tri-Way on its Motion on June 5,2007. 
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Erik F. Stidham, ISB No. 5483 
Dean Arnold, ISB No. 6814 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Blvd. 
Mailing Address: 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
E-mail: efstidham@hollandhart.com 
JUL O 3 2007 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Robert Gray 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
Defendants. 1 
Plaintiff, Robert Gray ("Gray"), by and through his counsel of record, Holland & 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
Hart, LLP,  moves for an order clarifying the Court's Order regarding Tri-Way's Motion 
ROBERT GRAY, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, 
INC., a Washington Corporation; RAY 
ALLRAD, an individual; KATHY 
PETERSON, an individual; GARY 
PETERSON, an individual, 
for Summary Judgment entered on June 5, 2007 ("June 5 Order"). 
Case No. CVOC 0409193D 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
CLARIFICATION OF ORDER 
GRANTING MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO TRI- 
WAY 
Assigned Judge: Cheri C. Copsey 
Gray seeks clarification that the June 5 Order is limited to Gray's claim for 
Breach of Contract (Count I) and his Statutory Claim for Wages (Count 111). 
The June 5 Order discusses Gray's claim for Breach of Contract. (June 5 Order, 
at 9-16). At the conclusion of the Court's discussion of the Breach of Contract claim, 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF GRANTING MOTION F O Q O l ( ) Z  
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO TRI-WAY - 1 
\h 
the June5  Order states "neither contract is enforceable and partial summary judgment is 
granted as to Tri-Way and Peterson." (Id at 16). In turn, the June 5 Order considers 
Gray's Statutory Wage Claim. (Id. at 16-17). After considering the Statutory Wage 
Claim, the Order states "[tlhus, this cause of action fails." (June 5 Order at 17) 
(emphasis added). 
The June 5 Order is silent regarding Gray's other causes of action. Accordingly, 
Gray understands that five of his causes of action (Counts 11, IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII) 
remain to be tried before a jury. Accordingly, Gray requests that the Court clarify that 
its June 5th Order is limited to Gray's Breach of Contract Claim (Count 1) and his 
Statutory Wage Claim (Count 111). 
Such clarification is necessary in order to eliminate the various uncertainties in 
the Court's June 5th Order. Clarifying these uncertainties will help facilitate adequate 
litigation of the claims in this matter. 
This Motion is supported by the Court's record. 
/Ip 
DATED this day of July, 2007. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Attorneys for ~ i a i n t i f f  Robert Gray 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF GRANTING MOTION FO 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
J 
I hereby certify that on this% day of July 2007, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Jason G. Murray, Esq. U.S. Mail 
MOFFATT HOMAS BARRETT ROCK Hand Delivered 
& FIELDS, CHTD. Overnight Mail 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor C] Telecopy (Fax) 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0829 
Fax: (208) 385-5384 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF GRANTING MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO TRI-WAY - 3 001 04 
THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRI 
I I THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
I I ROBERT GRAY, 
I I Plaintiff, Case No. CVOC 040919333 
ORDER CLARIFYING JUNE 5,2007 I SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER 
I I Defendant. 
TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, 
INC. 
/ /  On August 3, 2006, Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc ("Tri-Way") moved this Court to 
AND CORRECTING THE ORDER 
1 1  grant summary judgment finding the parties never entered into an employment contract. Tri-Way 
supported its Motion with affidavits and documents. Robert Gray opposed and filed supporting 
affidavits. Tri-Way replied 
I I  The Court heard argument September 25, 2006, and sua sponte ordered further briefing I I regarding the applicability of the statute of frauds to the employment agreement because by its terms 
the parties contemplated a five year term of employment. Both parties filed additional memoranda. 
The Court further ordered the parties into mediation. 
Mediation failed and the parties asked the Court to enter a decision. Pursuant to stipulation 
of counsel, the Court took the matter under advisement on May 11,2007. 
On June 5,2007, the Court granted Tri-Way summary judgment and issued a Memorandum 
Decision. July 3, 2007, Gray moved the Court to clarify its decision to indicate whether it intended 
/ / t o  grant summary judgment to Tri-Way on all counts. 
In reviewing the prior decision, the Court observed a typographical error and hereby issues 
this errata. Section 111, paragraph 1 is corrected to read as follows with the change underlined. 
II Gray also makes a claim for wages due and owing under Idaho Code 5 45-601 which provides, 
"Wage claim" means an employee's claim against an employer for 
compensation for the employee's own personal services, and includes any 
ORDER CLARIFYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER 
CASE NO. CVOC 04091931) 1 
wages, penalties, or damages provided by law to employees with a claim for 
unpaid wages. 
Tri-Way concedes that the term wage includes "any ascertainable unpaid 
commissions and bargained-for compensation." Moore v. Omnicare, Inc., 141 Idaho 
809, 118 P.3d 141 (2005). Likewise, it concedes that a claim for an emplovee bonus 
may be part of the compensation bargained for in the agreement of ernplovment. 
Johnson v. AlJiedStores Corp., 106 Idaho 363,367,679 P.2d 640 (1984). 
II For the reasons stated below, the Court clarifies its June 5, 2007, decision. I 
1 This dispute arises out of an alleged employment contract between Robert Gray and Tri-Way, 1 
I la  Washington corporation. Tri-Way is a general contractor building commercial construction I 1 1  projects. In 2004, Tri-Way was expanding its operations into Arizona. Gray worked as a senior / 
construction manager for Albertson's Inc. when he began negotiations for employment with Tri-Way 
Construction in January 2004. Albertson's was going through a down-sizing and by 2002 had laid off 1 at least half of its construction managers. Gray had begun working for Albertsons in 1986. I I I Following a February 2004, meeting with Tri-Way, Gray retained counsel to prepare a written 1 agreement containing the proposed terms of his employment and a proposal whereby Gray would / 
1 1  buy out Peterson's interest. On March 10,2004, Gray e-mailed Peterson and Ray Allard at Tri-Way / 
1 1  that he would have his counsel prepare a proposed employment agreement. Gray testified in his / 1 1  deposition that there was no agreement between the parties as to any material terms. I I I On March 16,2004, Gray e-mailed an outline of his employment proposal to Tri-Way which 1 / included a buy-out of Gary Peterson's interest in the Seattle-Portland business and a salary and bonus I 
/plan.  Gray proposed that Allard, Peterson and Gray each contribute $15,000 to a capital account to I 
1 1  provide start-up costs for the Arizona venture. Gray also proposed that the Arizona and Seatile- I 
11 Portland operations be tracked separately until 2008 when they would be combined. Under his I 
proposal, none of the parties would take dividends out of the retained earnings until 2009, and at that 
time Gray's share would be 33% of the retained earnings. 
I These facts are undisputed. To the extent any facts are disputed, Gray's facts are considered true for the purposes of 
Tri-Way's summary judgment only. To the extent Gray "argues" that his conclusion that an agreement had been reached 
is a fact, thereby creating a material dispute, the Court disagrees. It is a legal conclusion. 
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For 2004, Gray proposed he would draw a minimal salary of $400 per week, and in 2005 he 
~ o u l d  be paid $1 10,000 either as salary or draws. This amount would increase by 8% through 2008. 
3ray proposed that as of January 1, 2009, he would become 50-50 partners in the Tri-Way Sealtle- 
'ortland operation. However, he indicated he was open to suggestions. Gray testified that on or 
ibout April 29,2004, he sent an e-mail to his accountant, Rob Grover, referencing partnership papers 
hat he was having his attorney draft for a "corporation/partnership in Arizona." 
On May 19, 2004, Gray e-mailed his initial  raft^ Employment Agreement, drafted by his 
ittomey. It proposed a term of employment of 5 years, beginning June 1,2004, and ending August 
L, 2009, unless otherwise terminated as provided in the draft agreement. He also proposed that his 
;alary would be $4,000 per month until January 2005 when it would raise to $10,000. The draft also 
ncluded an annual bonus of 50% of the net profits before taxes of only the Arizona operation. This 
iraft differed significantly from the proposal Gray e-mailed Tri-Way on March 16, 2004. Peterson 
icknowledged he received the e-mail with the draft proposal on May 19, 2004, at 10:31 in the 
norning. 
Gray testified that prior to May 21St, his attorney also generated what was labeled a Draft 
3ption to Purchase Corporate Stock. Gray testified that this document was discussed at the May 21'' 
neeting. This document was clearly labeled a draft. In it, Gray agreed he would tender $5,000 to 
he Petersons when the agreement was executed as consideration for the Petersons granting him the 
~ption to puchase their stock. He testified he never tendered (or offered) the $5,000 to Peterson and 
hat no party ever signed the Option to Purchase. That draft agreement also proposed that Gray 
 odd be entitled to exercise the option to puchase the Petersons' stock at "any time during the 
Ieriod from April 1, 2009 through and including August 1, 2009," approximately five years in the 
-. Peterson testified neither nor his wife ever agreed to this option. 
Subsequent to this draft, another draft was prepared. This new draft contained Gray's 
landwritten notes. No party ever executed this draft. Gray testified that he sent e-mails to Peterson 
md that in an e-mail dated July 27, 2004, he wrote: "I also hope to have the final draft of our 
igreements with me, so we could possibly go over those and sign them, and I could hand you your 
;5,000." 
The document is clearly labeled ''Draft." 
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Gray quit his job at Albertson's May 1, 2004, the parties met to discuss Gray's draft 
greement on May 21, 2004, and before Gray e-mailed his initial Draft Employment Agreement or 
cnt Peterson a copy of the Draft Option to Purchase Corporate Stock. 
The parties, Gary Allard, Gary Peterson, Peterson's wife and Gray, met on May 21, 2004. 
'eterson testified at his deposition that Tri-Way (Allard, Peterson and his wife) told Gray they 
sjected Gray's proposed employment agreement. Gray denies they told him that and testified in his 
ffidavit as follows: 
As of May 21, 2004, I had an agreement regarding the substantial terms of my 
employment with Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc., including but not limited to, 
compensation and profit sharing and my option to purchase the Petersons' ownership 
interest in Tri-Way . 
On May 21, 2004 during the meeting regarding my employment with Tri-Way, Gary 
Peterson and Ray Allard gave me the impression that we had an agreement regarding 
my option to purchase the Petersons' interest in Tri-Way and regarding my 
compensation. Based on their conduct during the meeting, I believed that we had 
reached an agreement3 
lowever, subsequent to this May 21St meeting, Gray acknowledges that another draft was prepared -- 
ixhibit 7 to Gray's deposition. Gray acknowledged this draft was prepared after the May 21'' 
ieeting. While the date it was actually prepared is unclear, Gray testified it obviously reflected a 
der version of the emplovment agreement because it contained a non-compete and non-disclosure 
lause discussed at the May 21,2004, meeting; his draft did not contain these items. Therefore, he 
:stified it must have been prepared after the May 21, 2004, meeting. Gray also testified the 
.andwritten changes to Exhibit 7 were his, and he further testified that Exhibit 7 was not the same 
ocument used at the May 21,2004, meeting. His handwritten changes reflect significant changes to 
alary and the bonus pay provisions. 
Gray began working for Tri-Way on June I, 2004; opening its Arizona office, even though 
dmittedly no party had signed aw emploment or buv-out agreement. After he began working, 
;ray and Tri-Way continued to negotiate his employment contract and the buy-out agreement.' 
These two statements represent Gray's conclusions that he had an agreement and represent his perceptions. They are 
lctual statements. 
In preparing this Clarification, the Court reviewed all of the affidavits contained in the file. This case has been hard 
~ g h t  and Tri-Way initially moved the Court to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Court notes that in two 
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Tri-Way's attorneys prepared another version, (labeled "Ver. 1 6/04/04" at the top) reflecting 
some of the things discussed at the May 21'' meeting. This version was dated three days after Gray 
began working and modified his proposed salary, reducing the 2005 salary to $8,000 per month and 
pro-rating the proposed incentive or bonus pay. This version is clearly a draft because it contained 
/ / typed italicized remarks inserted in the middle of text - most significantly -- text directly addressing 1 compensation and bonuses. For example, in Article 4, which addressed compensation and incentive / / or bonus pay, this draft contained the following language inserted in the middle of the text: 
Section 4.2. Performance Based Salary. . . . * this section is too confusing? 
*computed when+each month at the end of the first year? 
Peterson testified he rejected this version. 
Gray testified that this version reflected some of the things discussed in the May 21St meeting, 
/ /  but he did not believe it accurately reflected evervthing discussed in the meeting. In fact, 
testified he wanted the non-compete to be chanrred. Likewise, Gray testified that he recalled 
receiving a subseauent version labeled "Ver.2 6110.04" at the top. Gray testified that this June 10, 
1 1  2004, version contained changes Gray suggested, and his handwritten notes on this version suggests 1 1  further changes. Like the previous version, it also contained m e d  italicized remarks inserted in the I  I  middle of text expressing continued concerns about the language in the compensation and bonus 
I I section, among other things. 
I I  Gray claims that there were no huther discussions about the employment agreement beyond 1 1  June 22,2004, twenty-two days after he began working for Tri-Way and testified as follows: 
A. I believe they were completed and there were no discussions necessary at this 
point. 
Q. And why do you say that? 
A. Because of the discussions that took place on May 21'' and final drafts were 
executed between June 1' and June loth 
Q. When you say "final drafts were executed," what do you mean by "executed"? 
affidavits submitted by Gray (dated April 27,2005, and May 12 2005, respectively), be testified under oath that he began 
work for Tri-Way May 2004 and that he immediately obtained two Albertson's projects on behalf of Tri-Way as 
Tri-Way's employee. 
5 While Gray disputes there were continued "negotiations," his own exhibits clearly demonstrate that the agreement 
continued to evolve over a period of time subsequent to his beginning employment and that the parties continued to 
discuss the important provisions regarding compensation. 
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A. I mean typed. 
Q. Prepared? 
A. Prepared. 
Q. Okay. ~ e v i s e d ? ~  
A. Correct. 
Q. Okay. And yet none of those revised agreements were signed by any party at 
any time, correct? 
A. Correct. 
On July 27,2004, ao~roximately 6 weeks after he began working, Gray e-mailed Peterson, in 
relevant part, as follows: 
I also hope to have the final draft of our agreements with me, so we could possibly go 
over those and sign them, and I could hand you your $5,000. 
The parties continued to modify and discuss the salary and bonus provisions throughout September 
2004, as well as, the proposed buy-out agreement. During this period, the parties had numerous 
conversations negotiating the employment agreement terms. Peterson testified that the Arizona 
division would not effectively be run if 50 percent of its net profits were being taken out in cash and 
given to Gray. These concerns caused Peterson to have his attorney to make further revisions to the 
compensation provision in the employment agreement -- Article 4. 
Gray testified that around September 1, 2004, Tri-Way began attempting to change portions 
of the "agreement." On September 13, 2004, Gray e-mailed Peterson and Ray Allard, in relevant 
part, as follows: 
I understand from our conversation that if AZ profit for the year was $300,000 for 
example, and $184,000 after taxes, your proposal was to have me take 50% of the 
$184,000, or $92,000, as my annual bonus. Of the remaining $92,000, % was going 
to go to the company as retained earnings, and % was going to go to a separate escrow 
account, which would fund the buyout (or a portion thereof) in 4 years as a dividend 
payout to Gary [Peterson]. This agreement you sent me below doesn't say that. It 
says % of my 50% bonus would go to the escrow account each year. Which defeats 
the purpose of having the option to buy stock agreement, and would be unacceptable 
to me anyway. If you can have this revised to read the way it was discussed, I'll pass 
6 Neither party introduced any evidence of a "final" version that contained no italicized conunents clearly suggesting 
continued concerns about the versions. 
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it on to my CPA for review and get back to both of you. If I misunderstood our 
discussion, please let me know. 
'eterson responded by e-mail as follows: 
Rob 
Think about what you are asking. You want Ray and I to buy me out in 4 % years and 
give you half of the company! 
The 50% after taxes that is for the owners will stay in retained earnings as cash flow. 
Your 50% as we discussed will be divided with % in cash bonus to you and the other 
half to remain in the company as a separate account to use as the purchase agreement. 
Any questions - Please respond. 
Gary 
I n  October 2,2004, Gray sent another proposal to Ray Allard and indicated this was a "last gasp" to 
'try and put this deal together." Gray gave Tri-Way until October 25, 2004, to agree to his terms. 
3ctober 20, 2004, he returned the company credit cards and on October 21, 2004, he e-mailed Ray 
qllard, as follows: 
As I mentioned in our conversation earlier today [October 21,20041, I'd like to make 
next Friday my last day with Tri Way. . . . 
I will not seek reimbursement from Tri Way for those costs I incurred in Attorney and 
CPA fees as we tried to draft our apreements over the last 6 months, even though they 
are substantial. As is the earnest money deposit I'll be walking away from on the 
house here in Phoenix. As is the amount of depleted retirement savings. Buy [sic] 
hey, like I said, I'm a big boy and I put myself into this nightmare, I'll have to dig 
myself (and my family) out of it. 
I would hope that whatever portion of the profits I generated for Tri Way over the last 
4 months that you and Gary feel I'm entitled to could be paid to me by November lSt. 
:Emphasis added.) October 26, 2004, Gray again e-mailed Ray Allard and Peterson in relevant part 
IS follows: 
Gary, 
Just wanted to thank you for the opportunity to tw to put this 'deal' together over the 
last few months. . . . 
Let me try to explain: The last two weeks were not good ones for me. After 5 or 6 
months of effort, I have to admit that our failure to put this deal together. . . 
Emphasis added.) Gray testified he "refused to allow" Tri-Way to make the proposed 
'modifications" and that on or about October 22,2004, Tri-Way emailed Gray terminating him. 
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Peterson testified that Gray gave Tri-Way an October 25,2004, deadline to respond to Gray's 
I1 final offer. However, according to Tri-Way, at some point prior to October 20, 2004, Gray returned 
all the corporate credit cards and on October 21, 2004, Gray tendered his resignation. Gray does not 
dispute that he returned all the corporate credit cards. He claims, however, he was terminated by Tri- 
Way. 
According to Tri-Way, it paid Gray the agreed-upon salary for the work he had done so far 
and offered him a bonus of $60,000. Gray brought two projects to Tri-Way - generating gross 
revenues of $960,000 and $215,000. Kathy Peterson testified that the Arizona division generated 
11 $271,792.48 in net profits from June 2004 to September 30,2004. I  
/ / represented to him that he could purchase Gary Peterson's interest in Tri-Way for a certain amount. I 
10 
l3 1 For example, he testified he was unaware that Kathy Peterson owned a 25% interest in Tri-Way, 1 
Gray testified that Tri-Way misrepresented and concealed certain facts which form the basis 
of the cause of his action for fraud and upon which he claims he relied. He testified Tri-Way 
l4 1 1  until the May 21'' meeting or that she was unwilling to sell her shares. However, in his deposition, I 
27 ( I  Stock." 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
2 1 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
Gray testified that he never had any discussions with her about her willingness to sell her shares and 
no one ever communicated to him that she was unwilling. Gray also testified that Tri-Way 
represented it would compensate him "at an escalating base salary as well as at an annual amount 
equal to 50% of the net profit realized by the Defendant's efforts [Tri-Way]." Gray asserts that 
because of the representations made regarding these terms, he quit his job at Alhertson's and 
accepted employment with Tri-Way. 
Gray brought suit alleging breach of contract, a statutory claim for wages, promissory 
estoppel, equitable estoppel, and fraud. Relevant to this Motion for Summary Judgment, Gray seeks 
"past and future" loss of income, including income that he "would have received in merit and 
longevity wage increases," and "past and future losses of income which Robert Gray would 
ordinarily have received." He also sought enforcement of the "Draft Option to Purchase Corporate 
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29 
Tri-Way and Peterson moved for summary judgment and asked the Court to dismiss all 
Gray's claims with prejudice. 
4 
ANALYSIS 
4 / 1 if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled ! 
2 
3 
Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is 
"rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
11 is sought may not merely rest on allegations contained in his pleadings, but must come forward and 1 
5 
6 
1 1  admissibie evidence to contradict the assextions of the moving party and establish a genuine I 
to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 5 56(c); See also First Security Bank o f  Idaho, N.A. v. 
Murphy, 131 Idaho 787,790, 964 P.2d 654,657 (1998). A party against whom summaly judgment 
issue of material fact. McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 820 P.2d 360 (1991); Olsen v. J.A. Freeman 
Co., 117 Idaho 706, 791 P.2d 1285 (1990). See Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208,211, 868 P.2d 
' 11 1224, 1227 (1994). Any sworn statements that are part of the record are to be considered by the trial I 
1 / court in deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact. I 
On causes of action to be tried to a jury, the party opposing summary judgment is entitled to / 
/ 1 the benefit of every reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidentiary facts. G & M Farms I 
v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 85 1 (1991); Meridian Bowling Lanes, Inc. v. 
Meridian Athlete Ass'n, Inc., 105 Idaho 509, 670 P.2d 129 4 (1983). All controverted facts are 
liberally construed in favor of the party opposing the summary judgment. Tusch Enterprises v. 
Cofln, 113 Idaho 37,740 P.2d 1022 (1987); Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466,716 P.2d 1238 (1986). 
A. GRAY'S CLAIM BASED ON QUANTUM MERUIT OR IMPLIED CONTRACT 
FAILS. 
The doctrine of quantum meruit is a remedy for an implied in fact contract and permits a 
22 
23 
party to recover the reasonable value of services rendered or materials provided on the basis of an 
implied promise to pay. Cheung v. Pena, 143 Idaho 30, -,I37 P.3d 417, 422 (2006); B a h  v. 
24 
25 
Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho 185, 191,108 P.3d 332,338 (2005). "An implied in fact 
contract is defined as one where the terms and existence of the contract are manifested by the 
I 
26 
27 
I 28 
1 29 
30 
conduct of the parties with the request of one party and the performance by the other often being 
inferred from the circumstances attending the performance." Fox v. Mountain West Elec., Inc , 137 
Idaho 703,708, 52 P.3d 848, 853 (2002) (quoting Farnworth v. Fernling, 125 Idaho 283,287, 869 
P.2d 1378,1382 (1994)). 
31 
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1 
2 
5 1 Wrest Prods.. Inc. v. Chandler Supply Co., 95 Idaho 739, 743, 518 P.2d 1201, 1205 (1974). Such a / 
The implied-in-fact contract is grounded in the parties' agreement and tacit understanding; it 
is a contract. Kennedy v. Forest, 129 Idaho 584, 587, 930 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1997). A contract 
3 
4 
implied-in-fact is a true contract whose existence and terms are inferred from the conduct of the 
parties. Kennedy v. Forest, 129 Idaho 584, 587, 930 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1997) (citing Continental 
/ I  general rule is that where the conduct of the parties allows the dual inferences that one performed at I  
6 contract is grounded in the parties' agreement and tacit understanding. Id., 95 Idaho at 743, 518 P.2d 
at 1205. Hausam v. Schnabl, 126 Idaho 569, 574, 887 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Ct. App. 1994). "The 
1 1  Idaho 324,325,563 P.2d 48,49 (1977)). I  
lo 
the other's request and that the requesting party promised payment, then the court may find a contract 
implied in fact." Homes by Bell-Hi, Inc. v. Wood, 110 Idaho 319, 321, 715 P.2d 989, 991 (1986) 
(citing Clements v. Jungert, 90 Idaho 143, 153,408 P.2d 810, 815 (1965); Bastian v. Gafford, 98 
' Although unclear, Gray also apparently claims that he should he compensated for the value of the two projects he 
brought to Tri-Way. While be characterizes this as a quantum meruit claim, it is really a claim of unjust enrichment 
based on the value Tri-Way received from receiving the two projects and not based on "the nature of the work and the 
customary rate of pay for such work in the community at the time the work was performed." Thus, quantum meruit is not 
appropriate for this claim. 
001.14 
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l4 
l5 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
2 1 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
For a quantum meruit claim, the measure of recovery is the reasonable value of the services 
rendered or of goods received, regardless of whether the defendant was enriched and the burden is on 
the party claiming quantum mernit. Erickson v. Flynn, 138 Idaho 434-435, 64 P.3d 959, 963-964 
(Ct. App. 2002). This is an objective measure and is proven by evidence demonstrating the nature of 
the work and the customary rate of pay for such work in the community at the time the work was 
performed. Baker v. Boren, 129 Idaho 885, 894, 934 P.2d 951, 960 (Ct. App. 1997); Peavey v. 
Pellandini, 97 Idaho at 659, 551 P.2d at 614. Thus, if the dispute was that Gray had not been 
compensated for his services, this would he a jury issue. 
However, Gray does not dispute that he was compensated for his services at the agreed upon 
salary. The issue is whether he was entitled to a bonus and the value of that bonus (if any).7 To the 
extent this quantum meruit claim is based on the alleged agreed upon bonus, as the Court ruled on 
his wage claim, Gray introduced no evidence that the parties ever actually agreed on the terms of his 
bonus. They continued to negotiate right up until Gray quit. In addition, in response to the summary 
judgment motion, he introduced no evidence that the customary rate of pay for his work in the 
community at the time the work was performed included such a bonus. Thus lilce his wage claim, 
this cause of action fails. See also Robertson v. Hansen, 89 Idaho 107, 111, 403 P.2d 585, 587 
(1965); Weatherhead v. Cooney, 32 Idaho 127, 180 P. 760 (1919)~ Tri-Way's motion for summary 
judgment is granted on this issue. 
B. GRAY'S CLAIM OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT FAILS 
Unjust enrichment, or restitution, is the measure of recovery under a contract implied in law. 
Barry v. Pacific West Const., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 834, 103 P.3d 440, 447 (2004) (citing Peavey v 
Pellandini, 97 Idaho 655, 658, 551 P.2d 610, 613 (1976)). A contract implied in law, or quasi- 
contract, "is not a contract at all, but an obligation imposed by law for the purpose of bringing about 
justice and equity without reference to the intent of the agreement of the parties, and, in some cases, 
in spite of an agreement between the parties." Erickson v. Flynn, 138 Idaho 430, 434-35, 64 P.3d 
959,963-64 (Ct.App.2002). Recovery under an unjust enrichment theory is limited to the amount by 
which the defendant was unjustly enriched. Id. at 434, 64 P.3d at 963; 66 Am.Jur.2d. ~EsTITuTroN 
AND IMPLIED CONTRACTS 2 (1973). The essence of a contract implied in law is that a party has 
received a benefit from another which it would be inequitable for him to retain without 
compensation to the other. In Smith v. Smith, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that: 
"Restitution" and "unjust enrichment" are the modem designations for the older 
doctrine of "quasi contracts." The substance of an action for unjust enrichment lies 
in a promise, implied by law, that a party will render to the person entitled thereto that 
which in equity and good conscience belongs to the latter. 
95 Idaho 477,511 P.2d 294 (1973). 
The unjust enrichment doctrine, also referred to as quasi-contract, contract implied in law, or 
restitution, allows recovery where the defendant has received a benefit from the plaintiff which it 
would be inequitable to retain without compensating the plaintiff for the value of the benefit. 
Continental Forest Products, Inc. v. Chandler, 95 Idaho 739, 743, 518 P.2d 1201, 1205 (1974); 
8 The Court notes that these cases involve the application of I.C. $ 9-508 which is similar to the statute of frauds. I.C. 8 
9-508 requires a11 real estate brokerage contracts to be in writing to be enforceable. As the court stated in Weatherhead 
when it rejected arguments similar to the ones before this Court: "The vital question is whether recovery can be had on a 
quantwn meruit in the face of this statute, there being admittedly no written contract. . . We think the construction 
contended for by appellant would absolutely nullify the statute." 
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ldaho Lumber, Inc. v. Buck, 109 Idaho 737, 744, 710 P.2d 647, 654 (Ct.App.1993). In this case, 
Gray's contention is that Tri-Way was unjustly enriched by the two projects he brought to the 
:ompany. Thus, he argues the recipient (Tri-Way) must make restitution to him. However, 
~ccording to the Idaho case law, restitution shall be made only to the extent that, as between the two, 
the benefit would be unjust for the recipient to retain. Idaho Lumber, 109 Idaho at 744,710 P.2d at 
554. The burden is on Gray to establish what that amount is? 
Importantly, the measure of recovery in a quasi-contractual action is the actual amount of 
the enrichment, but the amount of enrichment which, as between the two parties it would be unjust 
for one party to retain. Hixon v. Allphin, 76 Idaho 327, 281 P.2d 1042 (1955); 66 Am.Jur.2d, 
RESTITUTION AND IMPLIED CONTRACTS, at p. 946 (1973). "Thus, the substance of an action for unjust 
enrichment lies in a promise, implied by law, that one will render to the person entitled thereto that 
which in equity and good conscience, belongs to the latter." Hixon, 76 Idaho 333, 281 P.2d 1045. 
In Gillette v. Storm Circle Ranch, the Supreme Court wrote: 
Unjust enrichment is an equitable doctrine and is inapplicable where the plaintiff in 
an action fails to provide the proof necessary to establish the value of the benefit 
conferred upon the defendant. 
101 Idaho 663, 667, 619 P.2d 11 16, 1120 (1980) (lessee harvested fall crop that leaser had planted 
and then planted the next crop, but before it could be harvested the leaser sold the property). 
In Blaser v. Cameron, the Court of Appeals indicated that a party seeking recovery under an 
unjust enrichment theory must present evidence not only of the value of the services it rendered, but 
also "the amount of the benefit which, if retained by the [defendant], would result in their unjust 
snrichment." 121 Idaho 1012, 1017, 829 P.2d 1361, 1366 (Ct.App.1991). The Court of Appeals 
affirmed the district court's finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a claim for unjust enrichment 
because it did not present evidence of the amount by which the defendant was unjustly enriched. Id.; 
See also, Hertz v. Fiscus, supra (tenant remodeled restaurant-lounge business and then the 
relationship soured and the landlord took possession of the business); Continental Forest Products, 
' Furthermore, to the extent Gray may rely on his "employment" agreement, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that an 
implied-in-law contract cannot create an employment relationship. Kennedy v. Forest, 129 Idaho 584, -, 930 P.2d 
1026, 1029-1030 (1997). For a quasi-contractual obligation to arise, Tri-Way would have to have been unjustly enriched 
>y its retention of the benefits of Gray's services (as opposed to the two projects). In this case, however, Tri-Way was 
001.16 
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Tnc. v. Chandler Supply Co., supra (lumber wholesaler ordered and received two carloads of 
plywood from a different lumber broker than the one from which the order was placed); Smith v. 
Smith, 95 Idaho 477, 51 1 P.2d 294 (1973) (relatives brought suit to quit title to property and to 
$etermine the individual interests in the property); Brown v. Yacht Club of Coeur d'Alene, Ltd., 
supra (purchaser entitled to recover reliance damages from seller on a real estate contract); Pichon 
v. L.J. Broekemeier, Inc., 108 Idaho 846, 702 P.2d 884 (Ct.App.1985) (vendor of real estate brought 
action to recover damage caused by purchaser in default); Idaho Lumber, Inc. v. Buck, supra (owner 
of rented property was enriched by the remodeling accomplished at the request of the lessee by the 
contractor). 
Similarly, the Court finds that in response to summary judgment, Gray introduced no 
evidence of the amount Tri-Way was enriched by bringing it two projects. Thus, his claim for unjust 
enrichment fails and summary judgment to Tri-Way is entered on this issue. 
Finally, in two affidavits submitted by Gray (dated April 27, 2005, and May 12 2005, 
respectively), he testified under oath that he began work for Tri-Way May 2004 and that he 
immediately obtained two Albertson's projects on behalf of Tri-Way as Tri-Way's employee. He 
points to no case law that would allow an employee to recover the profit earned by an employer 
simply by virtue of the employee's labor absent an agreement. Therefore, the Court grants summary 
judgment to Tri-Way on this issue. 
C. GRAY'S CLAIM BASED ON EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL" PAILS 
As previously ruled in the June 7,2007, decision, equitable estoppel assumes the existence of 
a complete agreement, which is lacking here. Therefore, the Court need not address the issue of 
whether equitable estoppel even applies as an exception to LC. $ 9-505(5). Lettunich v. Key Bank 
Nut. Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362, 367, 109 P.3d 1104, 1109 (2005). Tri-Way's motion for summary 
judgment is granted on this issue. 
not unjustly enriched by the retention of the benefits of Gray's services. Even if Tri-Way received a "benefit" from 
Gray's services, Tri-Way compensated Gray for his services. 
'O The Court has already ruled on his promissory estoppel claim. 
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2 
1 Fuw v Greenwood, 101 Idaho 387,389,613 P.2d 1338, 1340 (1980) Gray must make a prima facie 
Q 
D. GRAY'S CLAIM BASED ON FRAUD FAILS. 
Finally, Gray claims fraud. In Witt v. Jones, 111 Idaho 165, 722 P.2d 474, (1986) the Idaho 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
0 
Supreme Court set forth the elements for a cause of action in Idaho based on fraud: 
The elements for a cause of action based on fraud are: (1) a representation; (2) its 
falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its 
truth; (5) speaker's intent that it should be acted upon by another person and in 
manner reasonably contemplated; (6) hearer's ignorance of its falsity; (7) hearer's 
reliance on trutk (8) hearer's right to rely thereon; and (9) hearer's consequent and 
proximate injury. 
1 1  representations made by Tri-Way that they had an agreement. By his own admission, Gray clearly 
17 
" 
10 
11 
case on each element. Smith v. King, 100 Idaho 331,597 P.2d 217 (1979). 
There is no indication in the record that Gray was justified in relying upon any alleged oral 
' ' I I agreement itself cannot be the basis of any alleged representations. 
15 
.- 
13 
I A 
16 I  1 The Court is not required to simply accept Gray's conclusory opinions that he had an 
knew that the agreement terms were still being negotiated when he began working for Tri-Way. 
Furthermore, the draft agreement was not even prepared by Tri-Way; Gray prepared it. The 
17 / / agreement when the facts so clearly indicate that when he began working for Tri-Way he himself 
18 1 continued to send and receive draA agreements with italicized words in the very sections addressing 
19 I  I the bonus issue indicating the provisions needed revisions. Moreover, there is no evidence that there 
20 1 1  was ever any agreement on the buy-out. Therefore, Gray was not justified in relying on Tri-Way's 
23 1 1  Therefore, the Court clarifies that it grants Tri-Way's and Peterson's summary judgment 
2 1 
22 
alleged oral representations nor was he ignorant of the inaccuracy of any alleged Tri-Way's oral 
representations to the effect he had an agreement on the bonus or the buyout. 
El--+ 
Cheri C. Copsey 
24 
25 
26 
District ~udge 
motion. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 6"' day of August 2007. 
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TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, 
INC., a Washington Corporation; RAY 
ALLRAD [sic], and individual; KATHY 
PETERSON, an individual; GARY 
PETERSON, an individual, 
Defendants. 1 
COME NOW the above-named parties, by and through their undersigned counsel, 
and hereby stipulate and agree that all counterclaims or causes of action brought on behalf of 
defendantslcounterclaimants Gary Peterson and Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc., against the 
STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL OF 
COUNTERCLAIM WITH PREJUDICE - 1 
plaintifficounterdefendant, Robert Gray, which remain following the Court's Order Denying in 
Part and Granting in Part Gray's Motion for Summary Judgment, entered on or about June 11, 
2007, may be dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this 6th day of September, 2007. 
HOLLAND &HART LLP 
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Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICJAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ROBERT GRAY, 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. CV OC 0409193D 
ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION 
VS. I FOR DISMISSAL OF 
ALLRAD [sic],-and individual; KATHY 
PETERSON, an individual; GARY 
PETERSON, an individual, 
TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, 
INC., a Washington Corporation; RAY 
Defendants. 
COUNTERCLAIMS WITH 
PREJUDICE 
The stipulation of defendants/counterclaimants Gary Peterson and Tri-Way 
Construction Services, Inc., and the plaintifflcounterdefendant, Robert Gray, having come before 
this Court and good cause appearing therefor; 
ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL 
OF COUNTERCLAlMS WITH PREJUDICE - 1 
IT IS HEREBY ODERED AND THIS DOES ORDER that the counterclaims of 
defendants/counterclairnants are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
k 
4 
DATED this day of September, 2007. 
k 
The Honorable Cheri C. yopsey, 
District Judge 
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Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ROBERT GRAY, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, 
INC., a Washington Corporation; RAY 
ALLRAD [sic], and individual; KATHY 
PETERSON, an individual; GARY 
PETERSON, an individual, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0409193D 
JUDGMENT 
c- 
The Motion for Sumrnary Judgment filed on behalf of defendants having come 
before the Court and being briefed and argued; and 
JUDGMENT AND RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE - 1 
5 \ T nT- 
The Court being fully advised in the premises and having issued its Order 
Granting Motion for Summary Judgment to Tri-Way on June 5,2007, and its subsequent Order 
Clarifying June 5,2007 Summary Judgment Order and Correcting the Order on August 7,2007; 
NOW THEREFORE, Judgment on the plaintiffs amended complaint is hereby 
entered in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff, and plaintiffs action is dismissed as 
against said defendants. 
th - 
DATED this day of ,2007. 
1 
L C +  
The Honorable Cheri C. cops& 
- ~- 
District Judge 
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RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE 
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order on 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, it is hereby CERTIFIED, in accordance with 
Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the Court has determined that there is no just reason for delay of the 
entry of a final judgment and that the Court has and does hereby direct that the above final 
judgment be entered. 
DATED this - day of ,2007. 
The Honorable Cheri C. Copsey 
District Judge 
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Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ROBERT GRAY, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, 
INC., a Washington Corporation; RAY 
ALLRAD [sic], and individual; KATHY 
PETERSON, an individual; GARY 
PETERSON, an individual, 
Case No. CV OC 0409193D 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Defendants. I 
COME NOW the above-named defendants, by and through undersigned counsel, 
and pursuant to Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Idaho Code Sections 
12-120(3) and 12-12], move this Court for an award of attorney fees in addition to those costs 
DEmNDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES - 1 
A 
allowed as a matter of right and other discretionary costs described in those Rules. The basis for 
defendants' motion is as follows: 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As prevailing parties, defendants Tri-Way Construction Services, Tnc., Gary 
Peterson, Kathy Peterson and Ray Allard (collectively "Tri-Way" or "defendants") seek to 
recover all attorneys' fees that they have incurred in defending against the various claims 
brought by plaintiff Rob Gray in this matter involving a purported employment contract. On 
June 5,2007, following over two years of litigation, the Court issued its Order Granting Motion 
for Summary Judgment to Tri-Way, granting summary judgment on all of plaintiffs claims 
alleged against the defendants. On June 14,2007, the Court entered an Order Denying in Part 
and Granting in Part Gray's Motion for Summary Judgment. In short, the Court dismissed 
Counts 11, I11 and VI because they were abandoned by defendants. However, the Court denied 
plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on those claims which defendants opposed. Plaintiffs 
subsequently moved for clarification of the Court's Order granting Tri-Way summary judgment, 
and an Order Clarifying Summary Judgment Order was entered on August 6,2007, making it 
amply clear that defendants had prevailed on all causes of action raised by plaintiffs. A final 
Judgment was entered by the Court in defendants' favor on September 12,2007. As prevailing 
parties, defendants are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees under Idaho Code Sections 12-121 
11. ARGUMENT 
A. Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) represents a substantial policy of the state of 
Idaho. 
The Idaho courts have routinely described the mandatory award of attorneys' fees 
pursuant to Section 12-120(3) as a "cost o f  using the lldahol court svstem to resolve disputes in 
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specified types" of actions which "allocates this cost between the parties." Sanders v. Lanybrd, 
134 Idaho 322,325, 1 P.3d 823,826 (Ct. App. 2000) (quoting DeWils Interiors, Inc. v. Dines, 
106 Idaho 288,291,678 P.2d 80 (Ct. App. 1984)) (emphasis added). In explaining that an award 
of attorneys' fees under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) is a "fair" cost of using the Idaho court 
system, the Idaho Court of Appeals in De Wils described the effect and purpose of Section 12- 
120(3) as follows: 
Section [12-120(3)] produces a harsh result for the losing party in 
litigation over a commercial dispute. This party suffers not only 
the outcome of the dispute and his own legal expense, but also is 
burdened with costs and attorney fees awarded to the other side. 
However, this result is fair i f  the benefits and costs o f  litixation 
are identified in advance and the parties can guide their decision 
accordinglt. The parties are abjured by the statute to evaluate 
carefully the merits of their claims or defenses in the commercial 
dispute. When decidinp whether to litipate, each oarto must 
w e i .  the potential benefits o f  prevailinp apainst the potential 
costs o f  losinp. There is a direct relationship between a parto's 
decision to litixate a commercial dispute and the benefits or costs 
which flow from that decision. 
106 Idaho at 293,678 P.2d at 85 (emphasis added). Though the De Wils case specifically dealt 
with an underlying commercial transaction, the same reasoning applies to the facts and claims in 
the present matter, as it was based upon a "contract relating to . . . services." See Idaho Code 
Section 12-120(3). 
As further evidence that Section 12-120(3) represents a substantial policy of the 
state of Idaho, the Idaho Court of Appeals has made it clear that an award of attorneys' fees in 
cases involving a contract under Section 12-120(3) is mandatory as opposed to discretionary. 
See Myers v. Vermaas, 114 Idaho 85,87,753 P.2d 296 (1988) (emphasis added). Specifically, 
the Idaho Court of Appeals has described the nature and purpose of Section 12-120(3) as 
follows: 
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However, we think a different analysis is required to LC. 5 12-120. 
Unlike LC. $5 12-121 and 61-617A, LC. 6 11120 provides for a 
mandatory, not discretionary. award o f  attornev fees to the 
prevailing partv. . . . The automatic nature of an award under I.C. 
5 12-120 makes it, in effect, an adjunct to the underlying . . . 
agreement between the parties. It establishes an entitlement. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
As additional support for the strong policy in favor of mandatory attorney fee 
awards under Section 12-120(3), the Idaho Supreme Court held in Ward v. PureGro Co., 128 
Idaho 366,913 P.2d 582 (1996), that Section 12-120(3) required an award of attorneys' fees to 
the prevailing party when the nature of the underlying suit was among those specifically listed 
under the statute. Among the issues raised on appeal in the Ward case was the claim that no 
attorney fees should be awarded under Section 12-120(3) because the substantive merits of the 
contract claim had been analyzed under California law. Nevertheless, when it came to the 
determination of whether Ward was entitled to an award of attorneys' fees, the Idaho Supreme 
Court strengthened the policy in favor of mandatory attorney fees under Section 12-120(3) by 
awarding fees to Ward as the prevailing party, notwithstanding the fact that the substantive 
contract claims were analyzed under the substantive law of another state. In so doing, the Idaho 
Supreme Court explicitly held: 
LC. 5 12-120(3) provides that in any civil action to recover on a 
contract relating to a "commercial transaction," the prevailing 
party MI be allowed a reasonable attorney fee ifthe 
commercial transaction is the gravamen of the lawsuit. Brower 
v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours d; Co., 117 Idaho 780,784,792 P.2d 
345,349 (1990) . . . . Since Ward brought this action claiming a 
breach of that contract, a "commercial transaction" was the 
gravamen of this lawsuit. Thus, Ward is entitled to an award of 
attorney fees incurred on appeal pursuant to LC. 5 12-120(3). 
E.g., Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 
869 P.2d 1365 (1994). 
Ward, 128 Idaho at 370,913 P.2d at 586 (emphasis added). 
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The holding in Ward is clear and applies with great force to the facts presented 
here. The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that the award of attorneys' fees, pursuant to 
Section 12-120(3), is a fundamental policy of the state of Idaho. That fundamental policy 
applies to this case, in that the alleged employment agreement was the gravamen of all of 
plaintiffs claims. As the Idaho appellate courts have recognized, a mandatory award of fees in 
cases involving a contract relating to services under Section 12-120(3) is simply a "cost of using 
the [Idaho] court system to resolve disputes" in specified types of actions. De Wils, 106 Idaho at 
291,678 P.2d at 83; Sanders, 134 Idaho at 325, 1 P.3d at 828. And, the Idaho courts have found 
nothing punitive about a mandatory fee award under Section 12-120(3). Id. Indeed, over twenty 
years ago, the Idaho Supreme Court cautioned litigants who are looking to file suit in Idaho in a 
case involving the specified causes of action set forth in Section 12-120(3), and admonished 
would-he litigants to evaluate the merits of their claims or defenses carefully before filing an 
action involving a commercial dispute. Why? Because "[tlhere is a direct relationship between 
a party's decision to litigate a commercial dispute and the benefits or costs which flow from that 
decision." De Wils, 106 Idaho at 293. 
Presumably, Mr. Gray performed such an evaluation before he filed this suit, or at 
least when he chose to oppose defendant Tri-Way's initial Motion to Dismiss, which argued that 
this matter should properly have been brought in Washington. Mr. Gray's insistence that Idaho 
was the proper forum, and that its law should apply, further supports the policy in favor of 
applying the mandatory attorney fee provisions of Section 12-120(3). Mr. Gray also specifically 
prayed for attorney fees pursuant to Section 12-120(3) in his Complaint and Amended 
Complaint, further acknowledging its applicability in this matter. 
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In addition, as the Idaho Supreme Court acknowledged in Ward, the strength of 
Idaho's policy of allowing attorneys' fees in those types of cases specified in the statute is 
paramount and applies even where the substantive claims in this case are governed by the law of 
another jurisdiction. See Ward, 128 Idaho at 370,913 P.2d at 586. When read together, the 
cases of Ward, Sanders, and DeWils illustrate that, for cases involving those causes of action 
specified under Section 12-120(3), the Idaho courts view a mandatory award of attorneys' fees as 
part and parcel with litigating a contract case in Idaho. After all, a party who chooses to litigate 
in Idaho necessarily generates attorneys' fees in Idaho and uses the time and resources of the 
Idaho courts, which impacts chambers, its staff, the clerk of the court, and other court personnel. 
This is simply another way of articulating why Section 12-120(3) is a "cost of using the [Idaho] 
court system" as stated in the DeWils and Sanders cases. Accordingly, Idaho has a strong 
interest in ensuring that Section 12-120(3) governs the award of attorneys' fees. This principle is 
woven into the fabric of the Idaho authorities addressed above and applies with great force to the 
facts presented here. 
Finally, the award of attorneys' fees in cases involving contracts specified under 
Section 12-120(3) has been the law in Idaho for decades. Section 12-120(3) unequivocally 
provides that "the prevailing party be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee" in cases 
involving a commercial transaction. This language is mandatory, unavoidable, and emphatic. 
To be sure, Section 12-120(3) is not a default provision or gap filler, subject to override by the 
parties in cases involving contracts that relate to services. Rather, it represents a basic and 
fundamental policy choice by the State of Idaho that, for cases involving such contracts, an 
award of attorneys' fees is mandatory. In fact, one could easily speculate that a substantial factor 
in Mr. Gray choosing to file this suit in Idaho rather than Washington is because of the 
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mandatory availability of attorneys' fees under Section 12-120(3). In light of the Idaho Court of 
Appeals' twenty year old admonishment in DeWils that would be litigants should choose their 
forum carefully because the "costs" of litigating commercial cases in Idaho will come in the 
form of the award of fees under Section 12-120(3), taken together with plaintiffs 
acknowledgment in his pleadings that Section 12-120(3) governs a fee award in this case, 
plaintiff cannot now avoid the application of Section 12-120(3). 
B. Standards Governing an Award of Attorneys' Fees Under Idaho Code 
Section 12-120(3). 
The defendants seek an award of their attorneys' fees for their defense of 
plaintiffs claims pursuant to Section 12-120(3), which provides: 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, 
note, bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relatine to 
the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and 
in any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by law, 
rite prevailing part)! shull be allowed a reasonable attorwqv's fee 
to be set by the Court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
(Emphasis added.) 
As demonstrated below, the defendants are clearly the prevailing parties and this 
action meets the criteria established by Section 12-120(3) for an award of attorney fees. As the 
Supreme Court of Idaho has noted: 
Under LC. 5 12-120(3), the prevailing party in a civil action 
involving a commercial transaction is entitled to an award of 
reasonable attorneys fees. There is a two-stage analysis necessary 
to determine whether a prevailing party is entitled to an award of 
attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3). Fiust, the commercial 
transaction must be integral to tire claim, and second, the 
commercial transaction must provide the actual basis for 
recovery. A commercial transaction means all transactions except 
those for personal or household purposes. 
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Iron Eagle Dev. LLC v. Quality Design Sys,, Inc., 138 Idaho 487,493,65 P.3d 509,515 (2003) 
(citations omitted and emphasis added). Again, as stated above, though Iron Eagle Dev. LLC 
dealt with the "commercial transaction" provision of Section 12-120(3), because the alleged 
employment contract was one "relating to . . . services" as provided under the statute, the same 
rationale employed by the Iron Eagle Court applies to this case as well. 
Here, the entirety of plaintiffs action was based upon the purported employment 
agreement. As such, the underlying contract was certainly "integral" to the various causes of 
action, including those sounding in tort. The second element addressed by the Iron Eagle Court 
is also present here, in that all theories of recovery asserted by plaintiff were based upon the 
"terms" of the alleged employment agreement. Indeed, the contractual terms which plaintiff 
sought to enforce represented the entirety of his damage claims, and thus the two-stage analysis 
set forth above has been satisfied. 
1. The defendants are the prevailing parties in this action. 
"The determination of whether a litigant is the prevailing party is committed to 
the discretion of the trial court." Sanders, 134 Idaho at 325, 1 P.3d at 826; see also IDAHO R. 
Clv. P. 54(d)(l)(B). In Idaho, governing legal standards on the prevailing party issue are 
provided by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(B). There are three principal factors the trial 
court must consider when determining which party, if any, prevailed: "(1) the final judgment or 
result obtained in relation to the relief sought; (2) whether there were multiple claims or issues; 
and (3) the extent to which each party prevailed on each issue or claim." J e r v  Joseph C.L. U. 
Ins. Assoc., Inc. v. Vaught, 117 Idaho 555,557,789 P.2d 1146, 1148 (1990). Importantly, under 
Idaho law, "[a] determination of who qualifies as a prevailing party is determined 'from an 
overall view, not a claim-by-claim analysis."' Vanderford v. Knudson, --- P.3d ---, 2007 WL 
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2012425, "10 (Idaho July 13,2007) (quoting Eighteen Mile Ranch, L.L.C. v .  Nord Excavating & 
Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005). 
On August 7,2007, this Court issued its errata Order granting the defendants' 
motion for summary judgment on all claims asserted by Mr. Gray in this action. Moreover, on 
September 12,2007, the Court entered a final Judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissed 
this case with prejudice, which included all of plaintiffs claims for relief against the defendants. 
Accordingly, the final judgment and result obtained by the defendants in relation to the relief 
sought overwhelmingly and exclusively favors the defendants. As the United States Supreme 
Court has stated, "[rlespect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least some 
relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail." Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 
760, 107 S. Ct. 2672,96 L. Ed. 2d 654 (1987). Here, Mr. Gray received none of the relief sought 
by way of his Amended Complaint, as final Judgment was entered in the defendants' favor. 
Moreover, "in deciding whether a party was the prevailing one the inquiry is not 
conducted motion-by-motion or argument-by-argument." Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 425, 
434, 11 1 P.3d 110, 119 (2005). Rather, the prevailing party determination is done from an 
overall view. Eighteen Mile Ranch, 117 P.3d at 133. As demonstrated above, in analyzing the 
prevailing party issue as a coherent whole, it is clear that the defendants are the prevailing party 
in this action.' 
' Although the defendants alleged a counterclaim against Mr. Gray, the defendants 
stipulated and agreed to dismiss those counterclaims with prejudice in an effort to bring some 
finality to this matter. Indeed, although the defendants agreed to dismiss their counterclaims, 
they did so in order to effectuate an appeal or, in the event no such appeal was taken, to obtain 
closure. As such, plaintiff did not "prevail" on the defendants' counterclaims. 
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2. The gravamen of this litigation is a contract of the type described in 
Section 12-120(3). 
In what is a familiar expression of Idaho law, to determine whether attorneys' fees 
are available under Section 12-120(3), "[tlhe critical test is whether the [contract at issue] 
comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit; the [contract] must be integral to the claim and constitute 
a basis upon which the party is attempting to recover." Bingham v. Montane Res. Assoc., 133 
Idaho 420,426,987 P.2d 1035,1041 (1999). There can be no doubt that the gravamen of this 
lawsuit involves a contract of the type specified in Section 12-120(3). All of plaintiffs claims- 
including those allegations of fraud, constructive fraud, quantum meruit, implied contracts, 
quasi-contracts, unjust enrichment or equitable estoppel-sought to enforce or were otherwise 
entirely based upon the terms of the alleged employment agreement andlor option to purchase 
stock. As such, the alleged contracts were not simply the "gravamen" of the case, they were the 
case, and defendants clearly prevailed on all counts. 
3. The defendants are entitled to all of their attorneys' fees incurred in 
the defense of this action. 
Defendants have fully detailed for the Court the scope and amounts of fees 
claimed in this action by way of the Memorandum of Costs and Fees filed concurrently herewith. 
Under Section 12-120(3) and controlling Idaho law, defendants submit that they are entitled to 
an award of all of their reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in the defense of this action. 
In a recent case involving the issue of the enforceability of an unsigned loan 
commitment letter, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that the attorneys' fees incurred by the 
defendant bank in defending against claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith, and fvaud were recoverable under Section 12-120(3) because such 
claims arose in the context of the underlying contract. See Lettunich v. Key Bank Nut ' I  Ass 'n, 
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141 Idaho 362,368-69, 109 P.3d 1104, 11 10-11 (2005). Notably, the plaintiff argued that the 
defendant bank could not recover attorneys' fees in defending against the fraud claim. Id. at 369, 
109 P.3d at 11 11. In rejecting this argument, the Idaho Supreme Court stated, "the fact is, all of 
[plaintiffs] claims arise within the . . . context of [plaintiff] attempting to obtain a loan for his 
business. The fraud claim is simply another aspect of [plaintiffs] claim that he purchased cattle 
at the sale as a result of [the defendant bank's] representations. All of this is integral to the 
[contract] between [the defendant bank] and [plaintiff]." Id. 
More recently, the Idaho Supreme Court clarified its holding from Lettunich 
stating: 
From time to time the Court has denied fees under LC. 5 12-120(3) 
on the commercial transaction ground either because the claim 
sounded in tort or because no contract was involved. The 
commercial transaction ground in Z.C. 8 12-IZO(3) neither 
prohibits afee award-for a commercial transaction that involves 
tortious conduct (see ~ettunich v. Key Bank Nat 7 Ass 'n, 141 Idaho 
362,369, 109 P.3d 1104, 11 11 (2005)), nor does it require that 
there be a contract. Anv previous holdings to the contrary are 
overruled. We hold that [plaintiff] is entitled to a fee award on 
appeal with respect to his fraud claim, as he is seeking recovery of 
damages sustained as a result of the commercial transaction 
involved in this case. 
Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 152 P.3d 594,559-600 (2007) (emphasis 
added). Thus, whether in the context of an underlying contract or a commercial transaction, 
when the transaction at issue involves one of those transactions specified in Section 12-120(3), 
the prevailing party's entitlement to attorney fees is mandatory, even if the underlying lawsuit is 
based in part on a tort theory of recovery. 
In light of Lettunich and Blimka, the defendants are entitled to an award of 
attorneys' fees under Section 12-120(3) for all reasonable fees incurred in the defense of this 
action. As demonstrated above, there can be no dispute that plaintiffs claims flow from the 
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central issue in this case: his failed effort to enforce the Draft Employment Ageement and the 
Draft Option to Purchase Stock. The Idaho Supreme Court's reasoning in Lettunich applies with 
equal force here because, the fact is, all of plaintiffs claims arise within the context of his 
attempt to enforce a purported contract relating to services. See Lettunich, 141 Idaho at 369, 109 
P.3d at 11 11. The dismissal of plaintiffs claims for fraud and other equitable remedies are 
simply alternative aspects of his more general complaint that the defendants wrongfully refused 
to cornply with the terms of the underlying "contracts." As a result, the defendants are entitled to 
an award of their attorneys' fees incurred in connection with the defense of such claims. 
Finally, the Court's determination that there was no meeting of the minds 
sufficient to form a binding contract does not alter the fact that plaintiffs pursued this action 
under a contract theory. As such, plaintiff may not avoid the mandatory attorney fee provisions 
of Section 12-120(3) simply by arguing that no valid contract was ever found to exist. To adopt 
such a premise would render the statute illusory 
itself under similar facts. 
111. CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, defendants respectfully request that the Court award 
them their attorney fees in the amount set forth in their Memorandum of Costs and Fees. 
DATED this 26th day of September, 2007. 
,' 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES to be 
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Erik F. Stidham ( ,$US.  Mail, Postage Prepaid 
HOLLAND & HART LLP ( ) Hand Delivered 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1400 ( ) Overnight Mail 
Post Office Box 2527 ( ) Facsimile 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527 
Facsimile (208) 343-8869 
@ G. Murray 
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1. The above-named Appellant, Robert Gray ("Gray"), hereby appeals the Order 
entered by the Court on June 5, 2007 and subsequent Order Clarifying June 5, 2007 Summary 
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Judgment Order and Correcting the Order on August 7, 2007, which was later reduced to 
Judgment entered on September 12,2007, Hon. Cheri C. Copsey, presiding. 
2. Appellant Gray has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
Judgment and Order described in Paragraph 1 above are appealable under and pursuant to Rule 
1 l(a)(l) of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
3. Appellant intends to assert a number of issues on appeal including, but not limited 
to, the following: 
a. the Trial Court erred granting of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment against all claims made by Plaintiff Rob Gray; 
b. the Trial Court erred in ruling that Rob Gray's claim for breach of contract 
fails as a matter of law; 
c. the Trial Court erred in ruling that Rob Gray's statutory claim for wages 
fails as a matter of law; 
d. the Trial Court erred in ruling that Rob Gray's claim for promissory 
estoppel fails as a matter of law; 
e. the Trial Court erred in ruling that Rob Gray's claim for equitable 
estoppel/ quantum meruit fails as a matter of law; 
f. the Trial Court erred in ruling that Rob Gray's claim for fraud fails as a 
matter of law. 
Appellant reserves the right to add additional issues on appeal and to revise or restate the 
issues set forth above. 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. Appellant requests the reporter's transcript, 
6 .  Appellant requests that all documents and pleadings in the Court file be included 
in the clerk's record on appeal, in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28 I.A.R., 
and specifically including all briefs and affidavits submitted by Appellant Gray in this matter. 
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Plaintiff, Robert Gray ("Gray"), by and through his counsel of record, Holland & 
DATED this lr( day of October, 2007. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
MOFFATT THOMAS BARRETT ROCK & 
FIELDS. CHTD 
Services, lnc. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this &day of October 2007, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Jason G. Murray, Esq. C] U.S. Mail 
MOFFATT HOMAS BARRETT ROCK Hand Delivered 
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Hart, LLP, and Defendant, Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc. ("Tri-Way") both agree 
ROBERT GRAY, 
Plaintiffs 
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TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, 
INC., a Washington Corporation; RAY 
ALLRAD, an individual; KATHY 
PETERSON, an individual; GARY 
PETERSON, an individual, 
to extend the time for Gray to object to Tri-Way's Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs. 
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Assigned Judge: Cheri C. Copsey 
The parties recognize that the original Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs served on 
Gray on September 26, 2007 was incomplete. Tri-Way has now provided a complete 
copy to Gray. The parties thereby stipulate to a further three (3) day extension of time 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff Robert Gray 
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Erik F. Stidham, ISB No. 5483 
Julie Tetrick, ISB No. 6985 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
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101 South Capitol Blvd. 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff Robert Gray 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ROBERT GRAY, 
Plaintiffs 
TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, INC., 
a Washington Corporation; RAY ALLRAD, an 
individual; KATHY PETERSON, an individual; 
GARY PETERSON, an individual, 
Case No. CVOC 0409193D 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO 
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR FEES 
AND COSTS 
Assigned Judge: Cheri C. Copsey 
Defendants. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Defendants are not entitled to the attorneys' fees which they seek. First, Defendants 
should not be considered the "prevailing party" under Idaho Code $ 12-120(3) and Rule 54 of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants asserted six claims against Plaintiff Robert Gray 
("Gray"). Of the six (6) claims, Defendants conceded at summary judgment that three (3) of 
their claims against Gray were without factual or legal merit. Then Defendants dismissed the 
remaining three (3) claims against Gray. In short, neither Defendants nor Gray should be 
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considered the prevailing party given that none of the parties prevailed on any of the affirmative 
claims. 
Second, even if Defendants are considered to be prevailing parties, Defendants should not 
recover all of the $64,359.19 in fees and costs they seek. The Court should equitably apportion 
all fees and costs to reflect that Defendants' victory was only a partial victory. Moreover, 
Defendants, even if they prevailed on a particular claim, may only recover fees for those claims 
which were grounded in contract, and may not recover fees and costs for those claims which 
were grounded in tort or based on statute. Also, Defendants should not be allowed to recover 
fees related to unnecessary and meritless motions such as their unsuccessful motions to dismiss 
based upon jurisdiction. 
Finally, Defendants are not entitled to their discretionary costs because they failed to 
provided sufficient evidentiary support justifying the costs and also failed to establish that this 
case's costs were "exceptional" and the costs were reasonably incurred. 
11. ARGUMENT 
A. Defendants Are Not Prevailing Parties under Rule 54, and Thus, Are Not Entitled to 
an Award of Fees and Costs. 
The Court should deny Defendants' request for fees and costs in its entirety on the basis 
that Defendants were not the prevailing party. Under both Idaho Code Section 12-120(3), which 
authorizes an attorney fees in a civil action involving a commercial transaction based on a 
contract, and Rule 54(d)(l)(A) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, which authorizes an award 
of costs as a matter of right, the party seeking such fees and costs must first prove it qualifies as 
"the prevailing party." Idaho Rule of Civil Produce 54(d)(l)(B) provides the framework for 
determining the prevailing party issue for entitlement to both fees and costs, which states: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and 
entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider 
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the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief 
sought by the respective parties, whether there were multiple 
claims, multiple issues, counterclaims, third party claims, cross- 
claims, or other multiple or cross issues between the parties, and 
the extent to which each party prevailed upon each of such issue or 
claims.. . 
Thus, under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B), there are three principal factors the trial court must 
consider when determining which party, if any, prevailed. First, the court must evaluate the final 
judgment or result obtained in relation to the relief sought; second, whether there were multiple 
claims or issues between the parties; and third, the extent to which each of the parties prevailed 
on each of the claims or issues. Chadderdon v. King, 104 Idaho 406,411-12,659 P.2d 160, 165- 
66 (Ct.App. 1983). "The mandate of [Rule 541 is clear: The trial court is vested with the 
discretion to apportion costs and fees, taking into account counterclaims, cross-claims or other 
multiple issues." Jones v. Whiteley, 112 Idaho 886, 889, 736 P.2d 1340, 1343 (Idaho App. 
1987). 
For example, in .Jones, the plaintiffs brought suit against the defendants for sums due on a 
contract. The defendant counterclaimed for restitution of overpayment made to the plaintiffs in a 
previous transaction. 112 Idaho at 887, 736 P.2d at 1341. The trial court found for the plaintiffs 
on the contract claim, but reduced the plaintiffs' recovery by the amount of the overpayments. 
Id. Based upon these facts, the trial court refused to find that either party prevailed for purposes 
of awarding fees and costs, noting that the plaintiffs had prevailed on some claims and defendant 
had prevailed on others. Id. at 889, 736 P.2d at 1343. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
courts decision: "We find no abuse of discretion in such decision. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(A), which 
authorizes costs to the prevailing party, and LC. 5 12-120(2), which authorizes attorney fees to a 
prevailing party, are not applicable where, as here, there is no prevailing party." Id. at 889-890, 
736 P.2d at 1343-1344. 
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In Ruge v. Posey, 114 Idaho 890, 761 P.2d 1242 (Ct. App. 1988), a pedestrian and her 
husband brought action against an automobile driver for injuries sustained as a result of a motor 
vehicle accident. At trial, the plaintiffs prevailed on the compensatory damages claim, but did 
not prevail on the claims for loss of consortium and punitive damages. Id. Pursuant to Rule 
54(d)(l), plaintiffs sought an award of costs. Id The trial judge, however, determined that 
although plaintiffs prevailed on the issue of compensatory damages, there was no overall 
prevailing party within the meaning of the rule, and as such, plaintiffs were not entitled to an 
award of costs. Id 
Similarly, this case involved multiple claims and issues. Here, Plaintiff asserted a total of 
eight claims against Defendants, including breach of contract, fraud, estoppel, and statutory wage 
claim violations. See First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial ("Amended 
Complaint"). Defendants counterclaimed against Plaintiff, asserting six claims, including breach 
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference with prospective economic 
advantage, defamation, tortious interference with contract, conversion, and quasi-estoppel. See 
Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, and Counterclaim. After engaging in 
discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The Court heard argument on 
September 25,2006. At summary judgment, Defendants conceded that their claims for Tortious 
Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage (Count 11), Defamation (Count 111) and 
Quasi-Estoppel (Count VI) were without legal or factual support. See Order Denying in Part and 
Granting in Part Gray's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
On June 5, 2007, this Court granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. See 
Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment to Tri-Way. Nine days later, on June 14, 2007, 
the Court entered a separate decision on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, granting it in 
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part and denying it in part. See Order Denying in Part and Granting in Part Gray's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Shortly thereafter, Defendants dismissed the remainder of their 
counterclaims, which were not already dismissed by the Court's prior decision. Neither party 
recovered on any of their respective claims. 
Stated differently, Gray can be said to have prevailed on six of the fourteen claims 
asserted while Defendants can be said to have prevailed on eight of the fourteen claims asserted. 
Taking into account the parties' proportional success on the multiple claims and issues, the Court 
- under both Jones and Ruge - would be within its sound discretion to find that no party 
prevailed, and that each party must bear its own costs. See Jones, 112 Idaho at 889-890, 736 
P.2d at 1343-1344; Ruge, 114 Idaho at 892, 761 P.2d at 1244. Like the parties in Jones and 
Ruge, both Plaintiff and Defendants in this case only prevailed on a fraction of their respective 
claims. Therefore, the Court should find that Rule 54(d)(l)(A) and LC. 9 12-120(2), do not 
apply here - where there is no prevailing party. 
B. Even Assuming Defendants Are Prevailing Parties, Defendants Are Not Entitled To 
Recover Of All The Fees Sought. 
1. Fees and Costs Should Be Apportioned. 
Even if the Court deems Defendants the "most" prevailing party, Defendants are not 
entitled to the entire fee and cost award they have requested given that they did not prevail on a 
significant portion of the total claims asserted. "Where parties have each prevailed on different 
causes of action tried in the same lawsuit, attorney fees [and costs] may be apportioned 
accordingly." Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. v. Peterson, 102 Idaho 111, 121, 626 P.2d 767, 
777 (Idaho 1980) (citing Jensen v. Shank, 99 Idaho 565, 585 P.2d 1276 (1978) and I.R.C.P. 
54(d)(l)(B)). See also Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629, 862 P.2d 321 (Idaho Ct.App. 
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1993); Badell v. Badell, 122 Idaho 442,835 P.2d 677 (Idaho App. 1992); Prouse v. Ransom, 117 
Idaho 734,791 P.2d 1313 (Ct.App. 1989). 
In Badell, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's award of a seventy-five 
percent attorney fee award where the court found that the plaintiff only prevailed in part. 122 
Idaho at 450, 835 P.2d at 685 (Idaho Ct.App. 1992). Similarly, in Bumgarner, the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to reduce the plaintiffs fee award by one-half to 
reflect the fact that the plaintiff only prevailed on one of his trespass claims, which overlapped to 
some extent with his other trespass claim, but was not successful on his emotional distress claim 
and a separate trespass claim. 124 Idaho at 644, 862 P.2d at 336. See also Northwest Bee-Corp 
v. Home Living Service,l36 Idaho 835,41 P.3d 263 (Idaho 2002)(affirming trial court's decision 
to award defendant only one-half of attorneys' fees as a portion of her fees were incurred during 
the preparation of her counterclaim upon which she did not prevail). 
Application of this equitable rule to the present case should result in a pro-rata reduction 
of Defendants' fee award for the claims on which Plaintiff prevailed. Here, each of the parties 
has prevailed on different causes of action tried within the same lawsuit. Thus, attorney fees 
should be apportioned accordingly in accordance with the prior decisions of Idaho courts. It 
would certainly be within the Court's sound discretion to award Defendants no more than 60% 
of the fees and costs requested, or $38,615.51, to reflect the fact that Defendants only prevailed 
on eight of the fourteen claims asserted (approximately 60% of the claims). See Massey- 
Ferguson, 102 Idaho at 121, 626 P.2d at 777; Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629, 862 P.2d at 336; 
Badell, 122 Idaho at 450, 835 P.2d at 685. 
2. Fees Incurred On The Tort And Statutory Claims Mav Not Be Allowed. 
In addition, Defendants are not entitled to fees incurred prosecuting and defending claims 
grounded in tort andlor statutory violations. Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) does not authorize 
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attorneys' fees for claims grounded in tort or statutory violations. Northwest Bec-Corp v. Home 
Living Service, 136 Idaho 835, 41 P.3d 263 (Idaho 2002); Prop. Mgmt. West, Inc. v. Hunt, 126 
Idaho 897, 899-900, 894 P.2d 130, 133-34 (Idaho 1995). Accordingly, the attorneys' fees 
claimed by Defendants must be apportioned to exclude the unrecoverable fees spent on the other 
causes of action not grounded in a contract. Hunt, 126 Idaho at 899-900. 
In Prop. Mgmt. West, Inc. v. Hunt, 126 Idaho 897, 894 P.2d 130 (1995), the plaintiff sued 
the defendant on a variety of theories after the defendant's employment relationship with the 
plaintiff soured. A major issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in granting 
attorney fees under I.C. (j 12-120(3) to plaintiff as the prevailing party on the claims. Id. The 
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could not be awarded attorney fees on two of the claims 
upon which it prevailed because, although the underlying relationship between the parties may 
have been based on the defendant's employment with the plaintiff, those two claims were 
grounded in tort, not in contract. Id. at 899-900, 894 P.2d at 132-33. C.J, Atwood v. W: Constr., 
Inc., 129 Idaho 234, 923 P.2d 479 (Ct.App.1996) (awarding attorney fees expended on 
employment contract but disallowing fees expended on plaintiffs age discrimination claim 
which was rooted in statute). 
Just as the plaintiff in Hunt could not recover attorneys' fees expended on non-contract 
based claims, Defendants should not be allowed to recover for fees incurred prosecuting and 
defending claims grounded in tort and statutory violations. Plaintiff brought claims for fraud, 
constructive fraud, and violations of Idaho's wage claim statutes. Defendants asserted 
counterclaims for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, defamation, 
tortious interference with contract, and conversion. None of these foregoing claims pleaded by 
the parties can be fairly said to be an action "on the contract" for purposes of Section 12-120(3). 
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Thus, no contractual or statutory authority for an award of attorneys' fees exists on these seven 
causes of action - which constitute one-half of the claims asserted: and Defendants' fee award 
should be reduced accordingly. 
Combining the numbers of claims on which Defendants did not prevail (the six 
counterclaims) and the number of claims that are not contract-based (three in addition to the six 
counterclaims), the Court should find nine claims for which Defendants would not be entitled to 
be awarded fees and costs (assuming Defendants are even deemed the "prevailing party"). Thus, 
subtracting those nine claims from the total of fourteen claims asserted, Defendants should only 
receive fees incurred in relation to the five remaining claims as represented by a percentage of 
the overall claims asserted, or a thirty-three percent fee award of $20,305.20'. 
3. Defendants Should Not Be Allowed to Recover Attorney Fees and Costs 
Associated With Its Motion to Dismiss. 
Furthermore, Defendants wrongfully seek fees and costs associated with their 
unsuccessful motions to dismiss based upon jurisdiction. The Court clearly held that it had 
jurisdiction over the Defendants. Defendants did not prevail on these arguments, and therefore 
are not entitled to fees and costs associated with those arguments. Defendants incurred fees of 
$6,872.00 related to the meritless motion to dismiss based on lack of j~risdiction.~ Accordingly, 
' Note that the calculation excludes discretionary costs. 
2 
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Attorney ] 
Patricia 
M. Olsson 
Jason G. 
Murray 
Russell G. 
Metcalf 
TOTAL 
Dates 
12/7/04, 12/15/04,2/15105,4/6/05, 
4/25/05, 5/4/05, 5/16/05 
12/8/04, 12/9/04, 12/16/04,2122/05, 
2/23/05,3122/05,3128105,3~31105, 
4/6/05,4/7/05,4/8/05,4/12/05, 
4/25/05,5~2/05,5/3/05,5/4/05, 
5/12/05,5/16/05,5/17/05,5/23/05 
2/22/05,2/23/05,3/7/05,3/23/05, 
3/24/05,9/7106, 9/8/06 
Total 
$1455.50 
$3904.00 
$1512.50 
$6872.00 
the award to Defendants should be reduced by $6,872.00 to deduct the fees and costs associated 
with their failed motions to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction. 
C. Defendants Are Not Entitled to Discretionary Costs Because It Cannot Show Such 
Costs Were Necessary And Exceptional. 
In general, an award of discretionary costs is "committed to the sound discretion of the 
district court." Zimmerman v. V o l h a g e n  ofAmerica, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 858, 920 P.2d 67, 74 
(1996). However, the burden is on the prevailing party to make an adequate and initial showing 
that discretionary costs were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and should in 
the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party. Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847, 934 
P.2d 20 (1997); Automobile Club Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 124 Idaho 874, 880, 865 P.2d 965, 971 
(1993), citing Westfall v. Caterpillar, Inc., 120 Idaho 918, 926, 821 P.2d 973, 981 (1991). 
Furthermore, it is important to note that even if a requested discretionary cost is necessary and 
reasonable, if the Plaintiff fails to prove that the cost was not exceptional, the court must deny 
the cost on that basis alone. See Bingham v. Montane Resource Associates, 133 Idaho 420, 987 
P.2d 1035 (1999); Fish v. Smith, 131 Idaho 492,493-94,960 P.2d 175, 176-77 (1988); see also 
lnama v. Brewer, 132 Idaho 377,384,973 P.2d 148, 155 (1999). 
Plaintiff objects to the Defendants claimed discretionary costs pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 
54(d)(l)(D), which provides in relevant part, as follows: 
Additional items of cost not enumerated in, or in an amount in excess of that 
listed in subparagraph (C), may be allowed upon a showing that said costs were 
necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of 
justice be assessed against the adverse party. The trial court, in ruling upon 
objections to such discretionary costs contained in the memorandum of costs, 
shall make express findings as to why such specific item of discretionary cost 
should or should not be allowed .... 
Id. 
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Specifically, Plaintiff objects to the Defendants' claimed discretionary costs described as 
follows: 
1. Photocovying Imaging (1,353.23) 
2. Vendor Services ($177.00) 
3. Westlaw Research ($560.11) 
4. Out-of-Town Travel - devositions of G. Peterson. K. Peterson, and R. Allard 
($647.15) 
Defendants have made no showing that these discretionary costs "were necessary and 
exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against 
[Plaintifq." There is no basis for the Court to find from the record that the additional sums 
claimed by the Defendants fall within the category of exceptional costs. The Supreme Court has 
approved, as a proper reading of the term "exceptional" in Rule 54(d)(l)(D), a trial court's denial 
of expert witness fees, travel and lodging expenses for expert witnesses and attorneys, and 
photocopying charges on the ground that the use of such experts and other expenses are 
commonly incurred in serious personal injury actions. Fish v. Smith, 131 Idaho 492, 960 P.2d 
175 (1998). The same rationale is applicable in this contract dispute action. Indeed, there is 
nothing exceptional about the discretionary costs claimed by Defendants and Defendants make 
no effort to prove otherwise. Because Defendants have not put forth any effort to justifl their 
discretionary costs and nonetheless would be unable to do so, their request for such costs in the 
amount of $2,828.29 should also be denied. 
111. CONCLUSION 
To the extent Defendants only partially prevailed, the Court should either deny attorney 
fees altogether or fairly apportion such fees and costs to the extent that each party prevailed. In 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR FEES AND COS&lGO 
- 10 
addition, Defendants are not entitled to fees and costs incurred in the prosecution and defense of 
non-contract based claims. Defendants are not entitled to any discretionary costs. 
DATED this day of October, 2007. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ROBERT GRAY, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, 
INC., a Washington Corporation; RAY 
ALLRAD [sic], and individual; KATHY 
PETERSON, an individual; GARY 
PETERSON, an individual, 
Defendants. 1 
Case No. CV OC 0409193D 
RESPONDENTS' REQUEST FOR 
ADDITIONS TO RECORD 
I 
COME NOW the above-named defendantslrespondents, Tri-Way Construction 
Services, Inc., Ray Allard, Kathy Peterson and Gary Peterson, by and through undersigned 
counsel, and request that, in addition to those documents automatically included under Rule 28 
RESPONDENTS' REQUEST FOR ADDITIONS TO RECORD - 1 
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, the following documents be included in the Clerk's Record on 
Appeal: 
1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on August 2, 2006; 
2. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
filed on August 2,2006; 
3. Affidavit of Jason G. Murray in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, filed on August 2,2006; 
4. Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, 
filed on August 30,2006; 
5. Affidavit of Jason G. Murray in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment, filed on August 30,2006; 
6. Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed on September 14,2006; 
7. Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, filed on October 13,2006; 
8. Reply to Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum Re: Statute of Frauds, 
filed on November 27,2006; 
9. Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment to Tri-Way, lodged on 
June 5,2007; 
10. Order Clarifying June 5,2007 Summary Judgment Order and Correcting 
the Order, lodged on August 7,2007; and 
11. Judgment, entered by the Court on September 12,2007. 
001 
RESPONDENTS' REQUEST FOR ADDITIONS TO RECORD - 2 BOI-MTZ 672138 1 
DefendantsIRespondents further request that the Exhibits to the Affidavits of 
Jason G. Murray requested herein (Request Nos. 3 and 5, respectively) be filed as Exhibits to the 
Clerk's Record in accordance with I.A.R. 31. 
This Request for Additions to the Clerk's Record on Appeal is brought pursuant 
to Idaho Appellate Rule 28(c), and is further supported by the Affidavit of Jason G. Murray in 
Support of Request for Additions to Record, filed contemporaneously herewith. 
DATED this 10th day of December, 2007. 
003.GS 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10th day of December, 2007, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENTS' REQUEST FOR ADDITIONS TO 
RECORD to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Erik F. Stidham ( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
HOLLAND &HART LLP (iY/~and Delivered 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1400 ( ) Overnight Mail 
Post Office Box 2527 ( ) Facsimile 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527 
Facsimile (208) 343-8869 
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DEC 21 
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THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF Bv 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ROBERT GRAY, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, 
INC., et al. 
Case No. CVOC 0409193D 
ORDER GRANTING COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Defendants. 
On June 5, 2007, the Court granted Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc. and the Petersons 
collectively "Tri-Way") summary judgment on all of Robert Gray's claims and on August 9, 2007, 
he Court clarified its Order Granting Summary Judgment to Tri-Way. 
On June 11, 2007, the Court denied Gray's Motion for Summary Judgment on Tri-Way's 
3ounterclaim as to the Counts I, IV and V of Tri-Way's Counterclaims finding there were disputes 
)f material facts. As to Counts 11, 111, and VI, the Court dismissed those counterclaim counts. On 
September 6, 2007, the parties stipulated to dismiss Tri-Way's remaining counterclaims. The Court 
:ntered final judgment on September 12,2007. Gray appealed and on September 26,2007, Tri-Way 
noved for costs and fees under I.C. 5 12-120(3) and I.C. 5 12-121. Gray opposed. 
The Court scheduled argument for November 29, 2007. Gray's attorney failed to appear but 
ater Gray's attorney filed an affidavit in which he testified that he had not received notice of the 
learing. The Court clerk contacted Gray's attorney and he indicated the Court could make its 
lecision without further argument. Therefore, on December 20, 2007, the Court took the matter 
inder advisement. 
For the reasons stated below, the Court grants Tri-Way's Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees 
md the Court awards Tri-Way attorney's fees in the amount of $48,207.75 and costs as a matter of 
ight in the amount of $2,217.40. In an exercise of discretion, the Court denies Tri-Way any 
liscretionary costs. By reference, the Court hereby incorporates the factual statement found in its 
Irder Granting Summary Judgment to Tri-Way dated June 5,2007. 
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3 Rohr v. Rohr, 128 Idaho 137, 91 1 P.2d 133 (1996); Owner-Operator Independent Drivers v. Idaho I I 
1 
2 
4 / I  Public Utilities Com h, 125 Idaho 401, 871 P.2d 818 (1994); Matter of Estate of Keeven, 126 Idaho 
ANALYSIS 
In Idaho, parties pay their own attorney's fees unless a statute or contract provides otherwise. 
5 / /  290, 882 P.2d 457 (Ct.App. 1994) (also called the "American Rule") The party who claims attorney 
6 fees must present the Court either a statute or contract between the parties permitting such an award; I I 
7 1 I if the party does not point the Court to a statute or contract, attorney fees may be denied. Fournier v. 
8 Fournier, 125 Idaho 789,74 P.2d 600 (Ct.App. 1994) I/ I/ Tri-Way moved for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to I.C. $3  12-120(3), 12-121 and 
10 1 I I.R.C.P. 54. It contends it is the prevailing party. It further claims that the gravamen of the case was 
13 ( ( I .  TRI-WAY AND THE PETERSONS ARE THE PREVAILING PARTIES. 
1 1  
12 
14 11 The Court finds Tri-Way and the Petersons are the prevailing parties. The determination as to 
a commercial transaction and that attorney's fees are proper under I.C. § 12-120(3). Gray timely' 
objected to Tri-Way's memorandum of fees and costs. See I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6), 54(e)(6). 
15 
16 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the 
trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of the 
action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties, whether there were 
multiple claims, n~ultiple issues, counterclaims, third party claims, cross-claims, or 
other multiple or cross issues between the parties, and the extent to which each party 
prevailed upon each of such issue or claims. 
which party, if any, prevailed is within the Court's discretion. Holmes v. Holmes, 125 Idaho 
784,787, 874 P.2d 595, 598 (Ct.App. 1994) (citing Badell v. Badell, 122 Idaho 442, 450, 835 P.2d 
17 
18 
/ / See  also Jerry J Joseph C.L.U. Ins. Associates v. Vuught, 117 Idaho 555, 789 P.2d 1146 (CtApp. 
677, 685 (Ct.App.1992)). In determining whether there is a prevailing party, the Court first looks to 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 54(e)(l) incorporates Rule 54(d)(l)(B) which provides in 
30 / 1 I By stipulation, the parties extended the time for Gray to file his objection, 
26 
27 
Here, the Court granted summary judgment against Gray, dismissing all his claims and in 
favor of Tri-Way. Gray succeeded on absolutely none of his claims. In fact, while the Court did 
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iismiss three of Tri-Way's counterclaims, the Court denied Gray summary judgment against 
rri-Way on the other three counterclaims. In determining which party prevailed in an action where 
there are claims and counterclaims between opposing parties, the court determines who prevailed "in 
the action." That is, the prevailing party question is "examined and determined from an overall 
view, not a claim-by-claim analysis." Eighteen Mile Ranch, L.L.C. v Nord Excavating & Paving, 
lnc., 141 Idaho 716,719, 117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005). The Court is to view the overall success. 
While the Court did dismiss three of Tri-Way's counterclaims, these were only a very small 
part of this litigation. Tri-Way prevailed in defeating all of Gray's claims in which he requested past 
and future loss of income, merit and longevity wages: reputation damages, treble damages on his 
wage claim and restitution damages based on Tri-Way's alleged breach of contract. While the only 
issue upon which Gray prevailed was the initial Motion to Dismiss based on a lack of personal 
jurisdiction, Gray cannot claim success; on the merits, Tri-Way clearly avoided liability. As the 
Idaho Supreme Court opined: 
In litigation, avoiding liability is as good for a defendant as winning a money 
judgment is for a plaintiff. The point is, while a plaintiff with a large money 
judgment may be more exalted than a defendant who simply walks out of court no 
worse for the wear, courts must not ignore the value of a successful defense. . . 
Eighteen Mile Ranch, L.L.C., 141 Idaho at 719, 117 P.3d at 133. Gray's victory in getting the three 
cou~terclaims dismissed3 does not outweigh Tri-Way's success against him on Gray's complaint and 
had minimal effect on the overall case. 
After a full consideration of the entire litigation, including the respective claims and defenses, 
the Court is still of the view that Tri-Way and the Petersons are clearly the primary prevailing 
parties. See Freeman & Co. v. Bolt, 132 Idaho 152,968 P.2d 247 (Ct. App. 1998). Thus, the Court 
finds, in an exercise ofits discretion, that Tri-Way and the Petersons are the prevailing parties in this 
matter and are entitled to a reasonable award of attorney's fees provided a statute applies to their 
request. 
' Gray contended he was entitled to 50% of the net profits for the Arizona projects which for June 2004 to September 30, 
2004 amounted to $271,792.48 in net profits. 
> The Court acknowledges that subsequent to the Court's decision, the parties stipulated to dismiss all of Tri-Way's 
:ounterclaims but that does not change the Court's analysis. 
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11. TRI-WAY AND PETERSON ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES UNDER LC. 
$12-120(3) ONLY FOR THOSE CLAIMS BASED ON THE EMPLOYMENT 
CONTRACT -- NOT THE WAGE CLAIM. 
Tri-Way and Peterson claim fees under I.C. 5 12-121(3) claiming the gravamen of the lawsuit 
was a commercial transaction - Gray's alleged employment contract. I.C. 5 12-120(3) provides that 
the prevailing party in an action based upon "any commercial transaction" is entitled to recover 
attorney fees. The statute defines "commercial transaction" as "all transactions except transactions 
for personal or household purposes." The test for the application of this section is "whether the 
commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit, that is, whether the commercial 
transaction is integral to the claim and constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting to 
recover." Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763,776,890 P.2d 714,717 (1995). 
The term "comn~ercial transaction" is defined in I.C. §12-120(3) to mean "all transactions 
except transactions for personal or household purposes." Thus, by the plain terms of the statute, 
"[wlhere a party alleges the existence of a contractual relationship of a type embraced by section 12- 
120(3), . . . that claim triggers the application of the statute." Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Brady, 127 Idaho 
830, 835, 907 P.2d 807, 812 (1995). However, there must also be a nexus between the commercial 
transaction and the lawsuit: 
[Tlhe award of attorney's fees [under 5 12-120(3) ] is not warranted every time a 
commercial transaction is remotely connected with the case. Rather, the test is 
whether the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit. 
Attorney's fees are not appropriate under I.C. § 12-120(3) unless the commercial 
transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the party is 
attempting to recover. 
Id. quoting Brower v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., 117 Idaho 780, 784, 792 P.2d 345, 349 
(1990). "Where a party alleges the existence of a contract that would be a commercial transaction 
under Idaho Code 5 12-120(3), that claim triggers the application of the statute and the prevailing 
party may recover attorney fees even if no liability under the contract is established." Fritts v. Liddle 
& Moeller Const., Inc., 144 Idaho 171, -, 158 P.3d 947,951 (2007). 
In Brooks v. Gigray Ranches, 128 Idaho 72,910 P.2d 744 (1996), the Court outlined the two 
stages of analysis to determine whether a prevailing party could avail itself of LC. 5 12-120(3):(1) 
"there must be a commercial transaction that is integral to the claim"; and (2) "the commercial 
lransaction must be the basis upon which recovery is sought." Brooks, 128 Idaho at 78, 910 P.2d at 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
CASE NO. CVOC 0409193D 4 
750. That clearly exists here. The prevailing party in an action brought for breach of an employment 
contract is entitled to an award of fees under I.C. 3 12-120(3), on the basis that-an employment 
contract constitutes a contract for the purchase or sale of services under that statute. See Jenkins v. 
Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, -, 108 P.3d 380, 391 (2005); Clark v. State, Dept. of Health 
and Welfare, 134 Idaho 527,5 P.3d 988 (2000); Atwood v. Western Const. Inc., 129 Idaho 234,237, 
923 P.2d 479,482 (Ct.App.1996). 
Gray alleged the existence of an employment contract in his Complaint and claimed Tri-Way 
and the Petersons breached that contract. Gray does not concedes that if the Court finds Tri-Way to 
be the prevailing party, it would be entitled to reasonable attorney fees associated with defending 
Gray's employment contract claims. However, Gray argues Tri-Way is not be entitled to attorney 
fees associated with defending against the statutory claims he made pursuant to I.C. 5 45-612(2). 
The Court agrees. 
Former employers who prevail on a former employee's statutory claim for wages and treble 
damages can not recover attorney fees under I.C. 5 12-120(3) for defending against the statutory 
wage claim. Shay v. Cesler, 977 P.2d 199, 132 Idaho 585 (1999). The wage claim statute's attorney 
fees provision for prevailing employers is the exclusive code section under which former employers 
could recover attorney fees. I.C. 5 45-612(2); Id. The Idaho Supreme Court clearly ruled that I.C. 5 
12-120(3) is not an appropriate source for awarding attorney fees in wage claim disputes. See Polk v. 
Larrabee, 17 P.3d 247, 135 Idaho 303 (2000). 
Therefore, when various statutory and common law claims are separable, the court should 
bifurcate the claims and award fees pursuant to I.C. 5 12-120(3) only on the commercial transaction. 
See Willie v. Board of Trustees, 138 Idaho 13 1, 136, 59 P.3d 302, 307 (2002); Brooks v. Gigray 
Ranches Inc., 128 Idaho 72, 77-79, 910 P.2d 744, 749-51 (1996); Atwood v. Western Const., Inc., 
129 Idaho 234,241,923 P.2d 479,486 (Ct.App.1996). 
111. ATTORNEYS PEES IN THE AMOUNT OF $48,207.75 ARE REASONABLE. 
Tri-Way seeks an award of $58,818.50 in attorney fees. Gray contests the reasonableness of 
these attorney fees, and contends the Court should apportion those fees if the Court finds Tri-Way 
was the prevailing party. The Court agrees. 
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Determining whether the amount of an attorney fee award is reasonable is within the Court's 
sound discretion. Craft Wall of Idaho, Inc v Sbonebraker, 108 Idaho 704, 701 P.2d 324 (Ct.App. 
1985). Rule 54 provides the criteria courts must consider in awarding attorney's fees. Rule 54(e)(3) 
provides that the Court should consider the follow factors in determining the amount of such fees: 
(A) The time and labor required. 
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions. 
(C) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience and 
ability of the attorney in the particular field of law. 
(D) The prevailing charges for like work. 
(E) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case. 
(G) The amount involved and the results obtained. 
(H) The undesirability ofthe case. 
(I) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client. 
(J) Awards in similar cases. 
(K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer Assisted Legal 
Research), if the court finds it was reasonably necessary in preparing a party's 
case. 
(L) Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the particular case. 
In arriving at its decision, the Court applied all the required factors lo determine whether the claimed 
fees were reasonable. 
Among other things, the Court notes the fees were neither fixed nor contingent; they were 
hourly. The Court finds that the hourly fees are reasonable and reflect the prevailing rate. This case 
was hard fought. It stems from a business relationship gone sour. Furthermore, the law was complex 
and, more importantly, determining what facts were relevant and material was complicated. 
Therefore, the Court finds the issues in this case deserved more time than might normally be 
associated with a case. Moreover the circumstances of the case drove the fees. 
With respect to the actual fees, the Court carefully reviewed all the fees. With respect to any 
fees associated with the Motion to Dismiss or the statutory wage claim, the Court denies those fees. 
Tri-Way provided detailed billings that allowed the Court to reduce the fees by those fees associated 
with the unsuccessful Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and those associated with the 
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statutory claim. The Court further reduced the fees to reflect the fact the Court finds Tri-Way and the 
Petersons to have prevailed on 95% of the claims associated with defending against the employment 
contract. The Court notes that this was not hard to do, because the billings attached to Mr. Murray's 
affidavit were very detailed and the time spent on the Motion to Dismiss and wage claims were 
clearly delineated. The rest of the time and labor was reasonable. Based on the Court's review the 
Court finds that the amount of $48,207.75 is fair and reasonable. 
The Court, in an exercise of discretion and based upon the totality of the case, therefore 
awards Tri-Way $48,207.75, and finds that this is the most equitable method of apportionment. 
IV. THE COURT GRANTS TRI-WAY NON-DISCRETIONARY COSTS. 
Rule 54(d)(l)(C), I.R.C.P., governs awards of costs as a matter of right to the prevailing party. 
Tri-Way claims $2,217.40 for non-discretionary costs and Gray did not object. After reviewing the 
amounts claimed, the Court finds they fit within the rule and the Court awards Tri-Way these costs as a 
matter of right. 
V. THE COURT DENIES TRI-WAY DISCRETIONARY COSTS. 
Tri-Way also moves for an award of discretionary costs, for postage, facsimiles, photocopies 
and out of town depositions in the amount $2,828.29, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). The Court 
recognizes this issue as one of discretion. Although these costs may be reasonable and justified, the 
Court cannot find that these costs are "exceptional" costs as contemplated by the Rule. Postage, 
facsimile, deposition travel costs and photocopying costs are the commonplace and everyday 
expenses of practicing law. There is no evidence that any of these costs are exceptional. 
Therefore, in an exercise of discretion, the Court denies discretionary costs to Tri-Way. 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Tri-Way's Motion for Costs and Attorney 
Fees is hereby GRANTED and Tri-Way and the Petersons are awarded attorney's fees in the amount 
of $48,207.75 and costs as a matter of right in the amount of $2,217.40. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 21" day of December 2007, 
u c .  & 
Cheri C. Copsey u 
District ~udge  
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ROBERT GRAY, 
PlaintifflAppellant, 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, 
INC., RAY ALLRAD, KATHY PETERSON, GARY PETERSON, AND ITS ATTORNEYS OF 
RECORD: JASON MURRAY, OF THE FIRM MOFFATT THOMAS BARRETT ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHTD, 101 S. CAPITOL BLVD., lOTH FLOOR, P.O. BOX 829, BOISE, IDAHO 
83701-0829. AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
Case No. CV OC 0409193D 
VS. 
TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, 
TNC., a Washington Corporation; RAY 
ALLRAD, an individual; KATHY PETERSON, 
an individual; GARY PETERSON, an 
individual, 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
ROBERT GRAY'S 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Assigned Judge: Cheri C. Copsey 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
1. The above-named Appellant, Robert Gray ("Gray"), hereby appeals the Order 
Granting Attorneys' Fees and Costs entered by the Court on December 21, 2007, Hon. Cheri C. 
Copsey, presiding. 
2. Appellant Gray has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
Judgment and Order described in Paragraph 1 above are appealable under and pursuant to Rule 
1 l(a)(l) of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
3 .  Appellant intends to assert a number of issues on appeal relating to the award of 
attorneys' fees including, but not limited to, the following: 
a. the Trial Court erred in determining that Defendants were entitled to 
attorneys fees as the prevailing party pursuant to 3 12-120(3); 
b. the Trial Court erred in awarding attorney fees in the amount of 
$48,207.75. 
Appellant reserves the right to add additional issues on appeal and to revise or restate the 
issues set forth above. 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. Appellant requests that all documents and pleadings relating to the award of 
attorney fees be included in the clerk's record on appeal, in addition to those automatically 
included under Rule 28 I.A.R., and specifically including all briefs and affidavits submitted by 
Appellant Gray and Defendants in this matter relating to the award of attorneys' fees. 
Defendants Motion for Attorney Fees 
Defendants Memorandum of Costs and Fees 
Affidavit of Jason G. Murray in Support of Defendants' Memorandum of Costs 
and Fees 
Stipulation to Extend Deadline to Object to Motion for Attorneys Fees 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion for Fees and Costs 
Notice of Hearing on Defendants Motion for Attorney Fees 
Affidavit of Erik F. Stidham Regarding Attorneys' Fees Hearing 
Affidavit of Debra L. Jenkins Regarding Attorneys' Fees Hearing 
Order Granting Costs and Attorney Fees 
6. The undersigned hereby certifies: 
a. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
b. That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
c. That service has been made on all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20. 
11- 
DATED this day of January, 2008. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
BY - 
Erik F. Stidham. of the firm 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
Attorneys for plaintiff ~ o b e r t  Gray 
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I hereby certify that on this [Q day of January 2008, I caused to be served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Jason G. Murray, Esq. [Z1 U.S. Mail 
MOFFATT HOMAS BARRETT ROCK Hand Delivered 
&FIELDS, CHTD. [Z1 Overnight Mail 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor Telecopy (Fax) 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0829 
Fax: (208) 385-5384 
G k  
fgr HOLLAND & HART LLP 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICLAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
ROBERT GRAY, 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
Supreme Court Case No. 34666 
TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, INC., 
a Washington corporation; RAY ALLRAD, an 
individual; KATHY PETERSON, an individual; 
GARY PETERSON, an individual, 
Defendants-Respondents. 1 
I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do liereby certify: 
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the 
course of this action. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as 
CONFIDENTIAL EXHIBITS to the Record: 
1. Affidavit of Jason G. Murray in Support of Defendants' Memorandum of Costs and Fees, 
filed September 26,2007. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as EXHIBITS to 
the Record: 
1. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 
August 2,2006. 
2. Affidavit of Jason G. Murray in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
filed August 2,2006. 
3. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 
August 3,2006. 
4. Affidaivt of Robert Gray in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 
August 3,2006. 
5. Affidavit of Erik F. Stidham in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, 
filed August 3,2006. 
6. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
filed August 30,2006. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXIllBITS 
7. Affidaivt of Robert Gray in Support of Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, filed August 30,2006. 
8. Affidavit of Scott E. Randolph in Support of Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed August 30,2006. 
9. Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 
August 30,2006. 
10. Affidavit of Jason G. Murray in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, 
filed August 30,2006. 
11. Robert Gray's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 
September 13,2006. 
12. Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 
September 14,2006. 
13. Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
filed October 13,2006. 
14. Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Re 
Statute of Frauds, filed November 13,2006. 
15. Defendants' Memorandum of Costs and Fees, filed September 26,2007. 
16. Affidaivt of Erik F. Stidham Regarding Attomeys' Fees Hearing, filed 
November 29,2007. 
17. Affidavit of Debra L. Jenkins Regarding Attorneys' Fees Hearing, filed 
November 29,2007. 
LN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 24th day of January, 2008. 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
VS. 
ROBERT GRAY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Supreme Court Case No. 34666 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, INC., 
a Washington corporation; RAY ALLRAD, an 
individual; KATHY PETERSON, an individual; 
GARY PETERSON, an individual, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
ERIK F. STIDHAM 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
Date of Service: FEE3 f 2 2008 
JASON G. MURRAY 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ROBERT GRAY, 
Supreme Court Case No. 34666 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
TRI-WAY CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, INC., 
a Washington corporation; RAY ALLRAD, an 
individual; KATHY PETERSON, an individual; 
GARY PETERSON, an individual, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true 
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
15'" day of October, 2007. 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
R&?fitBL&>f $1,- F&Rfi:g ?:& 
BY ,., .;,,,:, ?$!$ <. , *;:.*,,, %;& '. 
Deputy Clerk 
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